RegulatingtheCryptoEcosystemTheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsifIsmailFabianaMeloandNobuyasuSugimotoNOTE/2022/008seofStablecoinsandArrangementsPreparedbyParmaBains,ArifIsmail,FabianaMelo,andNobuyasuSugimotoSeptember2022FINTECHNOTESRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2?2022InternationalMonetaryFundtingtheCryptoEcosystemTheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsNOTE/2022/008aBainsArifIsmailFabianaMeloandNobuyasaSugimotoSCLAIMERFintechNotesofferpracticaladvicefromIMFstaffmemberstopolicymakersonimportantissuesTheviewsexpressedinFintechNotesarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.COMMENDEDCITATIONBainsParmaArifIsmailFabianaMeloandNobuyasaSugimoto“RegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangements.”IMFFintechNote2022/008,InternationalMonetaryFund,Washington,DC.(Paper)ePub)PDFstablecoin;DLT;crypto-asset;DeFi;Tether;TerraUSD;FSB;CPMI-IOSCO;IOSCO;regulation;Economicsectors;Emergingtechnologies;Financialcrises;Financialsectorpolicyandanalysis;Financialsectorstability;Financialservices;Fintech;Systemicrisk;TechnologyAuthors’emailaddresses:PBains@AIsmail@FMelo@NSugimoto@*TheauthorswouldliketothankTobiasAdrianforhisguidance,andMarinaMoretti,JaySurti,Tommaso-ManciniGriffoli,AgnijaJekabsone,CarolineWu,JanNolte,MarianneBechara,JuanSebastianVianchaTrujillo,andCristinaCuervofortheircommentsandcontributionstothisnote.FINTECHNOTESRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3Contents Matters esidentsWorkingGrouponFinancialMarketsandExecutiveOrderonEnsuringResponsible tion egalUncertainty omMoneyMarketFundsandEMoneyRegulations itInsurance GuidanceontheApplicationofthePrinciplesforFinancialMarketInfrasctructurestoStablecoin perationalRisk INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4ecoinsbyMarketCapitalizationESdentialandConductRegulationoftheCryptoEcosystemStablecoinsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND5Acronyms/GlossaryngncingoforismnducturengeerTechnologyrationUSncilyReportationalOrganizationofesCommissionslesforFinancialMarketrrangementFINTECHNOTESRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND6ExecutiveSummaryStablecoinsarecryptoassetsthataimtomaintainastablevaluerelativetoaspecifiedassetorapoolorbasketofassets.1Toachievestability,assetsbackingstablecoinsareusuallyheld.2Thesecanbefiatcurrenciesbankdepositsshort-termmarketinstruments,andevenothercryptoassets.Therearevarioustypesofstabilizingmechanisms,someofwhicharevulnerabletorisksinastressedmarketenvironmentSofar,stablecoinshavebeenissuedbynonbanks,whicharelightlyregulatedorunregulated.Thispaperfocusesonstablecoinswithafacevaluedenominatedinamonetaryunitofaccount,suchastheUSdollar,andbackedbyfinancialassets,suchashigh-qualitybonds.Stablecoinshaveexperiencedperiodsofrapidgrowthwhichalsoacceleratedlinksbetweentraditionalfinanceandthecryptoecosystem.In2021,themarketvalueofstablecoinsquadrupledinconjunctionwiththeriseofdecentralizedfinance(DeFi),althoughithassincefalleninlinewiththebroadercryptomarketDollardenominatedstablecoinsaregrowinginpopularityinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesasapotentialstoreofvalueandhedgeagainstinflationandexchangeratevolatilityraisingrisksofdollarizationandcryptoization.Theinvolvementoflargefinancialinstitutionsinareaslikereservemanagement,custody,andissuancehasthepotentialtorapidlygeneratenewrisks.Inadditionhighervolatilitycorrelationhasbeenobservedbetweenstablecoinsandstockmarkets,especiallyduringrecentmarketstressperiods.Withoutproperregulation,contagionrisksbetweentraditionalfinanceandcryptoecosystemwillincrease.Comprehensiveconsistentandcoordinatedglobalstandardsarerequiredtoachieveeffectivecryptoregulationandsupervisionespeciallyforstablecoinsandtheirbroaderecosystem.Whilesector-specificglobalstandardsareusefulcrosssectoralcoordinationisessentialtoachieveaneffectiveregulatoryframeworkforthecryptoecosystemparticularlystablecoins.TheFinancialStabilityBoardFSBiswellplacedtotaketheleadincoordinatingandestablishingglobalstandardstosupportnationalregulationofcryptoassetsincludingstablecoins,andtheirecosystem(or“arrangements”),takingintoaccountsector-specificstandardsdevelopedbyotherstandardsetters.Anyglobalregulatoryframeworkforstablecoinsshouldbecomprehensive,risk-based,andflexibleanditshouldprovidealevelplayingfield.Theregulatoryframeworkshouldbecomprehensive,adequatelycoveringallentitiescarryingoutcorefunctions,includingissuersandcryptoassetserviceprovidersthatinteractwiththestablecoin,suchwallets,exchanges,andreservemanagers.Theregulatoryframeworkneedstolookatmorethanjustthefinaleconomicfunctions,whichwillchangeovertimeandacrosscountries.Forinstance,astablecoin’sintendedissuancemaybeforonepurpose,butitsprimaryusemaybeforanother,andthesamestablecoinmayperformadifferenteconomicfunctionindifferentjurisdictionsforexample,hedgeagainstinflationinone,andpaymentinanother).RegulationshouldberiskbasedandensurethattheentitiescarryingoutmultipleactivitiesaresubjecttogreaterprudentialrequirementsRegulationshouldprovidealevelplayingfieldtoensureitisproportionatetothe1Reference/work-of-the-fsb/financial-innovation-and-structural-change/crypto-assets-and-global-stablecoins/andglossaryin/wp-content/uploads/P160222.pdf.2Inthecaseofalgorithmicstablecoinstheremaybenobackingassets.FINTECHNOTESRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND7risksandreflectsthestructuralfeaturescharacteristicsandeconomicfunctionsoftheunderlyingstablecoin.icularregulationshouldberiskbasedfocusingonthestructuralfeaturesofstablecoinsandinsomecasestheirusage.ThisallowspolicymakerstolookthroughterminologyandmarketingofissuersandintermediariesKeyriskstousersstemfromtheinabilityofissuerstodeliveronthepurportedstructuralfeaturesoftheirstablecoins.Theseincludethedenominationofthestablecoin’sfacevalue,investmentmandateofthecompositionofreservesandthepledgetoredeemintocash.Insomecases,regulationmayneedtobeadaptedfortheuseofstablecoins,suchastoaccessthewidercryptoecosystemorrepresentbankdepositsAppropriateregulationwouldvarydependingonthestablecoin’sstructuralfeaturesandusageandultimatelyitsrisks.Hereareexamples:demandthatwilllikelybeusedforpayments—shouldbefullybackedinperfectlysafeandliquidassetsHereregulationmighttakeitscuefrome-moneyframeworks.Whereastablecoinbecomeswidelyused,requirementsmightbesimilartothoseinbankregulation.assetsAndstablecoinsofferingredemptionatthegoingmarketvalueoftheunderlyingassetsorinkind)mayholdriskierassets(forexample,atokenizedbond).Inthesecases,regulationmayalsodrawonthatformoneymarketfunds(MMFs),includingfromconstantnetassetvaluefunds.offeringtoendusers.uirementsonstablecoinsshouldbetailoredtoaddressrisksacrosstheentireecosystemandinrelationtothethreekeyfunctionsofstablecoins.Althoughredemptionrisksarefirstorder,otherrisksmustalsobeaddressedStablecoinsinvolvenotonlythecreationofassetsthatshouldbeprudentiallyoverseenbutalsotheuseofalternativeinfrastructurenetworksortransfermechanismsthatshouldbesafesoundandefficient.Thestablecoinecosystemincludescomponentsthatperformfunctionsrelatedto(1)issuance,redemption,andstabilizingmechanisms(involvingissuers,reserveassets,custodiansholdingreserves,marketmakers,andindividualsorentitiesinchargeofgovernance);(2)transferinvolvingforinstance,thenetwork,networkvalidators,andoperators);and(3)access(normallythroughcomponentssuchaswalletsandexchanges).Keyelementsoftheregulatoryframeworkshouldaddressfinancialstabilityconsumerprotection;credit;market;liquidity;operational,financial,marketintegrity;andconcentrationrisks.Dependingonthestablecoinarrangementstructureandcountrycircumstances,necessaryregulatoryadjustmentswouldbedifferent.GiventhevarietyoflegalframeworksinIMFsmembershipthisnotedoesnotintendtobeprescriptiveonthelegaldenominationsordesignoftheregulatoryframeworkbuttoprovidekeyelementsthatshouldfeatureinanyregulatoryarrangement(seetable1forregulatoryconsideration).Globalstandardsettingbodies(SSBs)arecognizantthatvariouscomponentsofstablecoinarrangementsmaybeperforminganequivalenteconomicfunctiontooneperformedbyinstrumentsandintermediariesofthetraditionalfinancialsector,andinsomecountrieswouldalreadybesubjecttothelegalandregulatoryframeworkthatappliestothese(“sameactivity,samerisk,sameregulation”).Inpractice,availableresourcesexistinglegalandregulatorystructure,anddesiredtimeframewillultimatelyaffectdomesticregulatoryresponsesindifferentcountries,whilethenovelnatureofunderlyingtechnologymightcallforINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND8sameregulatoryoutcomeratherthansameregulation.Whilethedesignofdomesticregulatoryresponseswillvary,thefollowingareessential:Forexampleinsomecountriesitmaybelessresource-intensiveandmoreexpedienttonarrowtheuniverseofstablecoinissuerstoentitiesthatarealreadyregulatedandforwhichanestablishedsupervisoryframeworkexistsThiswouldreducetheneedforregulatoryadjustmentstofocusonlyontherisksarisingfromthatactivity.Authorities,however,wouldneedtopayparticularattentiontoriskmanagementintheseinstitutionsandcarefullyassessinterconnectednessandspilloverstothebroaderfinancialsector,andthismayraisecompetitionissuesandlimituserchoice.stablecoinecosystemauthoritiesmustdevelopbespokeregulationorreviseexistingregulatoryframeworkstoensurethatallentitiesthatperformthesefunctionsarelicensedorauthorized.Licensingandauthorizationcriteriashouldbeclearlyarticulated,theresponsibleauthoritiesclearlydesignatedandcoordinationmechanismsamongthemwelldefined.Regulation,supervisionandoversightforthevariouscomponentsshouldbeproportionaltotherisksandfunctionstobeperformedandshouldadheretotheprincipleof“samerisk,sameactivity,sameregulation,”whileconsideringthenovelrisksoftheunderlyingtechnology.adjustmenttoaddressnewrisksaswellascontagionrisksarisingfromstablecoinactivitiestootherpartsoftheirfinancialsectorTheyshouldapplyrequirementscomparabletothoseintensivesupervisionsafetyandsoundnessstresstestingrecoveryandresolvability,whileconsideringdifferencesinbusinessmodelsespeciallywherestablecoinsdonotoffermaturitytransformation.Accesstothefinancialsafetynetcouldbeconsideredwhenstablecoinsreachasystemicscaleandwhencommercialbanksissuetheirownstablecoinsortokenizetheirdeposits,subjecttosafeguards.Authoritiesmustcoordinatetoaddresstherisksarisingfromstablecoinsbothdomesticallyandglobally.Bytheirverynature,stablecoinsarecross-border,andstablecoinsdenominatedinonecurrencymightbeusedinmarketsthatuseadifferentunitofaccount.Issuersmightbeheadquarteredinonejurisdictionandmarkettheirservicesglobally.Thiscanleadtoissuesaroundcapitalflowsandthemonetaryindependenceofjurisdictions.Dollar-denominatedstablecoinsheldinemergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomiescanacceleratedollarizationorcryptoization.ketswhererisksaregrowingquicklyauthoritiesshouldtakeimmediateactionbyusingallthetoolsattheirdisposal.Thegrowingsystemicimplicationsofcryptoassets,includingstablecoins,maywarrantimmediateregulatoryactions,particularlyinsomeemergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomies.Regulatorsshoulduseexistingregulatorypowers,guidedbyrelevantinternationalstandards,andfocusonareasofvulnerability,suchaswallets,exchanges,andfinancialinstitutions’exposures.Wherestablecoinsgeneratesystemicrisk,applicableregulatoryrequirementsshouldreflecttheirmainrisksandeconomicfunctions,withrulesalignedwiththoseofsimilarproducts.TheregulatoryframeworkshouldretaintheflexibilitytoincorporatetheinternationallycoordinatedstandardsforcryptoassetsandstablecoinsthatareunderdevelopmentattheFSBandotherstandardsetters.FINTECHNOTESRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND9Thealternativeofrestrictingcertainusesofstablecoinsorimposingcompletebans,whileattractiveintheshortterm,mayconstituteadisproportionateresponsetoriskandislikelytobedifficulttoenforceinthelongrun.Whereauthoritiesfacesevereandimmediaterisksbeforetheestablishmentofrobustglobalstandards,theymayneedtointroducemeasurestoslowdownstablecoinadoptionincertainfunctionstoprotectcustomersandfinancialstability.However,thosemeasuresshouldnotbeseenasapermanentsolutionbecausetherearestrongincentivesandtechnologicalalternativesforcircumventionInstead,authoritiesneedtoaddressthemaindriversofstablecoinuse,suchaspotentiallyweakmacroeconomicconditionsorunmetdigitalpaymentneeds.TableRecommendationsforPrudentialandConductRegulationoftheCryptoEcosystem:oinsvestRisksnsiderationFinancial111Run/liquidityriskderfinancialtorandDeFiysubstitutionandbankrmediation1111PrudentialrequirementstoaddressmismatchesConcentrationlimitsCross-bordercooperationCompliancewithPFMI(fordesignatedandglobalstablecoinarrangements)ConsumerProtectionInvestor1111MisleadingdisclosuresInappropriateuseofclientassetstsofinterest1111DisclosureandauditrequirementsionofthereservessetsandrestrictionoftheeuseofreserveassetsImplementationofIOSCOmmendationsoncryptoadingplatformsrrestrictionsontheuserageOperationalCyber-Resiliency11OperationalfailuresCyberattacks111Requirementsfortherobustness,resiliency,andintegrityofoperatingsystemSegregationoftheclient’sprivatekeysincoldwalletsCompliancewiththePFMIwhereapplicableFinancialIntegrity1AML/CFT1AdoptFinancialActionTaskForcestandardsEmbracingthePotentialofStablecoinsWhileManaging11LackofsufficientpowersorscopeofregulatoryauthoritiesLackofregulatoryresourceandexpertise11LegislativechangetoempowerregulatorsAuthoritiestodeterminelegalicationofstablecoinsFINTECHNOTESRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:TheCaseofStablecoinsandArrangementsINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND10Introduction3TheFSBdefinesstablecoinsascryptoassetsthataimtomaintainastablevaluerelativetoaspecifiedassetortoapoolorbasketofassets.4Thisbroaddefinitionimpliesthatstablecoinscouldbebackedbyamonetaryunitofaccountsuchasthedollaroreuro,acommoditysuchasgold,oracurrencybasket.Thevalueofastablecoinasexpressedagainsttheassettowhichitispegged,wouldneedtobestableifitistoberedeemedatpar,incashimmediately,andatalltimes.MuchhingesonhoweffectivethestabilizationmechanismsareandwhetherastablecoinissuerhasthemeanstohonoraredemptionrequestSomestablecoinsmaybefarfromstable.Therefore,theuseofthetermtostablecoinsinthisnotemerelyfollowsacommonnamingconvention;itdoesnotimplyactualstability.5Thispaperfocusesonstablecoinswithafacevaluelinkedtoacommonlyusedmonetaryunitofaccountandbackedbyfinancialinstruments.Currently,stablecoinswithafacevaluelinkedtoamonetaryunitofaccount(forexample,dollar-backedstablecoins)areusedprimarilyincryptoassetmarketstoaccessothercryptoassetsacrossdifferentexchangesandaregrowingespeciallyrapidlyasameansofgeneratingyieldinDeFiapplications.Butthisclassofstablecoinscouldseerapidadoptionifitcanensurenominalstabilityrelativetoaunitofaccountwidelyusedtopricegoodsandservicesaswellasfinancialassets.Suchstablecoinscouldpotentiallybecomepopularasameansofpayment,includingacrossbordersandasastoreofvalue,andcompetewithotherformsofmoneysuchasbankdeposits,cashorevencentralbankdigitalcurrency(CBDC)ifintroduced.Foreigncurrencystablecoinscouldalsoleadtocurrencysubstitutioniftheyareusedasastoreofvalueandmeansofpaymentincountrieswithweakcurrencies.Thisnote—anditscompanionnoteonRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystem:ThecaseofUnbackedCryptoAssetsBainsandothers2022)—buildsonthekeyelementsofRegulationofCryptoAssetsCuervoandothers020).ThetwoFintechNotestogetherprovideacloserlookattheregulatorychallengesbroughtbyunbackedcryptoassetsasset-backedstablecoins,andtheirecosystem.InJanuary0,staffissuedaFintechNotediscussingvariouselementsontheregulationandsupervisionofcryptoassets.6Thenotecovered(1)riskassessmentofcryptoassets,initialcoinofferings,cryptoassetexchangesandstablecoins;and(2)regulationofcryptoassets,initialcoinofferings,andcryptoassetexchangesThatpaperraisedsomeimportantregulatoryissuesandconsiderationsofstablecoins;however,itdidnotdiscusstheirregulationindetail,nordiditlookcloselyatotherentitiesandfunctionsofthebroadercryptoassetecosystem.Thisnotereflectsevolvingmarketdevelopmentsandtheirassociatedrisksaswellasregulatoryandsupervisorydevelopments,andprovidesacloserlookatrapidlygrowingelementssuchasstablecoinsandtheirarrangements.Italsodiscussesotherkeyentities3Anyreferencetoexistingcryptoassetsandcompaniesinthispaperusespubliclyavailableinformationanddoesnotmeantoendorseoranalyzespecificfeaturesofcryptoassetsorarrangements.4Reference/work-of-the-fsb/financial-innovation-and-structural-change/crypto-assets-and-global-stablecoinsandglossaryin/wp-content/uploads/P160222.pdf.5Infact,manyifnotmostmarketed“stablecoins”areneitherstablenorcoins.SeeP.Krugman’sopinionpiece,“FromtheBigShorttotheBigScam,”TheNewYorkTimes,June6,2022.6Cuervo,Morozova,andSugimoto(2020),/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2020/01/09/Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-48810.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND11thatcarryoutcorefunctionsinthestablecoinecosystem.Themainpurposeofthisnoteistohelpregulatorsandsupervisorsidentifykeychallengesandrisks,providinghighlevelguidancefortheirconsiderationwhendesigningaregulatoryandsupervisoryapproachtoaddressrisks.ThisnoteispartofabroadersetofIMFpublicationsfocusedoncryptoassetsanddigitalmoney.InadditiontotheRegulationofCryptoAssetsFintechNote(Cuervoandothers2020),thecompanionFintechNoteRegulatingtheCryptoEcosystemTheCaseofUnbackedCryptoAssets(Bainsandotherscoverscloselyrelatedissuesofthewiderecosystem,suchascryptoassetexchangesandwalletserviceprovidersOtherIMFpublicationshavecoveredcryptoassetsandfinancialintegrity(Schwarzandothers2021),7digitalmoney,8andcapitalflowmanagementmeasuresinthedigitalage(Heandothers2022).9TheFintechNoteonblockchainconsensusmechanisms(Bains2022)focusesnarrowlyontheunderlyingtechnologythatdeliverscryptoassets.10ThegreaterroleofBigTechentitiesinthecryptoassetecosystemisanimportantdevelopment,andtheBigTechinFinancialServicesFintechNote(Bains,etal.2022)discussestheuniqueregulatoryconsiderationsrequiredtomanagetheirrisks.11TheIMFhasalsorecentlydedicatedtwoGlobalFinancialStabilityReport(GFSR)chapters,includingpolicyrecommendationstothecryptoassetecosystemAchapteroftheOctober2021GFSRexploresthegrowingsystemicriskofcryptoassets,includingstablecoins,12whiletheApril2022chaptercoversDeFilendinginwhichstablecoinsplayanimportantrole.Inthechapter,theauthorsarguethatproperstablecoinregulationisessentialfortheoverallstabilityofDeFiapplications.TheIMFhasalsodiscussedcryptoassetrisksinaseriesofblogsexploringboththerisksofcryptoassetsaslegaltender13andtheregulatoryimplicationsofthegrowthofcryptoassetmarkets.Thelatterblogcalledforaglobalregulatoryframeworkthatprovidesalevelplayingfieldalongtheactivityandriskspectrum,tobeledbyaglobalstandard-settingbody,suchastheFSB.14WhileCBDCisoutsidethescopeofthisnote,somerecommendationsmayberelevanttocomponentsoftheCBDCecosystemthathavesimilarcharacteristics.ServiceprovidersandtechnologiesrelatedtoCBDCcouldbesubjecttorisksandchallengessimilartothoseofstablecoinarrangementsandothercryptoecosystemstotheextentthattheyrelyonprivatesectorfirmstoprovidecriticalservices,asmostCBDCprojectsdoThesemayincludetechnologyvendorsandwalletserviceproviders,whichshouldbesubjecttothesameregulatoryapproachesdiscussedinthisnote.WhyStablecoinRegulationMattersStablecoinshavegrownrapidlywithmarketcapitalizationquadruplingin21(Figure1),coupledwiththegrowthofDeFi.Marketcapitalizationreachedapeakofover$175billioninDecember202115beforefallingtolessthanbillionbymid-2022.Duringthephaseofrapidgrowthin2021,stablecointrading7VirtualAssetsandAnti-MoneyLaunderingandCombatingtheFinancingofTerrorism(1)().8TheRiseofPublicandPrivateDigitalMoney().9CapitalFlowManagementMeasuresintheDigitalAge().10BlockchainConsensusMechanisms().11BigTechinFinancialServices().12GlobalFinancialStabilityReport,October2021().13CryptoassetsasNationalCurrency?AStepTooFar(IMFBlog).14GlobalCryptoRegulationShouldbeComprehensive,Consistent,andCoordinated(IMFBlog).15AccordingtoDeFiPulse;see/.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND12volumesoutpacedthoseofallothercryptoassets,primarilybecausetheyareusableforthesettlementofspotandderivativetradesacrosscryptoassetplatformsandapplicationswithouttheneedtoconverttofiatcurrencies.DeFialsogrewduringthisperiodtoaround$100billionbyDecember2021,16supportedbytheavailabilityofstablecoinsinasymbiotictwo-wayrelationship,beforefallingsignificantlyin2022.ThegrowthofstablecoinsislinkedtothegrowthofcryptomarketsandDeFi.Stablecoinsarethe“currency”ofDeFiandenableotherservices.DeFiaimstoprovidefinancialserviceswithoutcentralizedfinancialentities,althoughcentralizationexiststovaryingdegrees.Itoperatesonpermissionlessblockchainswherefinancialtransactionsareexecutedautomaticallybasedonpredefinedconditionsthroughprogrammedsmartcontracts.Operationssuchasdevelopingprotocols,decision-making,andliquidationareconductedautonomouslyandoftenanonymously.WhileDeFiactivitiesaremostlyconductedonchain,adminkeyandgovernancetokenholdersprovideanavenueofcentralization.17TheGFSRobservedthatDeFiseemstobelargelyusedbyasmallnumberofinstitutionalentities,butbecauseofpseudonymityofon-chaindata,thesewerenotidentifiable.Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhoseentitiesinclu