德國(guó)雙層結(jié)構(gòu)上市企業(yè)監(jiān)事個(gè)體獨(dú)立性分析,比較法論文本篇論文目錄導(dǎo)航：【題目】德國(guó)雙層構(gòu)造上市企業(yè)監(jiān)事個(gè)體獨(dú)立性分析【引言】【第一章】【第二章】【第三章】【4.1】【4.2】【結(jié)論/以下為參考文獻(xiàn)】摘要在公司內(nèi)部治理中行使監(jiān)督職能的人員的個(gè)人獨(dú)立性問(wèn)題，最初是在盎格魯撒克遜公司治理單一構(gòu)造法律傳統(tǒng)中，以克制監(jiān)督與管理在統(tǒng)一機(jī)構(gòu)〔Board〕下自個(gè)監(jiān)督自個(gè)的窘境為目的而進(jìn)行討論與研究的。但隨著時(shí)代發(fā)展，德國(guó)公司法長(zhǎng)久以來(lái)確立的監(jiān)督與管理機(jī)關(guān)人事、職能相分離的雙層形式中主要以監(jiān)督董事會(huì)對(duì)公司的管理為任務(wù)的監(jiān)事會(huì)的成員獨(dú)立性問(wèn)題也越來(lái)越遭到立法、理論界和實(shí)踐的重視。本文主要研究德國(guó)上市股份公司內(nèi)部治理雙層構(gòu)造中監(jiān)事個(gè)人獨(dú)立性保障的必要性和相關(guān)法律規(guī)范。全文共分為四章：第一章，德國(guó)公司內(nèi)部治理雙層構(gòu)造要義。首先，對(duì)監(jiān)事個(gè)人獨(dú)立性法律規(guī)范產(chǎn)生作用所依靠的基本法律框架加以分析和總結(jié)。華而不實(shí)第一節(jié)研究監(jiān)事會(huì)與董事會(huì)在人事上、職能上相分離的原則確立的主要法律規(guī)范，接下來(lái)簡(jiǎn)述德國(guó)雙層構(gòu)造中重要特征員工共同決定制度，作為法律上容忍的監(jiān)事個(gè)人利益沖突存在的制度，為本文研究設(shè)定了一定的限制。由于共同決定制度最初設(shè)計(jì)理念是實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)的滿意度，其相關(guān)法律規(guī)范分散于各個(gè)共同決定法案中，并牽涉憲法、勞動(dòng)法的特殊規(guī)則，而本文主要從公司法視角出發(fā)，因此在下文將不對(duì)員工代表在監(jiān)事會(huì)中的獨(dú)立性問(wèn)題作特殊討論，而只關(guān)注于股東一方代表監(jiān)事的獨(dú)立性。接下來(lái)簡(jiǎn)述雙層構(gòu)造主要缺陷監(jiān)事會(huì)與董事會(huì)溝通不暢、對(duì)監(jiān)督對(duì)象的信息把握缺乏。為克制此缺陷，德國(guó)立法者通過(guò)(股份法〕改革實(shí)現(xiàn)了監(jiān)事會(huì)的職能擴(kuò)張。本章最后概括了德國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)當(dāng)前雙層構(gòu)造的看法：固然監(jiān)事會(huì)的職能行使不完善被人長(zhǎng)期詬病，但研究證明并不是雙層構(gòu)造本身的問(wèn)題，任何一種形式都有其利弊，且兩種主要形式正在相互趨同化發(fā)展。因而，學(xué)界普遍以為，放棄雙層形式是沒(méi)有必要的。第二章，監(jiān)事會(huì)職能與監(jiān)事獨(dú)立性問(wèn)題。為應(yīng)對(duì)雙層構(gòu)造監(jiān)督缺陷而進(jìn)行的監(jiān)事會(huì)職能擴(kuò)張，對(duì)監(jiān)事會(huì)成員個(gè)人獨(dú)立性提出了新挑戰(zhàn)。首先是歷史考察。從1884年之前的(德意志普通商法典〕到今日受歐盟法影響并被(德國(guó)公司治理準(zhǔn)則〕所補(bǔ)充的(股份法〕中確定的雙層構(gòu)造及監(jiān)事會(huì)職能，監(jiān)事會(huì)與董事會(huì)的職能劃分經(jīng)歷了由模糊到清楚明晰再到相互融合的一個(gè)否認(rèn)之否認(rèn)的經(jīng)過(guò)。接下來(lái)重點(diǎn)考察現(xiàn)行法中監(jiān)事會(huì)的基本職能能監(jiān)督與咨詢。作為職能擴(kuò)大的表現(xiàn)，本文以監(jiān)事會(huì)特定事項(xiàng)保存權(quán)為例討論德國(guó)現(xiàn)行法中雙層構(gòu)造的界線能否已被突破。最后分析監(jiān)事會(huì)職能擴(kuò)大，十分是咨詢職能的發(fā)展給監(jiān)事個(gè)人獨(dú)立性帶來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)。得出結(jié)論：正是由于監(jiān)事會(huì)職能的擴(kuò)大，監(jiān)事個(gè)人獨(dú)立性保障問(wèn)題在公司治理討論中尤為重要。第三章，利益沖突與獨(dú)立性。由于個(gè)案中與制度性的利益沖突的存在，十分是德國(guó)監(jiān)事會(huì)成員兼職的角色設(shè)定，使得監(jiān)事不能以公司利益為唯一利益導(dǎo)向而進(jìn)行獨(dú)立公正的判定。利益沖突與監(jiān)事的不獨(dú)立性認(rèn)定有直接關(guān)聯(lián)。對(duì)利益沖突進(jìn)行規(guī)范，是保障監(jiān)事的個(gè)人獨(dú)立性的重要方式。第四章，監(jiān)事獨(dú)立性保障制度的規(guī)范分析。對(duì)公司治理實(shí)踐產(chǎn)生作用的規(guī)范主要是立法和作為軟法的(公司治理準(zhǔn)則〕。本文對(duì)(公司治理準(zhǔn)則〕作用機(jī)制和法律意義作了分析，以為這種方式可有效解決公司治理中公司自治與法律強(qiáng)迫之間的矛盾。而其產(chǎn)生作用的詳細(xì)表現(xiàn)，則結(jié)合接下來(lái)的(股份法〕規(guī)范進(jìn)行分析。在這一章中，本文著重對(duì)第100條第5款中概念的不確定性，和法律后果確定困難的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究。并得出結(jié)論：法律后果確定困難的問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生于事物本身的矛盾。對(duì)這一問(wèn)題的解決，當(dāng)前最有效的方式是通過(guò)法院個(gè)案認(rèn)定構(gòu)成案例群以抽象出規(guī)則，彌補(bǔ)法律空白帶來(lái)的法的不安寧性。(股份法〕第161條確立的遵守或者解釋的機(jī)制，結(jié)合(公司治理準(zhǔn)則〕詳細(xì)條款，通過(guò)市場(chǎng)而不是法律強(qiáng)迫的方式對(duì)公司治理的完善產(chǎn)生作用。本文關(guān)鍵詞語(yǔ)：德國(guó)上市公司雙層構(gòu)造監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)事個(gè)人獨(dú)立性公司治理ABSTRACTDiscussiononthethemetheindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardincorporategovernance,washoldoriginallyonlyintheregionfollowingthetraditionofAnglo-Saxonlaw.Toremedythedefectonecan?tcontrolitselfinauniformboard,theAnglo-SaxonlawhasdevelopedOutsideDirectorsSystem.Withthedevelopment,however,inGermanycorporationlaw,thatoveralongtimethetwo-tierboardsystemseparationbetweenamanagementboard(Vorstand)andasupervisoryboard(Aufsichtsrat)-rules,theproblemindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardisattractingmoreandmoreattention.Thismaster?sdissertationfocusonthetheme,thenecessityoftheindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardincorporategovernanceinGermanystockexchange-listedcompaniesandrelativeregulations.Thisdissertationisdividedinto4chaptersasfollows:ChapterOnestudiesthecrucialfactorsofthetwo-tiersystem.Firstly,itanalyzesandsummarizetheframework,onwhichtheindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardincorporategovernancerelies.Thefirstsectiondiscussesontheprincipleofbothpersonnelandfunctionalseparationbetweenamanagementboardandasupervisoryboard.Andthendescribebrieflythefeaturesofco-determinationregime.Asaregime,thatreflectsthetoleranceofconflictsofinterestsbylaw,itdefinedthelimitofmydissertation.Sincetheconceptofco-determinationregimeistorealizethesocialsatisfaction,furthermore,itreferstomanyotherlawdomainsincludingconstructionlaw,laborlaw,etc.,whilemeinedissertationcomposesjustinacorporategovernance?perspective.Thereforeinfollowingparagraphsthespecificproblemsrelatedtotherepresentativesoftheworkforceareignoredandonlytheindependenceoftherepresentativesofshareholdersisdiscussed.Theninthenextsectionisrevealedthemainflawsofthetwo-tierstructure-lackofcommunicationbetweenmanagementboardandsupervisoryboard,andthesupervisoryboardisnotenoughinformed.Inordertoremedythisdefect,GermanylawmakersexpandthefunctionofsupervisoryboardbymeansofthereformoftheAktG.AttheendofthisChapterissummarizedtheopinionsofGermanyscholars:althoughthefunctionofsupervisoryboardworksinadequatelyinthepractice,thedefectsyetdoesntresultfromthetwo-tiersystemitself.Everystructureinthecorporategovernancehasitsadvantagesanddisadvantages.Inadditiontothis,boththemainstructuresareconvergingwitheachother.Therefore,currentlyprevailingviewinjurisdictionandexpertsliteraturebelieveitnotnecessarytoabandontwo-tiersystem.ChapterTwodealswiththefunctionofboardofsupervisorsandtheindependenceofindividualsupervisors.Theexpansionofthefunctionofboardofsupervisorsinmoderntimeschallengestheindependenceofindividualsupervisors.Thedivisionofthefunctionsofboardofdirectorsandboardofsupervisorshasgonethroughthreestagesblurred,distinct,blendedfrombefore1884tothetwo-tierstructureandthefunctionsofboardofsupervisorswhichareinfluencedbytodayseuropeanlawsanddeterminbyAktGsupplementedbyGermanCorporateGovernanceCode.Thechapterthenexploresthebasicfunctionofboardofsupervisorsundercurrentlawssupervisionandconsultancy.Mydissertationdiscussesthatiftheboarderofthedouble-tierstructurehasbeenbrokenthroughundercurrentGermanlaw,basedonagreementreservationforthesupervisoryboardanexampleofthefunctionexpansionofboardofsupervisors.Thenthechapteranalyzesthechallenges,facedbyindividualsupervisors,arisingfromtheexpansionofboardofsupervisorsfunction,especiallythefunctionofconsultancy,anddrawstheconclusion:itistheexpansionoffunctionoftheboardthatmakestheindependenceofindividualsupervisorsanimportantissueforthediscussionofcorporategovernance.ChapterThreeisconcernedwithconflictsofinterestandindependence.Duetotheconflictsofinterestbetweenindividualsupervisorsandthecorporation,inparticularthedoubleroleofthesupervisorsinGermany,theindividualsupervisorcannotmakeindependentandfairjudgmentssolelyintheinterestofthecompany.Theconflictsofinterestisdirectlyrelatedtothedependenceofamember?saffirmation.Toregulatetheinterestconflictsisanimportantwaytosecuretheindependenceofindividualsupervisors.ChapterFouranalyzestheregulationsprovidedforasystemthatsecurestheindependenceofsupervisors.LegislationandGermanCorporateGovernanceCode(assoftlaw)arethemajorregulationsthathaveeffectonthepracticeofcorporategovernance.ThedissertationmakesanalysisonthemechanismandlegalsignificanceofGermanCorporateGovernanceCode,andfindsthatGermanCorporateGovernanceCodecaneffectivelyresolvethecontradictionbetweencorporateself-governanceandmandatorylaw.DetailsoftheeffectivenessofGermanCorporateGovernanceCodeisanalyzedtogetherwiththestipulationsofAktG.ThisChapterfocusesontheambiguityofthedefinitioninItem5ofArticle100,andthedifficultyindecidingthelegalresult,anddrawstheconclusionthattheproblemindecidingthelegalresultderivesfromthenatureofthings.Toresolvethisproblem,themosteffectivemethodcurrentlyistoabstractrulesfromagroupofcasesruledbycourt.ThecomplyorexplainsystemsetforthinArticle161ofAktG,combinedwiththestipulationsofGermanCorporateGovernanceCode,improvescorporategovernancethroughmarketmechanism,ratherthanmandatoryprovisionsoflaw.Attheendofthischapter,adviceisprovidedforthecorpor