1 中文 4890 字 本科畢業論文（設計） 外 文 翻 譯 外文題目 The Core Competence of the Corporation 外文出處 Harvard Business Review May-June 1990 外文 作者 普拉哈拉德 原文： The Core Competence of the Corporation The most powerful way to prevail in global competition is still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, theyll be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible indeed, theyll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself. Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telecommunications. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTEs Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in related display technologies. In 1980, GTEs sales were $9.98 billion, and net cash flow was $1.73 billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $3.8 billion in sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer businesses, but it had no experience as an operating telecommunications company. Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTEs 1988 sales were $16.46 billion, and NECs sales were considerably higher at $21.89 billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTEs other businesses are small in global terms. GTE has divested 2 Sylvania TV and Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of GTE has eroded. Non U.S. revenue as a percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to 15% between 1980 and 1988. NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telecommunications products and computers. It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved beyond public switching and transmission to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop computers bridging the gap between telecommunications and office automation. NEC is the only company in the world to be in the top five in revenue in telecommunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two companies, starting with comparable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC conceived of itself in terms of core competencies, and GTE did not. Rethinking the Corporation Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product markets and admonish them to become world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need but have not yet even imagined) This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western companies must assume responsibility for competitive decline. Everyone knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies actually get from political or macroeconomic relief. Both the theory and practice of Western management have 3 created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in need of reform. NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and communications, what it called C&C Success, top management reckoned, would hinge on acquiring competencies, particularly in semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate strategic architecture, summarized by C&C, and then communicated its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid 1970s. NEC constituted a C&C Committee of top managers to oversee the development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its strategic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies. NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of technological and market evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing, components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communications, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for any company that had built the competencies needed to serve all three markets. NEC top management determined that semiconductors would be the companys most important core product. It entered into myriad strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented 4 toward technology access. As they entered collaborative arrangements, NECs operating managers understood the rationale for these alliances and the goal of internalizing partner skills. NECs director of research summed up its competence acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s this way: From an investment standpoint, it was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasnt a need for us to develop new ideas.” No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE. Although senior executives discussed the implications of the evolving information technology industry, no commonly accepted view of which competencies would be required to compete in that industry were communicated widely. While significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior line managers continued to act as if they were managing independent business units. Decentralization made it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, individual businesses became increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills, and collaboration became a route to staged exits. Today, with a new management team in place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply its competencies to emerging markets in telecommunications services. The Roots of Competitive Advantage The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over;whelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casios latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets? In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. 5 Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In the short run, a companys competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in managements ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities. Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess. The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”) 6 Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sonys capacity to miniaturize or Philipss optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches. If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sonys competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions. Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways. Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be 7 guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets. Consider 3Ms competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as Post it notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies. In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to this challenge. Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies. Source:Harved Business Review May-June 1990 8 譯文 ： 公司的核心競爭力 很多公司仍在苦苦尋找在全球競爭中克敵制勝的最有效方式。 20 世紀 80 年代，人們評價某個高管有沒有才能，主要看這個人能否重組公司、撥亂反正和精簡層級。然而，進入 20 世紀 90 年代后，人們評價高管時，將看他們有沒有能力識別、培育和利用公司的核心競爭力 (corecompetence，也稱核心能力 )，為公司的成長找到新的途徑?？磥恚吖軅冊撝匦滤伎家幌鹿具@個概念本身了。 讓我們首先以美國的 GTE*和日 本的 NEC*兩家公司為例，探討十年來它們各自的發展軌跡。 20 世紀 80 年代初期，信息技術已初顯欣欣向榮的景象， GTE 憑借自己的地位，極有希望成為該行業的主力軍。這家公司在電信業非常活躍，其業務橫跨多個領域，包括電話、交換與傳輸系統、數字化專用自動小交換機 （ PAXB）半導體、分組交換、衛星、國防系統以及照明產品等等。此外， GTE 旗下的娛樂產品集團 (EntertainmentProductsGroup)，也就是喜萬年 (Sylvania)彩電的制造者，在相關的顯示器技術領域也占有一席之地。 1980 年， GTE 的銷售 額為 99 8億美元，凈現金流 17 3 億美元。與之相比， NEC 當時還只是一個小字輩，銷售收入僅為 38 億美元。盡管擁有與 GTE 不相上下的技術基礎和計算機業務，但 NEC在電信領域尚無任何經驗。 然而，到了 1988 年， NEC 卻后來者居上，銷售額達到 218 9 億美元，遠遠高于 GTE 公司的 164 6 億美元。這時， GTE 實際上已經淪為一家以經營電話業務為主的公司，盡管它在國防和照明產品方面仍占有一席之地。這家公司的其他業務從全球的角度看已經變得很小。在過去的幾年中， GTE 公司已經把喜萬年電視機和 Telenet 業務剝離了出 去，把交換機、傳輸設備和數字 PABX 等產品轉交給合資公司生產，而半導體業務則已關張大吉。在這個過程中， GTE 公司的國際地位一路下滑。 1980 到 1988 年間 GTE 在美國以外地區的銷售收入從過去占總收入的 20降到了 15。 相比之下， NEC 卻一躍成為世界半導體工業的領導者，并且在電信產品和計算機領域也躋身一流企業。它鞏固了自己在大型計算機方面的領先地位，還跨出9 了公用交換和傳輸領域，把觸角伸到了手機、傳真機和手提電腦等所謂的生活時尚產品 (1ifestyleproducts)領域，在電信和辦公自動化之間架起了橋梁 。 NEC成為惟一一家在電信、半導體、大型計算機三個領域的全球銷售收入均名列前五位的公司。為什么這兩家在起步時業務組合基本相近的公司，在幾年后的表現卻如此懸殊 ?主要是因為 NEC 能夠從 “ 核心競爭力 ” 的角度考慮企業問題，而 GTEZ卻沒有。 對公司的重新思考 經營多元化公司曾經是一項很簡單的工作，總部只需指示其業務單位把注意力放到某個特定的最終產品市場，并督促它們成為該領域的世界領先者即可。然而，隨著市場邊界的變化越來越快，目標開始變得飄忽不定，對目標市場的占領頂多只是暫時性的。但也有幾家公司屬于長袖善舞的一類 ，它們善于創造新市場，能夠快速打入新興市場并且在業已成熟的市場中大力改變客戶的選擇模式。這些公司自然成為大家效仿和學習的對象。對于公司的管理層來說，關鍵任務就是使自己的組織能夠在產品中加入令人無法抗拒的功能，或者更高明一些，創造出消費者需要但是還未曾想到過的產品。 這項任務的艱巨性超乎我們的想像。最終，只有從根本上改變大型公司的管理才能完成這項任務。首先，西方企業的高層領導需要為競爭力的下降承擔責任。人們或許會把競爭力下降歸咎于高利率、日本的保護主義、過時的反托位斯法、愛鬧事的工會以及缺乏耐性的投資者。但是 ，另一方面，人們卻較難意識到或者羞于承認這樣一個事實：政治上或者宏觀經濟上的“救濟”并不會給公司提供多少動力。其實是西方管理的理論和實踐在拖我們的后腿，真正需要改革的是我們在管理中遵循的原則。 像許多其他的對比案例一樣， NEC 與 GTE 之間的比較可以給我們很多啟迪。我們旨在通過這些對比分析來了解爭奪全球領先地位所依靠的基礎發生了什么變化。早在 20 世紀 70 年代初期， NEC 公司的管理層就清楚地闡明了把計算機與通信技術相融合的戰略意圖 (strategicintent)，即所謂的 “ C&C” （ computer& Communication，計算機與通信 )。 NEC 公司的領導認為，這一戰略成功與否關鍵在于能否獲得必要的核心競爭力，尤其是在半導體領域的核心競爭力。該公司的管理層采納了一個合適的戰略架構 (strategicarchitecture)，將其簡稱 C&C，10 然后在 70 年代中期將其意圖傳達給了整個組織以及外界人士。 NEC 公司成立了一個由高層經理組成的 “ 計算機與通信委員會 ” ，以指導核心產品與核心競爭力的開發。此外， NEC 還打破了各項業務的利益界限，建立了一些協調小組和協調委員會。按照其戰略架構， NEC 把大量的資源調配到元 件和中央處理器項目上，以加強公司在該領域的地位。它通過相互協作方式使得公司的內部資源成倍增長，借此積累起了多方面的核心競爭力。 NEC 仔細地辨明了三種相互關聯的技術和市場發展潮流。管理層認為，計算技術將從大型主機架構向分布式處理轉變，元件將從簡單的集成電路 (1C)發展為“ 超大規模集成電路 ”(VLSl) ，通信方面則從機械式縱橫交換機演化為復雜的數字傳輸系統，即我們所說的 ISDN(綜合業務數字網 )。隨著形勢進一步發展， NEC認為，計算、通信和元件業務將逐漸重疊和交織在一起，以至于最后很難將它們區分開來。如果一家 公司具備了服務于這三個市場的核心競爭力，那么到那時，必然會獲得巨大的商機。 NEC 的高層領導決定把半導體列為公司最重要的 “ 核心產 （ coreproduct）。它隨后與很多公司結成了戰略聯盟，到 1987 年聯盟數量已達到 100 多個，其目的就是為了以低成本快速構建企業的核心競爭力。在大型主機領域， NEC 最著名的合作伙伴是美國的霍尼韋爾公司 (Honeywell)與法國 Bull 公司。在半導體元件領域，幾乎所有的合作項目都是以獲取技術為目的。在結盟時， NEC 的運營經理對合作動機和目的非常明確：吸收和消化合作伙伴的技能。 NEC 的研發總監曾這樣總結 20 世紀 70 年代和 80 年代獲取技能的經歷： “ 從投資角度分析，這種方式使我們能夠以更低的成本迅速掌握國外技術。我們沒有必要自己開發新的創意。 ” 而 GTE 似乎并沒有如此明確的戰略意圖和戰略架構。盡管高層決策者也曾討論過信息技術的發展將帶來怎樣的影響，但對于在信息技術行業競爭將需要什么樣的能力 (competencies)，并沒有形成一致的觀點，更談不上將其在公司中廣泛傳播了。雖然公司做了大量工作來確認關鍵技術，但高層業務經理依