FAILURETOCHARGE

ACriticalLookatCanada’sEVPolicy

ExecutiveSummary

Canada’sgovernmenthasestablishedpoliciesdesignedtopush

automakerstoachievethegovernment’sgoalofhaving35percent

ofallnewmedium-andheavy-dutyvehiclesalesbeelectricby2030,

risingto100percentofallnewmedium-andheavy-dutyvehicle

salesbeingelectricby2040.

RockwoodLithiumMineinSilverCity,Nevada,USA

2

KennethP.Green

by2030,alongwith60newnickelmines,and17newcobaltmines.The

materialsneededforcathodeproductionwillrequire50morenew

mines,andanodematerialsanother40.Thebatterycellswillrequire

90newmines,andEVsthemselvesanother81.Intotal,thisaddsupto

388newmines.Forcontext,asof2021,therewereonly270metalmines

operatingacrosstheUS,andonly70inCanada.IfCanadaandtheUS

wishtohaveinternalsupplychainsforthesevitalEVmetals,theyhave

alotofminestoestablishinaveryshortperiod.

Historically,however,miningandre?n-

ingfacilitiesarebothslowtodevelop

“

Miningandre?ningfacilities

arebothslowtodevelopand

arehighlyuncertainendeavors

plaguedbyregulatoryuncer-

taintyandbyenvironmental

andregulatorybarriers.”

andarehighlyuncertainendeavors

plaguedbyregulatoryuncertainty

andbyenvironmentalandregulatory

barriers.Lithiumproductiontime-

lines,forexample,areapproximately

6to9years,whileproductiontime-

lines(fromapplicationtoproduction)

fornickelareapproximately13to18

years,accordingtotheIEA.

Theestablishmentofaggressiveandshort-termEVadoptiongoals

setsupapotentialcon?ictwithmetalandmineralproduction,which

ishistoricallycharacterizedbylonglead-timesandlongproduction

timelines.Theriskthatmineralandminingproductionwillfallshortof

projecteddemandissigni?cant,andcouldgreatlyaffectthesuccessof

variousgovernments’plansforEVtransition.

POLICYBACKGROUND

Concernedabouttheprospectsofsevereman-madeclimatechange,

governmentsaroundtheworldhaveinstitutedprogramstophaseout

theuseoffossilfuel-powered,internalcombustion-driventranspor-

tationsystems—beginningprimarilywithcarsandlighttrucks—and

replacethemwithBattery-ElectricVehicles(BEV);orvehiclesmostly

poweredbyelectricitybutwhichalsofeatureinternalcombustion

backuppower,calledPlug-inHybridElectricVehicles(PHEVs).

InDecember2022,theCanadiangovernmentintroducedregulations

thatwouldleadtothephasingoutofsalesofnewfossil-fuelpowered,

internalcombustionvehicles,tobereplacedbysalesofvehiclesdesig-

natedas“ZeroEmissionVehicles,”orZEVinlegislation.Canada’sAction

1

Planwill“setannuallyincreasingrequirementstowardsachieving100

percentnewlight-dutyzero-emissionvehiclesalesby2035,including

mandatoryinterimtargetsofatleast20percentofallnewlight-duty

vehiclesofferedforsaleby2026andatleast60percentby2030”

(Canada,2022).

Further,toreduceemissionsfrommedium-andheavy-dutyvehicles:

TheGovernmentofCanadawillaimtoreach35percentoftotal

newmedium-andheavy-dutyvehiclesalesbeingzero-emis-

sionvehiclesby2030.Inaddition,theGovernmentwilldevelop

amedium-andheavy-dutyzero-emissionvehicleregulationto

require100percentofnewmedium-andheavy-dutyvehiclesales

tobezero-emissionvehiclesby2040forasubsetofvehicletypes

basedonfeasibility,withinterim2030regulatedsalesrequire-

mentsthatwouldvaryfordifferentvehiclecategoriesbasedon

feasibility,andexploreinterimtargetsforthemid-2020s.(Govern-

mentofCanada,2022)

Accordingtothecost-bene?tanalysispublishedintheCanadaGazette

describingCanada’snewZEVtransitionplan:

1

ThiscategorizationschemeincludesBEVsonly,notPHEVs.

3

4

KennethP.Green

From2026to2050,theproposedAmendmentsareestimatedto

haveincrementalZEVvehicleandhomechargercostsof$24.5bil-

lion,whilesaving$33.9billioninnetenergycosts.Theseimpacts

accruetothosewhoswitchtoZEVsinresponsetotheproposed

Amendments.ThecumulativeGHGemissionreductionsareesti-

matedtobe430megatons(Mt),valuedat$19.2billioninavoided

globaldamages.TheproposedAmendmentsarethusestimatedto

havenetbene?tsof$28.6billionandwouldhelpCanadameetits

GHGemissionsreductiontargetsof40percentbelow2005levels

by2030andnet-zeroemissionsby2050.(CanadaGazette,2022)

AsCanadaandtheUnitedStatesshareanintegratedautomobilemar-

ket,itisalsoworthnotingthattheUShasplansforatransitionto

electricvehicles,thoughthestrategiesof

thetwocountriesdifferconsiderably.US

andCanadianplansforvehicleelectri?ca-

tionaredifferentinformsandfunctions,

timelines,andtargets.The?rstdistinction

isthattheUSincludesplug-inhybridelec-

tricvehiclesintoits“ZEV”category,along

withfuelcellelectricvehicles,whichare

currentlynichevehiclessoldprimarilyin

California,ratherthanmainstreampro-

ductionvehicles(Voelcker,2022).

IntheUnitedStates,theBidenAdministrationpublishedExecutive

Order14037in2021whichcontainedthestatedgoal“that50percent

ofallnewpassengercarsandlighttruckssoldin2030bezero-emission

vehicles,includingbatteryelectric,plug-inhybridelectric,orfuelcell

electricvehicles”(UnitedStatesFederalRegister,2021).Theinclusion

ofplug-inhybridvehicles(generallynotconsideredtobezero-emis-

sionvehicles)isasigni?cantdistinctionbetweentheUSandCanadian

electricvehicleplans.

PresidentBidenalsoissuedanotherexecutiveorderin2021thatwould

requirethefederalgovernmenttostopacquiringgasoline-powered

carsinitsownvehicle?eets.ExecutiveOrder14057requires“100

CanMetalMiningMatchtheSpeedofthePlannedElectricVehicleTransition?

5

percentzero-emissionvehicleacquisitionsby2035,including100

percentzero-emissionlight-dutyvehicleacquisitionsby2027”(United

StatesFederalRegister,2021b).

Internationally,vehicleelectri?cationgoalsaredifferentstill.TheInter-

nationalEnergyAgency(IEA)initsGlobalEVOutlook2021characterizes

thecollectiveEVtargetof“allexistingpolicies,policyambitionsand

targetsthathavebeenlegislatedfororannouncedbygovernments

aroundtheworld.ItincludescurrentEV-relatedpoliciesandregula-

tions,aswellastheexpectedeffectsofannounceddeploymentsand

plansfromindustrystakeholders.STEPS[the“StatedPolicyScenario”

oftheIEA]aimstoholdupamirrortotheplansofpolicymakersand

illustratetheirconsequences”(IEA2021a:73).

Inthisscenario,theIEA?ndsthat“thecollectivetargetoftheEV30@30

signatories[acoalitionofcitygovernmentsandEVindustrygroups]to

achieve30percentsalessharein2030forlight-dutyvehicles,buses

andtrucksissurpassedatthegloballevel(reachingalmost35%),which

re?ectsincreasingambitionsforwidespreadEVdeployment”(IEA

2021a:73).

Itisself-evidentthatincreasingproductionofelectricvehicleswill

requireacorrespondingincreaseintheconstituentmaterialsfrom

whichtheyaremanufactured.Inthecaseofelectricvehiclespowered

bylargebatteries,onemustassumethatincreasingtheproductionof

electricvehicleswillrequireamassiveincreaseintheproductionof

metalsusedinbatteryandEVmanufacturing,suchaslithium,nickel,

cobalt,copper,manganese,graphite,andotherelementssometimes

designatedasrareearthelements(REEs),orenergycriticalelements.

Canadahasbeguntorampupitsproductionre?ningcapacityforlith-

iumandotherrareearthelementsrequiredfortheelectricvehicletran-

sition.Forexample,theCanadiangovernmentrecentlyshowcasedlith-

iumproductioninCanada.InJamesBay,Quebec,thegovernmenthas

approvedtheJamesBayLithiumMineProject,aproposaltomine5,800

tonnesoflithium-bearingoreperdayintheEastmanCreecommunity

(D’Andrea,2023).InSaskatchewan,thegovernmenthasapprovedaplan

6

KennethP.Green

toproduceandre?nelithiumataplantinthesouthernpartofthe

province.Accordingtothegovernment,“Stageoneoftheprojectwill

produce[fromSaskatchewanoil?eldbrines]1to1.75kilograms(kg)of

lithiumhydroxideperday.Stagetwowillincludetheconstructionof

oneofCanada’s?rstlithiumextractionandre?ningfacilities,which

willproduceapproximatelyonetonneoflithiumhydroxideperday,

resultingin365tonnesperyear.Thiswillserveasademonstrationplant

priortofullcommercialization”(Saskatchewan,2020).

RareearthelementsproductionisalsounderwayintheNWTwiththe

processingandre?ningoftworareearthelementscriticaltothepro-

ductionofpowerfulmagnetsusedinelectricvehiclemotorstotake

placeinSaskatchewan(FrewandPonticelli,2023).TheNechalacho

mine“hostsaworld-classresource”ofrareearthores,relativelyrich

inneodymiumandpraseodymium,metalsusedintheproduction

ofhigh-strengthmagnetsusedinelectricmotorsandbatteryalloys

(VitalMetals,2020).Mostrecently(asoftimeofwriting),theCanadian

governmentannouncedthatitwillpayCAN$13billioninsubsidiesto

VolkswagentoestablishabatterymanufacturingfacilityinOntario

(Scherer,2023).ThispledgewasmatchedwithaCAN$15billionsub-

sidytoStellantisforasecondbatterymanufacturingfacilityinOntario

(Shakil,2023).

TheInternationalEnergyAgencywouldliketoseeCanadamovestill

morequicklyinitsdevelopmentofrareearthminingandre?ning

capacity.AtaCanadiangovernment-organizedpaneldiscussioninFeb-

ruary2023,FatihBirol,theheadoftheIEA,“warnedthattheenergy

shortagescurrentlygrippingEuropecouldberepeatedastheworld

transitionstocleanerfuels,ifWesterncountriesdonotincreasethe

availabilityofrareearthmineralsanddevelopfriendliersourcesof

them.”Further,accordingtoanarticleintheGlobeandMailcovering

theevent,Mr.BirolsaidhewouldliketoseecountrieslikeCanadamore

involvedontheinternationalstagebecause“thereisruleoflaw,there

istransparency,andthereisalsoaccountabilityofthegovernment…

Thesoonerthathappens,thebetter,hesaid”(WalshandGraney,2023).

WHATDOGLOBALVEHICLEELECTRIFICATIONGOALS

LOOKLIKE,NUMERICALLY?

Figure1,fromTheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransition,

showsexpectedEVmarketpenetrationto2030underIEA’sSustainable

DevelopmentScenario,orSDS.TheSDSre?ectswhattheIEAbelieves

wouldberequiredtosatisfyinternationalagreementsundertheParis

ClimateAccords(IEA,2021b).

2

Asisreadilyapparentfromthegraph,bothelectricvehiclesalesand

batterystoragecapacitygrowthareexpectedtobeseveralordersof

magnitudegreaterthanproductionin2020.Electriccarsales(inthe

leftpanel),areexpectedtorisefromapproximately3millionin2020,

Figure1:TheAdoptionofEVsandBatteryStorageisSettoAccelerate

RapidlyovertheComingDecades

AnnualelectriccarsalesandbatterystoragecapacityintheSDS

Batterystoragecapacityadditions

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

120

100

80

Japan

EuropeanUnion

UnitedStates

India

40

China

20

STEPS(World)

2020

2030

2040

2020

2030

2040

IEA.Allrightsreserved.

Note:Electriccarsincludebatteryelectricandplug-inhybridelectricpassengerlight-dutyvehicles,butexclude2/3-wheelers.

Source:IEA(2020c).

Source:IEA,2021b:84.

2

TheInternationalEnergyAgencypublishesagreatdealofdataregardingelectricvehicle

production,composition,manufacturing,andproductionofrawmaterials.AstheIEAis

consideredanauthoritative,quasi-independentsourceofinformationontheseissues,

wewillrelyheavilyontheirlatestpublicationsinthisstudy.

Atthesametime,theauthormakesnoclaimsregardingtheplausibilityofIEA’smathe-

maticalmodelingusedtogeneratesomeoftheseestimates.However,asitisassumed

thatIEA’sdatawillsigni?cantlyinfusegovernmentpolicydevelopment,thesemodeled

estimatesareworthyofattention.Aswithmostmathematicalmodelingexercises,which

frequentlyrely(ofnecessity)onanarrayofsubjectiveassumptions,theauthoradvises

cautioninassumingthesemodelsarereliablere?ectionsofreality.

7

8

KennethP.Green

Figure2:EVandBatteryStorageDeploymentGrowththrough2040

EVandbatterystoragedeploymentgrowsrapidlyoverthenexttwodecades,

withlight-dutyEVsaccountingforaround80%ofthetotal

Globalbatterycapacityadditions

Heavy-dutyPHEV

Heavy-dutyBEV

Light-dutyPHEV

Light-dutyBEV

????

????

????

????

????

STEPS

SDS

IEAAllrightsreserved

Source:IEA,2021b:87.

Note:STEPS=StatedPolicyScenariosofworldgovernmentspursuanttoParisclimateaccord.

SDS=SustainableDevelopmentScenariosoftheInternationalEnergyAgency.

to40millioninonly10years:amorethan10-foldincrease,andtothen

nearlydoubleinthedecadebetween2030and2040.

ReadersshouldnotethatthisIEAmodelincludes“plug-inhybrid”elec-

tricvehicleswhich,aspreviouslymentioned,arenottreateduniformly

invariousnationalandinternationalplansregardingvehicleelectri?-

cationtargetsandtimelinesdiscussedabove.

Correspondingly,IEAestimatesthatbatteryproductionwillalso

increasesigni?cantlyincomingyearsasisdisplayedin?gure2.

Aswith?gure1,onewillnotethatthe“ramp”ofincreasedbattery

powerproductionisverysteep.AstheIEAstates,“IntheSDS[Sustain-

ableDevelopmentScenarios],globalinstallationofutility-scalebat-

terystorageissetfora25-foldincreasebetween2020and2040,with

annualdeploymentreaching105GWby2040.Thelargestmarketsfor

batterydeploymentin2040areIndia,theUnitedStatesandChina”

(IEA,2021b:86).

Theincreasedproductionofbatterieswillinevitablyleadtoincreased

demandforthemetalsusedintheirfabrication.Hence,theIEAalso

projectssignificantgrowthindemandforEVbatterymetalsand

minerals.

HOWWILLGLOBALVEHICLEELECTRIFICATION

INFLUENCEMINERALANDMETALPRODUCTION

REQUIREMENTS?

AccordingtotheInternationalEnergyAgency,electricvehiclesuse

aboutsixtimesmoreraremetalsthandointernalcombustionvehi-

cles.Figure3breaksthisoutgraphicallybythevariousmetalsrequired

forEVproduction.Thedatain?gure3showthekeymetalsusedin

thevehicleelectri?cationequation.Copper,lithium,nickel,cobalt,and

graphitestandoutsharplyascomponentsofelectricvehiclesthatwill

beneededinquantitiesfarhigherthanisthecaseforconventional

internalcombustionvehicles.

Figure4putsthisinformationintocontextwithrespecttoIEA’spro-

jectedgrowthinmineraldemandforEVsthrough2040.Readerswill

notethatthechartofexpecteddemandessentiallyshowsexponential

growth.Lookingattheright-handpanelofthechart,onenotesthattwo

metals—lithiumandnickel(criticalbatteryelements)areexpectedto

Source:IEA2021d.

9

10KennethP.Green

Figure4:ProjectedGrowthinMineralDemandforEVs,2020through2040.

MineraldemandforEVSintheSDSgrowsbynearly30timesbetween2020and2040,

withdemandforlithiumandnickelgrowingbyaround40times

??

??

??

??

??

??

??

??

?

STEPS

Nickel

Cobalt

Manganese

Copper

Graphite

Silicon

REEs

IEA?Allrightsreserved?

NoteSiliconisexcludedfromthedemandgrowthgraphduetoitsveryhighgrowthover-foldincreasestartingfromalowbase?

Source:IEA,2021b:98.

Note:STEPS=StatedPolicyScenariosofworldgovernmentspursuanttoParisclimateaccord.

SDS=SustainableDevelopmentScenariosoftheInternationalEnergyAgency.

Figure5:DistributionoftheProductionofSelectedMineralsbyGovernance

andEmissionsPerformance,2019

Distributionofproductionofselectedmaterialsbygovernanceandemissionsperformance,2019

100%

Lowgovernancescoreand

highemissionsintensity

80%

Lowgovernancescoreand

lowemissionsintensity

60%

Highgovernancescoreand

highemissionsintensity

40%

20%

Highgovernancescoreand

lowemissionsintensity

Copper

Lithium

Nickel

Cobalt

IEA.Allrightsreserved.

Source:IEA,2021b:126.

CanMetalMiningMatchtheSpeedofthePlannedElectricVehicleTransition?11

seethegreatestgrowthindemand,followedbycopper(akeycompo-

nentofelectronicsystems),andgraphite,alsoacriticalcomponentin

theproductionofbatteries.Addeddemandforsteel-makingmetals

(manganeseandcobalt),whilelarge,islowerthanthatrelatedtoEV

batteryproduction.

Figure5showswheretheInternationalEnergyAgencyexpectsthemet-

alsandmineralsneededfortheelectricvehicletransitiontocomefrom,

andcharacterizesthequalityofgovernanceintheminingregionsthat

currentlyproduceneededEVmetals.

Figure6suggests,further,thattheIEAdoesnotexpecttheproduction

localesofthesecriticalmetalstochangeverymuchinthenearfuture.

HowwillallofthisplayoutwithregardtotheminingofEVbattery

metalsandminerals?InitsGlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022,theIEA

againoffersestimates.AsFigure7shows,bothofIEA’sfuturescenarios

requireamassiveincreaseinthenumberofminesneededtoprovide

materialsforeveryaspectoftheEVtransition.Fiftynewlithiummines

areneededby2030,inthe“AnnouncedPledgesscenario”(avariation

Figure6:ExpectedChangeinDistributionofCountriesProducing

EVMinerals,2019to2025

Geographicconcentration:Analysisofprojectpipelinesindicatesthat,inmostcases,the

geographicalconcentrationofproductionisunlikelytochangeinthenearterm

???

???

???

??

2015

2025

2025

2015

2025

2015

2025

2025

Copper

Nickel

Cobalt

Source:IEA,2021b:121.

12KennethP.Green

ontheSTEPSscenariobasedonestablishedgovernmentpledges)along

with60morenickelmines,and17morecobaltmines.Thematerials

neededforcathodeproductionwillrequire50moremines,andanode

materialsanother40.Thebatterycellswillrequire90moremines,and

EVsthemselvesanother81(IEA,2022:175).Intotal,thisis388new

mines.Forcontext,asof2021,therewereonly270metalminesoper-

atingacrosstheUS,andonly70inCanada.

Figure7:NumberofMinesRequiredtoProduceNeededMineralsfortheGrowthofElectricVehicles

Numberofminestoproducerequiredlevelsofmetals,anode/cathodeproductionplants,battery

gigafactoriesandEVplantsrequiredtomeetprojecteddemandin2030relativeto2021

Lithium

Nickel

Cobalt

Cathode

Anode

Batterycells

EVs

Batteries

EVs

Source:IEA,2022:175.

Note::STEPS=StatedPolicyScenariosofworldgovernmentspursuanttoParisclimateaccord.

SDS=SustainableDevelopmentScenariosoftheInternationalEnergyAgency.

APS=AnnouncedPledgesScenario(AssumedcomparabletoSDSabove).

Ina2022articletitled“TheRaw-MaterialsChallenge:HowtheMetals

andMiningSectorWillBeAttheCoreofEnablingtheEnergyTransi-

tion,”theMcKinseycompanyshowshowitenvisionsthesupplyofraw

materialsformetalswouldhavetoexpandfromcurrentlevelstomeet

theEVsalesgrowthtargetsunderascenariooflimitingclimatechange

to1.5°C(whichisessentiallytheParisAccordupperlimitforcontaining

climatechange).

As?gure8shows,whileallmetalsproductionisprojectedtoincrease,

lithiumproductionisexpectedtoincreaseover700percent,with

CanMetalMiningMatchtheSpeedofthePlannedElectricVehicleTransition?13

demandrunningsohighthatsubstituteelementscouldberequired

tomeetdemand.

Figure8:RawMaterialSupplyGrowthNeededtoSatisfyPredictedElectricVehicle

SalesGrowth

Supplychange,2010–20vsrequiredgrowthin2020–30ina1.5Cdegreepathway1,percent

???-??

????-??

?

??

??

???

???

???

???

???

???

???

???

Copper

Lithium

Mayrequire

signi?cant

substitution

Neodymium

Nickel

Source:McKinsey,2022.

ISMININGFOREVMETALSANDMINERALSLIKELYTO

KEEPUPWITHPROJECTIONSLIKETHOSEOFTHEIEA

ANDMCKINSEY?

AcriticalassumptionembeddedintheideaofanEVtransitionisthatthe

worldwillbeabletoproducethematerials—particularlythemetals—

neededtobuildelectricvehicles,ingovernment’schosenquantities,

ongovernment’schosentimelines.Thosematerialsincludenumerous

metals,includingcopper,lithium,nickel,manganese,cobalt,graphite,

andasmatteringofothermetalsandmineralsgenerallylumpedinto

thecategoryofrareearthelements.Skepticalvoicesare,well,skeptical.

InaninterviewwithYahoo!Finance,KeithPhillips,CEOofPiedmont

Lithium(PLL),toldreporterAkikoFujitathat“There’sgoingtobeareal

crunchtogetthematerial.Wedon’thaveenoughintheworldtoturn

thatmuch[lithium]productionintheworldby2035.”Phillipscontinued

toexplainthat,“…aslowpermittingprocesshasstalledapprovalsfor

newproductionsites.Meanwhile,Chinahascontinuedtodominate

theindustry,re?ningmorethanhalfofalllithiumsupplywhileAus-

traliaandChileremainthelargestproducersintheworld.Projectsget

permitted[inAustralia]inunderayear…Here,it’stwo,four,six,seven,

eightyears,whichisaproblem,especiallyinabusinessthat’sbooming

sofast”(Fujita,2022).

OthersbelievethefearsofaLithiumcrunchareoverblown.Inanarticle

byDavidKramerinPhysicsToday,Benchmark(amineral-marketanal-

ysis?rm)productdirectorAndrewMillerobservesthatwhileforecast

shortagestakeintoaccountwhat’shappeningnow,andknowntobe

indevelopment,“lithiumisnotscarce,sothequestionishowquickly

resourcescanbedevelopedoracceleratedtomeettheserequirements.”

Inthesamearticle,RoderickEggert,aneconomicsprofessorattheCol-

oradoSchoolofMines,isquotedasobserving,“Thereisasigni?cant

amountofunusedminingcapacity,principallyinAustralia,thatshould

allowgrowthindemandoverthenextfewyearstobemetwithouta

14

CanMetalMiningMatchtheSpeedofthePlannedElectricVehicleTransition?15

dramaticincreaseinprice.”Eggertfurtherobservesthat“Therearea

lotofundevelopedresourcesfrombothAustraliaandSouthAmerica,

andtheywillcompeteagainstoneanother”(Kramer,2021).

Forallthatminingisamassiveglobalendeavour,harddataonthe

timelinesofminingplanning,permitting,construction,andproduc-

tionarescarceinpubliclyaccessibleliterature.TheFraserInstitutehas

attemptedtomeasuretimelineuncertainty,anditsgrowth,inpubli-

cationssince2015.Inthe?rsteffort,theauthor(withcolleagueTaylor

Jackson),lookedatthetimelinesofpermitacquisitioninCanada.What

wefound,eventhen,isgroundsforskepticismabouttherapidexpan-

sionofminingactivitiesinCanada,orincountrieswithcomparable

regulatoryregimes(GreenandJackson,2015).

As?gure9shows,evenin2014(whenthedatawasgathered)mining

permittimesinCanadawereperceivedbyminingcompanyexecutives

(globally)tohavebeenlengtheningfor10years.

Miningpermittinganddevelopmenttimelinesdonotlookmuchbetter

intheUnitedStates.InanarticleinMiningMagazinefrom2020,Kevin

ShawandDanWhitmoregiveanexampleofoneUS-basedmining

endeavourthattookratherlongerthanexpected:“Thepropertyfor

theKensingtongoldminewaspurchasedin1987.Theinitialpermits

Figure9:ChangesintheTime-to-PermitApproval,2004to2014.

LengthenedConsiderably

LengthenedSomewhat

StayedtheSame

Source:JacksonandGreen,2015:5.

16KennethP.Green

fortheminewererequestedin1990,andproductionwasanticipated

tocommencein1993;however,aseriesofpermittingissuesresulted

inthemineonlybeginningcommercialproductionin2010(adelay

of17years).Litigationconcerningakeypermitthathadbeenissued

wentallthewaytotheU.S.SupremeCourtbeforebeingupheld.Atthe

outset,theKensingtongoldminewasestimatedtocostUS$195mil-

liontobuild.The?nalcostforconstructionwasUS$290million.Atthe

beginningoftheproject,productioncostswereestimatedtobeUS$225

perounceofgold.Attheend,productioncostshadincreasedby34

percentperounceandthecompanyreduceditsanticipatedproduction

ofgoldbyalmostathird”(ShawandWhitmore,2020).

ShawandWhitmoredescribedanotherUSminingproject,theRose-

montCopperproject,thatwassubmittedtotheUSForestservicefor

approvalin2007,butlitigationandoppositionbyindigenousgroups

delayedtheprojectforover13years(ShawandWhitmore,2020).

A2016reportbytheUnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOf?ce

(GAO)issomewhatdated,butitskey?ndingsarestillrevealing:

From?scalyears2010through2014,BLM[BureauofLandManage-

ment]approved66mineplans,andtheForestServiceapproved2

mineplansforhardrockminesthatvariedbymineraltype,mine

size,andlocation.Thelengthoftimeittookfortheagenciesto

reachthethirdstepofthe?ve-stepmineplanreviewprocess—the

stepinwhichthemineplanisapproved—rangedfromabout1

monthtoover11yearsandaveragedapproximately2years.(GAO,

2016)

In?gure10,theInternationalEnergyAdministrationalsooffersdata

regardingthetimelinesfordevelopmentoflithiumandnickelmines,

bothgloballyandinselectjurisdictions.Asareminder,lithium,the

componentmostcrucialforelectricvehiclebatteries,islikelytobethe

rate-controllingmetalneededfortheEVtransitiontounfoldaccording

tothevariousambitiousgovernmentaltimelines.

TheIEAalsodiscussestheimportanceofinvestmentleadtimesinthe

productionofvariouselementsandstagesofEVbatteryproduction.

CanMetalMiningMatchtheSpeedofthePlannedElectricVehicleTransition?17

Figure10:MiningProjectDevelopmentLeadTimes(inYears)

Projectdevelopmentleadtimes:Markettightnesscanappearmuchmorequicklythannewprojects

Lithium(Australia)

Lithium(SouthAmerica)

Nickel(Sul?de)

Nickel(Laterite)

Copper

Source:IEA,2021b:122.

Figure11showswhatIEAconsiders“typical”leadtimestoinitialpro-

duction(i.e.,mining)oflithium,nickel,andbatterycathodeingredients

(suchascobaltandmagnesium),productionofthebatteriesthem-

selves,andproductionofelectricvehicles.Ascanbeseen,thelead

times—thetimebeforeproductionbegins—arerelativelyshortfor

theactualmanufacturingandbuildingofproducts(EVsandbatteries),

butsigni?cantlylongerforthemetalsandmineralsthatgointothem.

WhiletheleadtimeformanufacturedaspectsofEVproduction,such

asEVproductionitself,isonlyestimatedataboutthreeyearsinthis

?gure,andbatteryproductionatabout?veyears,lithiumandnickel

leadtimesareupwardsof15years.

Finally,historictrendsinmining,atleastint