(圓滿版)lesson1研究生英語(yǔ)閱讀教程(提升級(jí)第三版)原文及翻譯(圓滿版)lesson1研究生英語(yǔ)閱讀教程(提升級(jí)第三版)原文及翻譯(圓滿版)lesson1研究生英語(yǔ)閱讀教程(提升級(jí)第三版)原文及翻譯[1]Spillonomics:UnderestimatingRisk漏油經(jīng)濟(jì)：低估風(fēng)險(xiǎn)DavidLeonhardtPublished:June1,2021Inretrospect,thepatternseemsclear.YearsbeforetheDeepwaterHorizon[h??ra?zn]rig[r?ɡ]blew,BPwasdevelopingareputationasanoilcompanythattooksafetyriskstosavemoney.AnexplosionataTexas[?t?ks?s]refinery[r??fa?n?ri]killed15workersin2005,andfederalregulatorsandapanelledbyJamesA.BakerIII,theformersecretaryofstate,saidthatcostcuttingwaspartlytoblame.Thenextyear,acorroded[k??r??d]pipelineinAlaskapouredoilintoPrudhoeBay,upbraided[?p?bre?d]BPmanagersfortheir“seemingindifferencetosafetyandenvironmentalissues['??ju:z].

〞[1]回憶起來(lái)，模式憂如很清楚。早在“深水地平線〞鉆機(jī)自爆前的很多年，

BP石油公司為了省錢甘冒安全的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就已經(jīng)臭名昭著。

2005年得克薩斯州煉油廠爆炸中有

15名工人喪生。聯(lián)邦看守機(jī)構(gòu)和前國(guó)務(wù)卿詹姆斯·

貝克三世領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的專門小組以為，

減少本錢是事故的局部原由。第二年，阿拉斯加腐化的管道將石油漏入普拉德霍灣。就連喬·巴頓，對(duì)全世界變暖持思疑態(tài)度的來(lái)自得克薩斯州的共和黨眾議員，

都訓(xùn)誡

BP管理人員“對(duì)安全和環(huán)境問(wèn)題表現(xiàn)得充耳不聞〞Muchofthisindifferencestemmedfromanobsessionwithprofits,comewhatmay.Buttherealsoappearstohavebeenanotherfactor,onemoreuniversallyhuman,atwork.ThepeoplerunningBPdidadreadful[?dr?df?l]jobofestimatingthetruechancesofeventsthatseemedunlikely—butthatwouldbringenormouscosts.這類冷淡全局部源于對(duì)利潤(rùn)的過(guò)分追求，不論出現(xiàn)什么狀況。但憂如也還有另一個(gè)要素在起作用，一個(gè)更廣泛的人性的要素。BP的管理人員在預(yù)計(jì)憂如不太可能發(fā)生但一旦發(fā)生就會(huì)帶來(lái)巨大損失的事件真實(shí)會(huì)發(fā)生的可能性時(shí)，犯了一個(gè)可怕的錯(cuò)誤。[3]PerhapstheeasiestwaytoseethisistoconsiderwhatBPexecutives[?g?zekj?t?v]mustbethinkingtoday.Surely,giventheexpenseoftheclean-upandthehittoBP’sreputation,theexecutiveswishtheycouldgobackandspendtheextramoneytomakeDeepwaterHorizonsafer.Thattheydidnotsuggeststhattheyfiguredtherigwouldbefineasitwas.[3]或許理解這一點(diǎn)最簡(jiǎn)單的方法就是思慮一下BP高管們此刻的想法。明顯，考慮到清理開(kāi)銷和對(duì)BP名譽(yù)的影響，高管們真希望能夠回到過(guò)去，多花些錢讓“深水地平線〞更安全。他們沒(méi)有增添這筆開(kāi)銷就說(shuō)明他們以為鉆機(jī)在當(dāng)時(shí)的狀態(tài)下不會(huì)出問(wèn)題。ForallthecriticismBPexecutivesmaydeserve,theyarefarfromtheonlypeopletostrugglewithsuchlow-probability,high-costevents.Nearlyeveryonedoes.“Thesearepreciselythekindsofeventsthatarehardforusashumanstogetourhandsaroundandreacttorationally['r??n?l?],〞RobertN.Stavins,anenvironmentaleconomist[f??t?l?ti]atHarvard,says.Wemaketwobasic—andopposite—typesofmistakes.Whenaneventisdifficulttoimagine,wetendtounderestimateitslikelihood.Thisistheproverbial[pr??v?:rbi?l]blackswan.MostofthepeoplerunningDeepwaterHorizonprobablyneverhadarigexplodeonthem.Sotheyassumeditwouldnothappen,atleastnottothem.只管針對(duì)BP高管的全部責(zé)備可能都是他們應(yīng)得的，但是他們絕不是獨(dú)一困難應(yīng)付這類低概率、高本錢領(lǐng)件的人。幾乎每個(gè)人都會(huì)這樣?！斑@些正是我們?nèi)祟愞k理時(shí)很難做出合理反應(yīng)的一類事件，〞哈佛大學(xué)環(huán)境經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家羅伯特·斯塔文斯說(shuō)。我們常常犯兩種根本且性質(zhì)相反的錯(cuò)誤。當(dāng)一件事情是很難想象的，我們常常會(huì)低估它的可能性。這就是盡人皆知的黑天鵝〔罕有之物〕現(xiàn)象。大部分在“深水地平線〞工作的人可能從未經(jīng)歷過(guò)鉆井平臺(tái)爆炸。所以他們以為這不會(huì)發(fā)生，最少不會(huì)發(fā)生在他們身上。Similarly,BenBernankeandAlanGreenspanlikedtoargue,notsolongago,thatthenationalrealestatemarketwasnotinabubble[??bl]becauseithadneverbeeninonebefore.WallStreettraderstookthesameviewandbuiltmathematicalmodelsthatdidnotallowforthepossibilitythathousepriceswoulddecline[d??kla?n].Andmanyhomebuyerssignedupforunaffordablemortgages[?m?:rg?d?],believingtheycouldrefinanceorsellthehouseonceitspricerose.Thatswhathouseprices’did,itseemed.相同，不久從前，本·伯南克和艾倫·格林斯潘也喜愛(ài)稱全國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)沒(méi)有泡沫，由于從前從未有過(guò)泡沫。華爾街交易員也持相同看法，他們成立的數(shù)學(xué)模型根本不存在房?jī)r(jià)降落的可能性。很多購(gòu)房者簽署了負(fù)擔(dān)不起的抵押貸款，相信一旦其價(jià)錢上升，他們能夠再融資或賣掉房屋?？雌饋?lái)房?jī)r(jià)恰似是在上升。Ontheotherhand,whenanunlikelyeventisalltooeasytoimagine,weoftengointheoppositedirectionandoverestimatetheodds.Afterthe9/11attacks,Americanscanceledplanetripsandtooktotheroad.Therewerenoterrorist[?t?r?r?st]attacksinthiscountryin2002,yettheadditionaldrivingapparentlyledtoanincreaseintrafficfatalities.另一方面，當(dāng)一個(gè)不太可能發(fā)生的事件是很簡(jiǎn)單想象的，我們常常會(huì)走向另一個(gè)方向，高估它的可能性?！?·11〞害怕侵襲后，美國(guó)人撤消了飛機(jī)旅行，轉(zhuǎn)而駕車上路。2002年在這個(gè)國(guó)家沒(méi)有發(fā)生害怕侵襲，但更多的駕車出行明顯致使了交通死亡人數(shù)的增添。Whenthestakesarehighenough,itfallstogovernmenttohelpitscitizensavoidtheseentirelyhumanerrors.Themarket,lefttoitsowndevices,oftencannotdoso.YetinthecaseofDeepwaterHorizon,governmentpolicyactuallywenttheotherway.ItencouragedBPtounderestimatetheoddsofacatastrophe.當(dāng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)特別高時(shí)，應(yīng)當(dāng)由政府負(fù)責(zé)以幫助防備這些圓滿人為的錯(cuò)誤。假如讓市場(chǎng)自行其是，常常做不到這一點(diǎn)。但是，在“深水地平線〞這件事情上，政府的政策實(shí)質(zhì)上起到了相反的作用。它滋長(zhǎng)BP低估了災(zāi)害的可能性。[8]Inalittle-noticedprovision[pr??v???n]ina1990lawpassedaftertheExxonValdezspill,Congresscappedaspiller’sliabilityoverandabovecleanupcostsat$75millionforarigspill.Eveniftheeconomicdamages—totourism,fishingandthelike—stretchintothebillions,theresponsiblepartyisonthehookforonly$75million.(Inthisinstance,BPhasagreedtowaivethecapforclaimsitdeemslegitimate.)MichaelGreenstone,anM.I.T.economistwhorunstheHamiltonProjectinWashington,saysthelawfundamentallydistortsacompany’sdecisionWithoutmakingthe.cap,executiveswouldhavetoweighthepossiblerevenue[?rev?nju:]fromawellagainstthecostofdrillingthereandtheriskofdamage.Withthecap,theycanlargelyignorethepotentialdamagebeyondcleanupcosts.Sotheyendupdrillingwellseveninplaceswherethedamagecanbehorrific,likeclosetoashoreline.Toputitanotherway,humanfrailty[?frelti]helpedBP’sexecutivesunderestimatethechanceofalow-probability,high-costevent.Federallawhelpedthemunderestimatethecosts.[8]?？松髽I(yè)瓦爾迪茲漏油事件發(fā)生后，在

1990年的一個(gè)法案極少引人注意的一項(xiàng)條款中，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)將鉆機(jī)泄露清理開(kāi)銷的責(zé)任上限制為7500萬(wàn)美元。即便對(duì)旅行業(yè)、漁業(yè)等造成的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失高達(dá)數(shù)十億美元，責(zé)任方也僅需要支付7500萬(wàn)美元?！苍谶@類狀況下，BP已同意對(duì)它以為合法的索賠，放棄這一上限?！吃谌A盛頓負(fù)責(zé)漢密爾頓工程的麻省理工學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家邁克爾·格林斯通說(shuō)這一法律從根本上歪曲了企業(yè)的決議。假如補(bǔ)償沒(méi)有上限，管理人員就會(huì)衡量油井可能的利潤(rùn)以及鉆井的本錢和傷害補(bǔ)償?shù)娘L(fēng)險(xiǎn)。而有了這個(gè)上限，他們就能夠在很大程度上忽視清理開(kāi)銷以外的暗藏傷害補(bǔ)償。所以在傷害可能特別可怕的地方，如湊近海岸線的地方，他們也會(huì)鉆井。換句話說(shuō)，人類的弊端使得BP企業(yè)高管低估了低概率、高本錢領(lǐng)件的可能性。而聯(lián)邦法律那么使得他們低估了本錢。InthewakeofDeepwaterHorizon,CongressandtheObamaadministrationwillnodoubtbetemptedtopasslawsmeanttoreducetherisksofanotherdeep-waterdisaster.Certainlytherearesomesensiblestepstheycantake,likeliftingtheliabilitycapandfreeingregulatorsfromthesway[swe?]ofindustry.Butitwouldbefoolishtothinkthattheonlyriskswearestillunderestimatingaretheonesthathavesuddenlybecomesalient.[?se?li?nt]在“深水地平線〞今后，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)和奧巴馬政府毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)希望經(jīng)過(guò)有關(guān)法律以減少再次出現(xiàn)“深水地平線〞這樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。自然他們能夠采納一些理智的做法，如消除責(zé)任上限，掙脫石油業(yè)對(duì)看守人員的影響。但是，假如以為我們當(dāng)前仍舊低估的但是那些忽然間引人凝望的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，那是特別蠢笨的。Thebigfinancialriskisnolongerahousingbubble.Instead,itmaybethehugedeficits[?d?f?s?t]thatthegrowthofMedicare,MedicaidandSocialSecuritywillcauseincomingyears—andthepossibilitythatlenderswilleventuallybecomenervousaboutextendingcredittoWashington.True,someeconomistsandpolicymakersinsistthecountryshouldnotgetworkedupaboutthispossibility,becauselendershaveneversoured[?sau?]ontheUnitedStatesgovernmentbeforeandshownosignsofdoingsonow.Butisn’tthatreminiscent[????n?s?nt]oftheoldBernanke-Greenspantuneaboutthehousingmarket?大的金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)已不再是房地產(chǎn)泡沫。相反，它可能是醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)、醫(yī)療救援和社會(huì)保障的增添在將來(lái)將會(huì)致使的巨額赤字，以及貸款人可能最后不肯再向華盛頓擴(kuò)大信貸。固然，一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和決議者堅(jiān)持以為國(guó)家還不該當(dāng)考慮怎樣應(yīng)付這類可能性，由于貸款人與美國(guó)政府的關(guān)系素來(lái)沒(méi)有惡化過(guò)，也沒(méi)有跡象顯示此刻就是這樣。但這是否是讓人聯(lián)想到伯南克和格林斯潘對(duì)住處市場(chǎng)的老調(diào)呢？Then,ofcourse,therearethegreenhousegasesthatoilwells(amongotherthings)sendintotheatmosphereevenwhenthewellsfunctionproperly.Scientistssaythebuildupofthesegasesisalreadylikelytow