1、 組織結構和企業文化外文文獻翻譯中英文2021外文文獻翻譯原文及譯文（節選重點翻譯）標題：組織結構和企業文化外文翻譯中英文 2021-2021文獻出處：Jonathan Newton, Andrew Wait, Simon D. Angus. Gamesand Economic Behavior, Volume 118, November 2021, Pages354-365譯文字數：4100 多字英文Watercooler chat, organizational structure andcorporate culture Jonathan Newton, Andrew Wait, Sim

2、onAngus AbstractModeling firms as works of employees, occasionalcollaborative decision making around the officewatercooler changes long run employee behavior (corporateculture). The culture that emerges in a given team ofemployees depends on team size and on how the team isconnected to the wider fir

3、m. The implications of the第 1 頁 共 23 頁 model for organizational structure are e_plored andrelated to trends in the design of hierarchies. Keywords:Collaboration, Teams, Hierarchies, Delayering, works,Evolution Apple is a very disciplined pany, and we havegreat processes. But thats not what its about

4、. Processmakes you more efficient. But innovation es from peoplemeeting up in the hallways or calling each other at 10.30at night with a new idea. Steve Jobs, founder ofApple Inc. IntroductionPeople talk, share ideas, and collaborate when it ismutually advantageous to do so. Workers bring theircolla

5、borative nature with them to the workplace and totheir dealings with their colleagues, withwhom they interact on shopfloors, in meetings, onproduction lines and during coffee and lunch breaks. Inthis paper we consider collaborative decision making inthe social environment of the workplace and, using

6、 asimple model of adaptive decision making, show that thiscan have dramatic and far reaching effects on corporateculture and the optimal internal structure oforganizations. Our model takes the well documented factthat humans are particularly good at mutually beneficial第 2 頁 共 23 頁 collaboration (Tom

7、asello, 2021), and incorporates thisfact into a noisy variant (Young, 1998) of the bestresponse dynamic that has been the bread and butter ofeconomic modeling since Cournot (1838). We model firms asworks of employees, each of whom can choose asafe action or a risky action. Therisky action represents

8、 innovative, even speculative,behavior within the firm. An employee will only find itin his interest to take the risky action if enough of hisneighbors in the work do likewise. Within firms,employees are divided into teams. A team is a group ofemployees who interact together, although they may alsoi

9、nteract with others outside of the team. The teamrepresents an employees work group, department, or evena corporate board or senior management mittee. Theability of employees to engage in collaborative actionchoice is modeled by the idea of a watercooler, aroundwhich small groups of employees within

10、 a team can chatand form collaborative intentions. Ifthere are no watercoolers, so that employees cannotshare intentions, the model reduces to the canonicalmodel of Young, for which the action profile in which第 3 頁 共 23 頁 every player chooses the safe action is always a long runequilibrium (Peski, 2

11、0_). This result no longer holdswhen small groups of players can occasionally meet at thewatercooler to form shared intentions, coordinating theiraction choice to their mutual benefit. Instead, byincorporating this basic facet of human nature into themodel, we obtain a diversity of behavior, depende

12、nt onwork topology. We find that in order for members of agiven team to play the risky action in long runequilibrium, some conditions must be satisfied. (i)Firstly, the team must not be too large. The larger ateam is, the less likely that a fi_ed amount ofcollaborative decision making around the wat

13、ercooler willhave an impact on long run behavior. (ii) Secondly,sufficient numbers of employees must be able tocoordinate their strategic choice at the watercooler;that is, munication within the team must be strong enoughto generate enough collaboration to overe the systemicbias in favor of the safe

14、 action. (iii) Thirdly, the teammust not be so small that the influence of its memberse_ternal connections can cause them to play the safeaction, or, if the team is indeed that small, then all第 4 頁 共 23 頁 members connections outside of the team must be to teamsthat play the risky action. In other wo

15、rds, the e_ternalinfluence from those outside of the team who play it safemust be limited. These conditions provideguidance for organizational design: they can be usedto promote or prevent different behaviors in differentpartsofanorganization. Section 5 provides e_les related todelayering and job ro

16、tation. Each of these conditionshelps to e_plain empirical facts. Condition(i) provides an e_planation for why panies seeking topromote innovation create organizational structures basedaround small teams (Cook, 20 xx; Stross, 1996). Condition(ii) helps e_plain the efforts that firms take toincrease

17、spontaneous interaction and facilitate informalmunication between workers; that is, to create largerwatercoolers (Evans, 2021). Condition (iii) helps e_plainwhy organizations seek to foster independence withinteams and even isolate research units from other parts ofthe organization (Sloan, 1964). Re

18、lated literature第 5 頁 共 23 頁 This paper contributes to several strands ofliterature. The practical contribution is to theliterature on the importance of the workplace socialenvironment the nature and patterns ofinteraction between workers in a firm (see, for e_leBandiera et al., 20_; Gibbons and Hen

19、derson, 2021;Kandel and Lazear, 1992). We demonstrate how thefacilitation of collective agency by the workplace socialenvironment can have a significant effect on corporateculture. Like Kreps (1990)and Hermalin (20_), we modelcorporate culture as an equilibrium oute played in acoordination game. To

20、do this we turn to the literatureon adaptivedecision making and evolution, which allows us todevelop a simple e_planation of some aspects of corporateculture, providing an alternative, even plementary,theory to the shared beliefs model of VanDen Steen (20_). Evolutionary models often focus onlong ru

21、n equilibria. This is similar to how therelational-contracting literature adapts long run folktheorems to study firms (Baker et al., 1999; Levin, 20_;Li et al., 2021), the difference being that evolutionary第 6 頁 共 23 頁 models impose very low rationality requirements on agents.Such low rationality mo

22、dels have had success ate_plaining laboratory data (Chong et al., 20_) as wellas empirical phenomena as diverse as crop-sharing norms(Young and Burke, 20_) and the wearing of the Islamicveil (Carvalho, 2021). The current paper shows how theincorporation of collective agency into such models canlead

23、to even richer empirical predictions whilstretaining the simplicity and elegance of evolutionarymethodology. The incorporation of collective agency intoperturbed evolutionary dynamics is a relatively new andrapidly growing literature (Newton, 20 xxa, Newton, 20 xxb;Newton and Angus, 2021; Sawa, 2021

24、; Serrano and Volij,20_), although considerable work has been done in theconte_t of matching, where pairwise deviations representintentional behavior by coalitions of size two (Jacksonand Watts, 20_; Klaus et al., 20_; Klaus and Newton,2021; Na_ and Pradelski, 2021; Newton and Sawa, 2021).The procli

25、vity of humans to engage in collective agencyis第 7 頁 共 23 頁 well documented and recent research in developmentalpsychology has shown that the urge to collaborate is aprimal one, manifesting itself from ages as young as14months(Tomasello,2021; Tomaselloetal.,20_; Tomasello and Rakoczy, 20_). Recentth

26、eoretical work has shown that the ability to act as aplural agent will evolve in a wide variety of situations(Angus and Newton, 2021; Newton, 2021; Rusch, 2021). Theauthors of the current paper believe that the evidence infavor of the incorporation of collective agency intomodels of human behavior i

27、s overwhelming. Furthermore,adaptive/evolutionary frameworks are ideal for this as,in contrast to static analyses, they e_plicitly modelbehavior both in and out of equilibrium. Finally, we notethat work on collective agency in evolutionary dynamicsbuilds on a broader literature on coalitional behavi

28、or ingame- theoretic models. The concept of joint optimization第 8 頁 共 23 頁 underpins cooperative game theory (see Peleg andSudholter, 20_, for a survey) and also motivates a smallbut established literature at the intersection ofnoncooperative and cooperative game theory (see, for e_leAmbrus, 20_; Au

29、mann, 1959; Bernheim et al., 1987;Konishi and Ray, 20_). However, despite the notedlimitations of methodological individualism in economics(Arrow, 1994), the use of coalitional concepts ineconomics has not attained the same level of popularityas, for e_le, the use of the concept of beliefs, e_ceptin

30、sofar as the concepts of the household andthe firm assume a sharing of intentions on the partof the individuals within those structures. The contrastis interesting, as developmental studies of childrenindicate that they collaborate at earlier ages than theycan understand beliefs. One of the goals of

31、 the currentpaper is to show how a weakening of methodologicalindividualism can lead to simple and striking economicpredictions that flow from some of the deepest currentsof human nature. Firm structure and designSo coalitional behavior can lead to heterogeneouschoices by teams within a firm dependi

32、ng on their size.第 9 頁 共 23 頁 This effect is not necessarily monotonic. Large teamsplay the safe action, medium-size teams the risky action.In the absence of neighbors, small teams can easily solvethe coordination problem and play the risky action, butthe presence of neighbors playing safe is enough

33、incentive for very small teams to choose the safe action.By e_ploiting the internal and e_ternal pressures thatdrive these results, a firm owner or manager canmanipulate the structure of the firm to achieve desiredoutes. If the manager would like the safe action to betaken by a small workgroup, she

34、will ensure it has stronglinks to a division that will definitely be playing thesafe action typically a large department. On theother hand, if the manager would like a team to play therisky action this group could be the firmsresearch group this teamshould be small and either have limited links to t

35、herest of the firm, or only link to other teams that playthe risky action. Entrepreneurs do indeed realize thepotential cost of too much munication. As Slone (2021)records, the founder of Amazon., Jeff Bezos, hassuggested第 10 頁 共 23 頁 “We should be trying to figure out a way for teamsto municate les

36、s with each other, not more”. An e_le ofthis ma_im being put into practice is the Palo AltoResearch Center (PARC), established by _ero_ to createthe innovations of the future. The PARC was deliberatelygeographically isolated from _ero_s headquarters ande_isting research laboratory in New York. Given

37、 itsintended role, it was important that the PARC wasseparated from the main bureaucratic processes andculture of _ero_, which was conservative and focused onits traditional copier business (Regani, 20_). E_le:delayeringThere has been a trend in recent decades fororganizations to shorten the lengths

38、 of their hierarchies.Moreover, many of these firms have also increased thespan of control of the senior management group; there hasbeen a notable increase in the number of individuals whodirectly report to the CEO. While there can be otherdrivers for such changes Guadalupe and Wulf (20_)emphasize t

39、he impact of product-market petition frominternationalization here we use Theorem 2,Theorem第 11 頁 共 23 頁 3 to look at a possible relationship betweenwatercooler chat and delayering. The elimination of TeamC does not affect Team E, which is large enough that itsdecision to play the risky action canno

40、t be outweighed bye_ternal influence. However, Team F is now in directcontact with Head Office, which plays the safe action. Itfollows from the third statementof Theorem 3 that all employees in Team F will alsonow play the safe action. The e_ternal contact here iscrucial as it allows the senior mana

41、ger to switch thebehavior of a small unit. The analysis of this sectionshows how delayering can create opportunities for aprincipal to e_ercise her influence by creating differentsized teams in her organization and linking them tocreate the right balance between e_ternal and internalpressures. In th

42、is way, different behavior can begenerated in separate parts of an organization, wheneverthis is a required ponent of the organizations strategy.E_le: job rotationFirms might choose to rotate workers through tasksfor a variety of reasons. Here we show that rotation canact as a mechanism to allow the

43、 culture of one part of an第 12 頁 共 23 頁 organization to contage another part of the organization.Specifically, we show how even relatively short spans oftime spent working in a small team can shape anemployees behavior. When rotated back to a larger team,the employee will, for a while, retainthe beh

44、avior to which he became accustomed in thesmall team. The periodic arrival of such employees isenough to change the long run culture of the large teamfrom safe to risky. Now, from any state, the state _=Ncan be reached without random shocks. To see this,consider that the following sequence of events

45、 will occurwith positive probability. First, all current members ofthe small team meet at the small teams watercooler,where they will agree to play the risky action. Second,the members of the small team switch places, one by one,with members of the large team. This gives at least fourmembers of the

46、large team who are now playing the riskyaction. Third, the other four members of the large teammeet at the large teams watercooler and agree to switchto the risky action. They are happy to do this as theremaining four members of the team are already playingthe risky action. Finally, the new members

47、of the small第 13 頁 共 23 頁 team all meet at the small teams watercooler and switchto the risky action. We have reached the state _=N. Allemployees are playing the risky action. Concluding mentsWhile the boundaries of a firm are defined by itsphysical assets (Hart and Moore, 1990), socialinteractions

48、between workers characterize the way thingsget done in an organization. Workers idly sharingscuttlebutt around the watercooler might seem like thebane of an employers life, but these informalinteractions could engender collectiveactions that enhance firm productivity. This paperhas e_amined how a ma

49、nager can tinker with anorganizations structure and the physical workenvironment to harness workers informal interactions forthe firms advantage. Although the direct applicationconsidered in this paper is the design of a firm, it isclear that adaptive/evolutionary models that incorporatesome degree

50、of collective agency should also beapplicable to other problems in applied economics. Inparticular, the implications of collective agency may beof particular importance whenever formal structures in anorganization can facilitate informal interactions. This第 14 頁 共 23 頁 is true for academic conferenc

51、es, where informalinteractions are typically of more import than organizedpresentations, and also for diplomacy, where formalmeetings are acpanied by informal, less structured,discussions in which parties are often more able to findmon ground and create shared intentions.中文飲水機旁聊天組織結構和企業文化喬納森牛頓 安德魯懷特

52、 西蒙安格斯 摘要將公司建模為員工網絡辦公室里的偶爾協作決策會改變長期的員工行為（企業文化）。給定員工團隊中出現的文化取決于團隊規模以及團隊與更廣泛公司的聯系方式。探索了該模型對組織結構的影響并將其與層次結構設計的趨勢相關聯。關鍵字：合作團隊層次結構延遲網絡演化蘋果是一家紀律嚴明的公司我們的流程非常好但這不是主要的。流程使我們更高效但是創新來自人們在走廊上聊天或晚上10:30 互相交流產生的新想法蘋果公司創始人史蒂夫喬布斯。引言當人們由共同的利益追求時人們會互相交流分享想法并進 行協作。員工將他們的協作性帶入工作場所并與同事打交道他 們在車間會議生產線以及咖啡和午餐休息時間與他們進行互動。在本

53、第 15 頁 共 23 頁 文中我們考慮了工作場所社交環境中的協作決策并使用簡 單的自適應決策模型表明這可能對公司文化和組織的最佳內部結 構產生巨大而深遠的影響。我們的模型采用了有據可查的事實即人類特別擅長互利合作（Tomasello2021 年）并將這一事實整合到了最佳響應動態的嘈雜變量中（Young1998 年）這一直是經濟建模的基礎。自古諾 （1838）起。我們將公司建模為員工網絡每個員工都可以選擇 ”;安全”行動或“風險”行動。冒險行為代表了公司內部的創新行為甚至是投機行為。員工只有在網絡中足夠多的鄰居也這樣做的情況下才發現采取冒險行動符合他的利益。在公司內部員工分為團隊。團隊是一群互

54、相協作的員工盡管他們也可能與團隊之外的其他人互動。該團隊代表員工的工作組部門甚至是公司董事會或高級管理委員會。員工參與協作行動選擇的能力以”;水冷卻器”的概念為模型冷卻器使團隊中的一小群員工可以聊天并形成協作意圖。如果沒有 水冷卻器使員工無法分享意圖則該模型將簡化為 Young 的規范模型在該模型中每個參與者選擇安全行動的行為模式始終是長期均衡的（Peski20_ 年）。當少數玩家偶爾在水冷卻器上見面以 形成共同的意圖協調他們的行動選擇以達到共同的利益時這種結果將不再成立。取而代之的是通過將人性的基本面納入模型中我們可以根據網絡拓撲獲得多種行為。第 16 頁 共 23 頁 我們發現為了使給定團

55、隊的成員在長期均衡中發揮冒險作用必須滿足一些條件。（1）首先團隊不能太大。團隊越大圍繞水冷卻器進行的固定數量的協作決策對長期行為的影響的可能性就 越小。（2）其次必須有足夠數量的雇員在水冷卻器上協調其戰略選擇；也就是說團隊內部的溝通必須足夠強大以產生足夠的 協作以克服系統偏見而采取安全行動。（3）再次團隊規模不能太小以免其成員的外部聯系的影響導致他們采取安全行動 或者如果團隊確實如此小則團隊外部的所有成員聯系都必須參 加冒險行動的團隊。換句話說必須限制來自團隊外部成員的外部 影響。這些條件為組織設計提供了指導：它們可用于促進或預防組織不同部分的不同行為。這些條件中的每一個都有助于解釋經驗事實。

56、條件（1）解釋了為什么尋求促進創新的公司圍繞小團隊建立組織結構（Cook20 xx； Stross1996）。條件（2）有助于解釋企業為增加自發性互動和促進工人之間的非正式溝通所付出的努力；也就是說 制造更大的水冷卻器（Evans2021年）。條件（3）有助于解釋為什么組織要在團隊中促進獨立性甚至將研究部門與組織的其他部分隔離開來（Sloan1964）。文獻綜述第 17 頁 共 23 頁 本文對多方面的文獻有所貢獻。實際的貢獻是關于工作場所社 會環境的重要性的文獻企業中工人之間互動的性質和模式（例如 參見 Bandiera 等 20_； Gibbons 和Henderson2021； Kand

57、el 和 Lazear1992）。我們證明了工作場所社會環境對集體代理的促進如何對公司文化產生重大影響。像Kreps（1990）和 Hermalin（20_）一樣我們將企業文化建模為在協調博弈中發揮 的均衡結果。為此我們轉向有關自適應決策和演化的文獻這使 我們能夠對企業文化的某些方面進行簡單的解釋為范登斯汀 （Van Den Steen）（20_）的共同信念模型提供替代甚至互補的理論。進化模型通常關注長期均衡。這類似于關系契約文獻如何將長期的民間定理應用于研究公司（Baker 等人1999; Levin20_; Li 等人 2021）不同之處在于進化模型對企業的合理性要求極低。如此低的理性模型

58、已經成功地解釋了實驗室數據（Chong 等 20_）以及經驗現象如農作物共享規范（Young and Burke20_）和伊斯蘭面紗的佩戴（Carvalho2021）。當前的研究顯示了將集體代理結合到這樣的模型中如何在保持進化方法的簡單性和優雅性的同時 可以導致更豐富的經驗預測。將集體代理納入擾動的演化動力學是一個相對較新且發展迅速的文獻（Newton20 xx； Newton20 xx； Newton 和 Angus2021；Sawa2021；第 18 頁 共 23 頁 Serrano 和 Volij20_）盡管在配對的背景下成對偏差代表規模為 2 的聯盟的有意行為（Jackson 和 Wa

59、tts20_; Klaus 等20_;Klaus 和 Newton2021; Na_ 和 Pradelski2021; Newton 和Sawa2021）。人類參與集體代理的傾向性已得到充分證明最近發展心理學的研究表明合作的沖動是一種原始的沖動這種沖動從 14個月的年齡就開始顯現出來 （Tomasello2021； Tomasello 等20_Tomasello 和 Rakoczy20_ 年）。最近的理論工作表明在多種情況下充當多元 主 體 的 能 力 將 不 斷 發 展 （Angus 和Newton2021； Newton2021； Rusch2021）。本研究的作者認為贊成將集體代理納入人類行為模型的證據是壓倒性的。此外自適應/進化框架對此非常理想因為與靜態分析相反它們明確地對處于平衡狀態和處于平衡狀態的行為進行建模。最后我們注意到在進化動力學中關于集體代理的工作建立在關于博弈論模型中的聯盟行為的更廣泛文獻上。聯合優化的概念是合作博弈理論的基礎（參見 Peleg 和 Sudholter20_進行調查）并且在非合作博弈和合作博弈的交叉點上激發了一些既小卻已確立的文獻（例如參見 Ambrus20_； Aumann1959； Bernheim等 1987； Konishi 和 Ray20_）。然