外文翻譯原文Domesticregulation,internationalstandards,andtechnicalbarrierstotradeMaterialSource:GriffithLawSchool,GriffithUniversity,Queensland,Australia2.TheTBTAandinternationalstandards2.1TheTBTA’sharmonizationobjectivesIthaslongbeenacceptedthatdomesticpoliciesandlawscannullifyorimpairthepurportedbenefitsoftradepolicies,andthattheWTOmustthereforereachbeyondbordermeasures(Bhagwati,1996:23–24).TheGATT’snationaltreatmentandMFNobligationsdothistosomeextent,butthegrowthinnon-tariffbarrierstotradeduringthe1960s–1970spromptedGATTpartiestonegotiatetheStandardsCode,thepredecessortotheTBTA,intheTokyoRound.TheadditionoftheSPSAduringtheUruguayRoundstemmedfromthefailuresoftheStandardsCodetocurtailthegrowthintechnicalregulationsinfoodandagriculturalproducts(MarceauandTrachtman,2002:813–815).TheTBTAanditscompaniononfoodandplantsafetynowaddconsiderablytothedisciplinesondomesticregulatoryautonomythatarecontainedintheGATT.ThePreambletotheTBTAshedslightontheAgreement’sunderlyingharmonizationclaims.Itskeytradeconcernsaretopromotetransparencybyeliminatingacountry’sabilitytochooserulesthathavegreaterprotectiveeffectandtofacilitatetradeexpansionwithassociatedeconomiesofscale(TBTA,Preamble;WTOCTBT,1995,annex4,Principle10).Theseobjectivesdonotnecessarilyrequireregulatoryharmonizationintheformofasingleinternationalstandardorrule.Ifthebasisoftheclaimforharmonizationissimplytoachieveeconomiesofscaleortoaddresstransparencyconcerns,CassisdeDijonmakesclearthatmutualrecognitionwouldbeequallyappropriate(Leebron,1996;Bhagwati,1996:9;BhagwatiandSrinivasan,1996:15).Butmutualrecognitiondoesnotrespondtoconcernsthattheregulatoryregimeofanothercountryimposestransboundarycosts,hinderstheimplementationofdomesticlaws,orissomehow‘unfair’(Leebron,1996:94).Suchconcernsfrequentlyunderpindomesticregulationinfieldsofconsumersafetyandenvironmentalhealth.Accordingly,theTBTAstrivesforabalancebetweentradefacilitationanddomesticregulatoryobjectives.ItsstartingpremiseistherightofMemberstointroduceproductrequirementsthatservearangeoflegitimatenon-tradeobjectives,includinghealth,andenvironmentalandconsumerprotection.Inthisrespect,theTBTAisconsistentwithbothtradeandconsumerconcernsaboutharmonization.TheTransatlanticConsumerDialogue(TACD)‘PrinciplesforInternationalHarmonization’,forexample,advocatethepreservationofculturalpreferencesinthefieldofhealthandsafety,identifyingsuchregulationsasinappropriatesubjectsofharmonization(TACD,2000,Principle1).UnliketheTACDPrinciples,however,theTBTAstillplacesstrongharmonizingdisciplinesontheregulatoryautonomyofMembersinthesepolicyspheres.Thesedisciplinesareconsideredfurtherbelow.2.2ThescopeoftheTBTATheTBTAdoesnotattempttospecifythefinalcontentofrulesorrequirements.Rather,itisconcernedonlywiththereductionofdifferencebetweenMembers(Leebron,1996:42).ItthereforesetsgeneralrulesforhowMembersmaydevelopproductrequirementsandconformityassessmentproceduresfortestingcompliancewithsubstantiverules.Thesegeneralrulesincludeadutytoconsideradoptionofinternationalstandardsforproductsandconformityassessmentprocedures;adutytoparticipateininternationalstandard-setting;criteriawithwhichstandardsandconformitymustcomplywheninternationalstandardsarenotused,suchasMFN,nationaltreatment,necessity,andleasttraderestrictiveness;andmutualrecognition.ThesignificanceoftheTBTA’sendorsementofinternationalstandardsandrelateddisciplinesisobviouslyaffectedbytheAgreement’sreach.TheTBTAisconcernedwithtechnicalregulationsandstandards;onlymeasuresthatfallwithinthedefinitionoftechnicalregulationorstandardaresubjecttotheTBTA’sdisciplines.Ifameasuredoesnotfallwithineitherofthesedefinitions,itsWTOconsistencyisexaminedundereithertheSPSA(ifthemeasuresetsfoodsafety,orplantoranimalhealthrequirements)ortheGATT(forotherrestrictionsontradeingoods).OnemightexpectthatMemberswishingtoconstraintheuseoftrademeasuresasinstrumentsofnon-tradepolicy,ortheabuseofproductregulationsfortradeprotectionpurposeswouldadvocatebroaddefinitionsthatleadtobroadTBTAcoverage.BroadersubjectmattercoveragewouldsupplementthearguablyweakerGATTdisciplines.3Thediscussionbelowsuggests,however,thattheAB’scurrentinterpretationleavesmanydomesticregulationsthatindirectlyaffecttradeingoodsoutsidethescopeofTBTAobligations.2.3TBTAdisciplinesforadoptinginternationalstandardsFormeasuresthatconstituteTBTAtechnicalregulations,theAgreementimposesarangeofsubstantiveandproceduraldisciplinesonMembers.TBTAArticle2.1synthesizesthenationaltreatmentandmost-favourednationprinciplescontainedinGATTArticlesIandIIIintoasinglenon-discriminationobligationinrespectoflikeproducts.Membersarealsorequiredtoavoidcreatingunnecessaryobstaclestotradeandtoadopttheleasttraderestrictivemeansofachievinglegitimateobjectives(TBTAArticle2.2).Theseobligationshavebeenanalysedindetailelsewhere(MarceauandTrachtman,2002:874–875;NeumannandTuerk,2003).Thefollowingdiscussionthereforefocusesontheprovisionsdealingwiththeadoptionofinternationalstandardsasdomestictechnicalregulations.TheTBTAdoesnotmandateharmonizationofproductstandards,butprovidesstrongincentivesfortheadoptionofinternationalstandards.Article2.4requiresMemberstouseinternationalstandardsasabasisfortechnicalregulations,wherestandardsexist,butitpermitshigherstandardsinsomecircumstances.Membersmayadopttheirownmeasurewherenointernationalnormhasbeenestablishedorwheretheinternationalmeasurewouldbeineffectiveorinappropriatetofulfilaparticularpolicyobjective,‘forinstancebecauseoffundamentalclimaticorgeographicalfactorsorfundamentaltechnologicalproblems’(TBTA,Articles2.2andDomesticregulation,internationalstandards,andtechnicalbarrierstotrade2572.4).TechnicalregulationsthataccordwithinternationalstandardsarerebuttablypresumedtobeconsistentwiththeTBTA’sobligationtoavoidunnecessaryobstaclestotrade(TBTA,Article2.5).ThisprovisionwascontestedinSardinesbecausetheECRegulation’srestrictivenamingstandardsdepartedfromthestandardssetbytheCodexAlimentariusCommission(Codex).Codexadoptedastandardforcannedsardinesandsardinetypeproductsin1978andreviseditin1995(‘CodexStan94’).CodexStan94setqualityandminimumcontentstandardsforproductscontainingfishandregulatedproductnamingandlabelling.UnderCodexStan94,thename‘sardines’wasreservedexclusivelyforthespeciesSardinapilchardus,butotherspeciesonthelistcouldusethename‘sardines’inconjunctionwithacountry,regionalorcommonnamequalifier(CodexStan94,Article6.1.1).PeruarguedthattheECRegulationprohibitedthemarketingofPeruvianSardinopsSagaxas‘PacificSardines’,andthatthiswasinconsistentwithCodexStan94astherelevantinternationalstandard.Accordingly,itarguedthattheECRegulationwasinconsistentwithTBTAArticle2.4.ThisclaimraisedseveralimportantissuesfortheoperationoftheTBTAstandardizationobligation.TBTAapplicationtopre-existingproductrequirementsTheSardinesdisputeclarifiedthatWTOmembersareobligedtoreviewtechnicalregulationsthatpredatetheWTOAgreementupontheintroductionofnewinternationalstandards.Article2.4saysthat‘wheretechnicalregulationsarerequired.theyshallbebasedoninternationalstandards’.Thislanguageiscapableofimplyingatemporaltrigger(‘atthetimeregulationsarerequired’)oracircumstantialtrigger(‘insituationswhereregulationsarerequired’)fortheobligationtouseinternationalstandards.Peruadvocatedacircumstantialtrigger,arguingthattheobligationreferstoallon-goingcircumstancesthatrequireregulation,evenwherethoseregulationsarealreadyinplace.5TheequivalentharmonizationprovisionoftheSPSAwasconsideredintheHormonesdispute.InHormones,theABconcludedthattheinternationalstandardsprovisionoftheSPSAappliedtoallexistingandfuturedomesticmeasures,therebeingnoevidenceofanintentiontoexemptexistingmeasuresfromSPSAdisciplines(HormonesAB,128).ThisdecisionwasbasedinpartonthelanguageoftheSPSA,whichreferstoboth‘adoptingormaintaining’SPSmeasures,butmorebroadlyonacontextualreadingoftheSPSA’sobligations.ThiscontextincludedreferencetoArticleXVI:4oftheWTOAgreement,whichrequiresMembersto‘ensuretheconformityofitslaws,regulationsandadministrativeprocedureswithitsobligationsasprovidedinthe[covered]agreements’.3.TheimplicationoftheTBTAforinternationalstandardsWhiletheTBTAdoesnotmandateadoptionofinternationalstandards,theSardinesdecisiondemonstratesthatitiscertainlyeasierforaMembertodefendproductrequirementsthatarebasedon,oradaptedtosuit,internationalstandards.Aswellaspromotingharmonizationofdomesticproductrequirements,thedelegationofstandard-settingfunctionstootherinternationalbodiesachieves‘politicaleconomiesofscale’byallowingapoolingofMembers’regulatoryandtechnicalresources(Howse,2002:101).Moreover,removingcontroversialstandard-settingfunctionstointernationalforainsulatesMembersfromthepressureofdomesticcoalitions,albeitsometimesattheexpenseofnationaldemocraticprocesses(Leebron,1996:63–64).Thedeviceofquasi-legislativedelegationalsohasthepotentialtoaddressgapsintheWTO’ssubjectmattercompetenceinpolicyareaslikehealthandenvironment(MarceauandTrachtman,2002:838).ThesefactorsshouldprovideapowerfulincentivetoMemberstocontributetotheirdevelopment.TheTBTAcallsonMembersto‘playafullpart,withinthelimitsoftheirresources,inthedevelopmentofinternationalstandardsforproductsforwhichtheyhaveadoptedorintendtoadoptregulations’(TBTAArticle2.6).Thefollowingdiscussionconsiderstwoaspectsofthequalityandappropriatenessofinternationalstandards,namelythecompositionofstandardsbodiesandtherangeofbodiesthattheTBTArecognizes.3.1CompositionanddecisionmakingTheprovisotoTBTAArticle2.6,thatMembersshouldcontributetostandardssettingwithinthelimitsoftheirresources,pointstoakeydeficiencyinthecompositionofcurrentbodies,namely,theirnorthernbias.TheTBTAdefinesaninternationalorganizationasonewhoseMembershipisopentoatleastallWTOMembers(TBTA,Annex1,4).ItunderminestheverybasisoftheTBTA’skeyharmonizationmechanismsifthatdefinitionispurelytheoreticalbecausedevelopingcountrieslacktheresourcesandexpertisetoparticipate.Whilethisnorth–southimbalanceishardlyuniquetostandardsbodies,theirinfluentialstatusinthenewWTOregimehasattractedincreasedattentiontotheproblem(Wilson,2001).Wilsonsuggestsprioritizingthedevelopmentofinternationalstandardsforkeyareasthatwilldelivertradeenhancementforbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries,thusenablingdevelopingcountriestoconcentratetheirresourcesandrepresentation.TheFAOhasacknowledgedtheneedtobuildthecapacityofdevelopingcountriesinCodex(FAO,2002,29)andarecentWorldBank–DohaDevelopmentfundinitiative,the‘StandardsandTradeDevelopmentFacility’,isaimedatimprovingdevelopingcountryrepresentation.Thesuccessofthedevelopmentsshouldbemonitoredclosely.TheSPScommitteehasthisfunctioninrelationtointernationalSPSstandards,butnosuchroleisgiventotheCommitteeonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade,sothereisnoformalprocessforassessingimprovementsinthefunctioningofTBTstandardsbodies.Acorollaryofthenorthernbiasistheover-representationofindustryrepresentativesonnationaldelegations,creatinginternaltensionsoverwho‘represents’anation(Hauselmann,1996;ConsumersInternational,1999;MaskusandWilson,2000;Wilson,2001:12;Wallach,2002:835–837).Thisindustrybiasalsomanifestsitselfinthedepartmentalleadagencyrepresentation–usuallyheadedbytradeoragricultureofficials,ratherthanhealthorenvironmentandinthegeneralpreferenceforan‘expertsgroup’modelofstandardsdevelopment(Piciotto,2003).Thesedevelopedcountry,industry,and‘expert’biasesinthecompositionofstandardsbodiescompoundtherisksinherentintheirweakerproceduraltransparencyandvotingrequirements.Domesticregulation,internationalstandards,andtechnicalbarrierstotrade267Removingtheneedforconsensusinfavourofamajorityvotecertainlymakesstandardsettingeasier,andinsulatestheWTOfromcriticism.Itcomesatacost,however,todemocraticdecisionmaking,whichcouldultimatelyunderminethelegitimacyofinternationalstandards(MarceauandTrachtman,2002:840;Trachtman,2003a:72;inrelationtoSPSAstandardsbodies,StewartandJohansen,1998:45,52).Broadeningthecompositionofstandard-settingbodiesandimprovingtheirdecision-makingprocedureswouldenhancethelegitimacyoftheresultingstandards.Itwouldmakethemmoredemocraticandaccountable,andenablethemtoaccommodateperspectivesthatacknowledgethesubjectiveandcontingentnatureofspecialistknowledge.譯文國內法規，國際標準和技術貿易壁壘（節選）資料來源:格里菲斯法學院，格里菲斯大學，昆士蘭，澳大利亞作者：JANMCDONALD2.與國際接軌的TBTA

2.1TBTA的統一目標

長期以來一直認為，對國內政策和法律可以取消或損害的貿易政策的本意是利益，因此，世貿組織必須超越邊界措施（巴格瓦蒂，1996：23-24）。關貿總協定的國民待遇和最惠國待遇義務，這在一定程度上，但在非關稅貿易壁壘的增長在20世紀60年代，70年代的貿易談判促使各締約方在關貿總協定東京回合的標準守則，對TBTA前身。該SPSA在烏拉圭回合期間除了源于對標準法典的失敗，以減少在食品和（馬素和Trachtman，2002：813-815）農產品技術法規的增長。該TBTA及其對糧食安全和植物同伴現在大大增加對國內管理自治是在關貿總協定中的學科。

到TBTA序言闡明了協定的基本協調索賠光。它的主要貿易問題是促進消除一個國家的能力選擇規則，有更大的保護作用，并促進貿易與規模經濟相關的經濟體（TBTA，序言;世貿組織全面禁試條約，1995年，附件4，原則10）擴展的透明度。這些目標并不一定需要在一個統一的國際標準或規則的形式監管的協調。如果進行統一要求的基礎上，只是為了實現規模經濟或解決透明度問題，黑醋栗去第戎明確，相互承認將是同樣適宜（Leebron，1996;巴格瓦蒂，1996：9;巴格瓦蒂和Srinivasan，1996：15）。但是，相互承認不響應關注到另一個國家的監管制度規定跨界成本，阻礙了國內法律的實施，或以某種方式'不公平'（Leebron，1996：94）。這種擔憂在消費者經常鞏固安全和環境健康領域的國內法規。因此，TBTA求之間的貿易便利化和國內監管目標的平衡。它的出發前提是成員國有權提出產品要求，服務于合法的非貿易目標的范圍，包括健康，環境和消費者保護。在這方面，TBTA是關于協調貿易和消費者的關注是一致的。跨大西洋消費者對話（TACD）'原則的國際協調'，例如，提倡文化偏好的健康和安全領域的保護，統一確定為不恰當的科目（TACD，2000年，原則1）的各種規定。不像TACD原則，但是，仍然TBTA地方對議員在這些政策領域的協調管理自主權強的學科。這些學科被認為是進一步下文。

2.2的范圍TBTA

該TBTA不嘗試指定的規則或requirements.Rather最終內容，它是只關心成員間的差異減少（Leebron，1996：42）。因此，它規定了成員如何可能發展為測試與實質性遵守規則的產品要求和合格評定程序的一般規則。這些一般規則包括有責任考慮產品和合格評定程序的國際標準;有義務參與國際標準制定，諸如最惠國待遇什么準則的標準和合格的國際標準時，必須遵守不使用，國民待遇，必要性，和最不發達國家貿易限制，以及相互承認。

該TBTA的國際認可的標準和相關學科的意義顯然是受到該協議的達成。該TBTA與有關技術法規和標準，這在技術法規或標準的定義，只有措施都受到TBTA的學科。如果措施不屬于這些定義之一，其WTOconsistency被檢查可選擇按照SPSA（如果設置食品安全的措施，或植物或動物的健康要求）或關貿總協定（關于貨物貿易的其他限制）。可以預期，議員希望限制的貿易措施，作為非貿易的政策，法規的產品或貿易保護目的濫用會主張，導致廣泛的TBTA覆蓋廣泛定義工具的使用。覆蓋面更廣泛的題材無疑將補充較弱關貿總協定disciplines.3下面的討論建議，不過，這AB公司目前的解釋留下了許多國內法規，在貨物貿易的間接影響外TBTA義務的范圍。

2.3TBTA學科為采用國際標準

采取措施，構成TBTA技術法規，協議規定了議員的實質性和程序性的學科范圍。TBTA綜合了2.1條國民待遇和最惠國待遇關貿總協定第一條和三載到一個單一的非同類產品的歧視，尊重義務的原則。成員也須避免造成不必要的貿易障礙，并采取了最低貿易實現（TBTA第2.2條）限制性合法目標的手段。這些義務，詳細分析了在別處（馬素和Trachtman，2002：874-875;Neumann和蒂爾克，2003）。因此下面的討論集中在與作為國內技術法規采用國際標準的條款。該TBTA沒有規定統一的產品標準，但提供了強大的動力采用國際標準。第2.4條要求成員國將其作為技術法規，標準存在的地方為基礎的國際標準，但它允許在某些情況下，更高的標準。大家可能采取措施，如果沒有自己的國際規范已經建立或在國際措施是無效或不適當履行特定的政策目標，'例如由于基本氣候或地理因素或基本技術問題'（TBTA，第2.2與國內法規，國際標準和技術性貿易壁壘2572.4）。技術與國際標準一致的可予駁回的推定為與TBTA的義務，以避免不必要的貿易障礙（TBTA，第2.5條）相一致的規定。

這一規定是有爭議的，因為在沙丁魚歐共體條例的限制性命名標準由食品法典委員會（法典）規定的標準出發。食品法典委員會于1978年通過了一個罐頭沙丁魚和sardinetype產品的標準和修訂1995年（'食品斯坦94'）。食品法典委員會斯坦94集的質量和含有魚類和規管產品的命名和標識產品的最低含量標準。根據法典斯坦94，名稱'沙丁魚'是專供種薩迪納pilchardus，但名單上的其他物種一起使用可以與一個國家，地區或通用名稱限定符（法典斯坦94，第6.1條名稱'沙丁魚'.1）。秘魯認為，歐共體條例禁止的'太平洋沙丁魚'的Sagax秘魯Sardinops營銷，而這是與食品斯坦94不一致的有關國際標準。因此，有人認為，歐共體規例第2.4條與TBTA不一致。這項索賠提出的義務的TBTA標準化操作的幾個重要問題。

TBTA申