1、格雷厄姆-多德都市的超級投資者們THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE巴菲特1984年在哥倫比亞大學的著名演講（上）blogbuffett 編輯年在慶祝格雷罕姆與多德合著的證券分析發行周年大會上，巴菲特這位格雷厄姆在哥倫比亞大學的投資課上唯一給了“A”的最優秀的學生進行了一次題為“格雷厄姆-多德都市的超級投資者們” (The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville)”的演講，在他演講中回顧了50年來格雷厄姆的追隨者們采用價值投資策略持續戰勝市場的無可爭議的事實，總結歸納出價值投資策略的精髓，在投資界具有非常

2、大的影響力。THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLETilsonfunds EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is an edited transcript of a talk given at Columbia University in 1984 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Security Analysis , written by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. This specialized volume firs

3、t introduced the ideas later popularized in The Intelligent Investor . Buffett's essay offers a fascinating study of how Graham's disciples have used Graham's value investing approach to realize phenomenal success in the stock market.  Is the Graham and Dodd "look for valu

4、es with a significant margin of safety relative to prices" approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company's prospe

5、cts and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. "If pri

6、ces fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out," writes one of today's textbook authors. 格雷厄姆與多德追求“價值遠超過價格的安全保障”，這種證券分析方法是否已經過時?目前許多撰寫教科書的教授認為如此。他們認為，股票市場是有效率的市場；換言之，股票價格已經充分反應了公司一切己知的事實以及整體經濟情況：這些理論家認為，市場上沒有價格偏低的股票，因為聰明的證券分析師將運用全部的既有資訊，以確保適當的價格。投資者能

7、經年累月地擊敗市場，純粹是運氣使然。“如果價格完全反應既有的資訊，則這類的投資技巧將不存在?！币晃滑F今教科書的作者如此與寫道。Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index. The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to

8、this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago. Absent this condition - that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for y

9、ou this morning - I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all of these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the sta

10、ted records. 或許如此！但是，我要提供一組投資者的績效供各位參考，他們長期的表現總是超越史坦普500種股價指數。他們的績效即使純屬巧合，這項假說至少也值得我們加以審查。審查的關鍵事實是，我早就熟識這些贏家，而且長年以來便視他們為超級投資者，最近的認知也有十五年之久。缺少這項條件換言之，如果我最近才從成千上萬的記錄中挑選幾個名字，并且在今天早上提供給各位我建議各位立即停止閱讀本文。我必須說明，所有的這些記錄都經過稽核。我必須再說明，我認識許多上述經理人的客戶，他們長年以來所收取的支票確實符合既有的記錄。 Before we begin this examination, I woul

11、d like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let's assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who calle

12、d wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a lit

13、tle over $1,000.在進行審查之前，我要各位設想場全國性的擲銅板大賽。讓我們假定，全美國225億的人口在明天早晨起床時都擲出一枚一美元的銅板。早晨太陽升起時，他們都走到門外擲銅板，并猜銅板出現的正面或反面。如果猜對了，他們將從猜錯者的手中贏得一美元。每大都有輸家遭到淘汰，獎金則不斷地累積。經過十個早晨的十次投擲之后，全美國約有22萬人連續十次猜對擲銅板的結果。每人所贏得的資金約超過1000美元。 Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being w

14、hat it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping. 現在，這群人可能會開始炫耀自己的戰績，此乃人的天性使然。他們可能保持謙虛的態度，但在雞尾酒宴會中，他們偶爾會以此技巧吸引異性的注意，并炫耀其投擲銅板的奇異

15、洞察力。 Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would hav

16、e been lost, $225 million would have been won. 假定贏家都可以從輸家手中得到適當的獎金，再經過十天，約有215個人連續二十次猜對擲銅板的結果，每個人并贏得大約100萬美元的獎金。輸家總共付出225億美元，贏家則得到225億美元。 By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on "How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Secon

17、ds a Morning." Worse yet, they'll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, " If it can't be done, why are there 215 of us?" 這時候，這群人可能完全沉迷在自己的成就中：他們可能開始著書立說：“我如何每天早晨工作30秒，而在二十天之內將美元變成100萬美元?！?/p>

18、更糟的是，他們會在全國各地參加講習會，宣揚如何有效地投擲銅板，并且反駁持懷疑態度的教授說，“如果這是不可能的事，為什么會有我們這215個人呢?” By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same - 215 egotistical orangutans with 20

19、straight winning flips. 但是，某商學院的教授可能會粗魯地提出項事實，如果225億只猩猩參加這場大賽，結果大致上也是如此有215只自大的猩猩將連續贏得20次的投擲。 I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population

20、 is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he's feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books th

21、ey read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors. 然而，我必須說明，前述事例和我即將提出的案例，兩者之間存在著若干重大差異。旨先，如果(a)你所選擇的225億只猩猩的分布狀況大致上和美國的人口分布相同；

22、如果(b)經過20天的競賽，只剩下215只贏家；如果(c)你發現其中有40只猩猩來自于奧瑪哈的某個動物園，則其中必有蹊蹺。于是，你會詢問猩猩管理員各種問題，它們吃什么飼料、是否做特殊的運動、閱讀什么書籍換言之，如果你發現成功案例有非比尋常的集中現象，則你希望判定此異常的特色是否是成功的原因。 Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer - with, say, 1,500 cases a ye

23、ar in the United States - and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it's not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not nece

24、ssarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search. 科學的調查也遵循此一形態。如果你試圖分析某種罕見的癌癥原因例如，美國每年只有1500個病例而你發現蒙大拿州的某個礦區小鎮便產生400個病例，則你必然對當地的飲水、病患的職業或其他種種變數產生興趣。你知道，在個小鎮中發生400個病例，絕不是隨機因素所造成。雖然你未必了解病因，但你知道從哪里著手調查。 I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. I

25、n addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of win

26、ners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village. 除了地理國家，還有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，還有我所謂“智力的起源”。我認為各位將在投資領域發現，不成比例的銅板投擲贏家來自于一個極小的智力村莊它可以稱為“格雷厄姆一多德都市”。這個特殊智力村存在著許多贏家這種集中現象絕非巧合所能夠解釋。 Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimporta

27、nt. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin wo

28、uld mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let's assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, whe

29、n the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father's call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous h

30、ereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn't have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.在某些情況下，即使非比尋常的集中現象也可能不重要。或許有100個只是模仿某一位極具說

31、服力的領導者，而依其主張來猜測銅板的投擲結果。當他猜正面，100個追隨者也會自動地做相同的猜測。如果這一位領導者是屬于最后215位贏家之一，則這100也便屬于同一個智力起源，這項事實便不具有任何意義，因為100個案例實際上只代表一個案例。同理，假定你生活在一個父權結構極為嚴密的社會，而美國每一個家庭都恰好以父親馬首是瞻。20天之后，你將發現215位贏家是來自于215個家庭。若干天真的分析師可能因此而認為，成功地猜測鋼板投擲的結果，其中具有高度的遺傳因素。當然，這實際上不具有任何意義，因為你所擁有的不是215位個別贏家，而只是215個隨機分布的家庭。 In this group of succe

32、ssful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their "flips" in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks

33、and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each

34、student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory. 我所要考慮的這一群成功投資者，共有一位共同的智力族長本杰明·格雷厄姆。但是，這些離開此智力家族的孩童，都是依據非常不同的方法猜測他們自己的“銅板”。他們各自前往不同的地方，買賣不同的股票和企業，但他們的綜合績效絕對無法用隨機因素加以解釋。他們做相同的猜測，并不是因為領導者下達某一項指令，因此也無法用這種方式解釋他們的表現。族知只提供了猜測銅板的智力理論，每位學生都必須自行決定如何運用這項理論。 The common intellectual theme of t

35、he investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are

36、bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks - I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week

37、 or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those sam

38、e businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focu

39、s on two variables: price and value. 來自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資者所具備的共同智力結構是：他們探索企業的價值與該企業市場價格之間的差異。事實上，他們利用其間的差異，卻不在意效率市場理論家所關心的問題：股票究竟在星期一或星期：買進，或是在一月份或七月份買進。當企業家買進某家公司時這正是格雷厄姆一多德都市的投資者透過上市股票所從事的行為我懷疑有多少人會在意交易必須發生于某個月份或某個星期的第一天。如果企業的買進交易發生在星期一或星期五沒有任何差別，則我無法了解學術界人士為何要花費大量的時間和精力，探討代表該企業部分股權的交易發生時的差異。毋庸多說，格雷厄姆

40、一多德都市的投資者并不探討bate、資本資產定價模型、證券投資報酬本的變異數。這些都不足他們所關心的議題。事實上，他們大多數難以界定上述學術名詞。他們只在乎兩項實數：價格與價值。 I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been mar

41、ked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them. It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility; it's s

42、imply that the data are there and academicians have worked hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything look

43、s like a nail. 面對圖形分析師所研究的價量行為，我始終感覺驚訝。你是否會僅僅因為某家公司的市場價格在本周或前一周劇揚便決定購買該企業呢?在日前電腦化的時代，人們之所以會大量研究價格與成交量的行為，理由是這兩項變數擁有了無數的資料。研究未必是因為其具任何功用；而只是因為資料既然存在，學術界人士便必須努力學習操作這些資料所需要的數學技巧。旦擁有這些技巧，不去運用它們便會帶來罪惡感，即使這些技巧的運用沒有任何功用，或只會帶來負面功用也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所說的，對一位持鐵錘的人來說，每樣事看起來都像是釘子。 I think the group that we have identif

44、ied by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentrati

45、on of value-oriented winners.我認為，這一群具有共同智力起源的投資者非常值得我們研究。雖然學術界不斷地對價格、成交量、季節性、資本規模以及其他變數，研究它們對股票績效的影響，但這群以價值為導向贏家的方法卻毫不受人關心。 I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four - I have not selected

46、these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham's class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the "pe

47、asant" level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it's possible to trace the record of three.關于這一項績效的研究，我首先要追溯到從1954年到1956年間，工作于GrehamNewman公司的四位伙伴。我們總共四個人我并不是從數以千計的對象中挑選這四個人。在我選修本杰明·格雷厄姆的課程之后，我要求進人GrahamNewman公司擔任無給職的工作，但格雷厄姆卻以價值高估而拒絕了我的要求。他對價值看得非常嚴重！經我

48、不斷地懇求，他最后答應雇我。當時公司有三位合伙股東，以及我們四位“學徒”。公司結束經營之后，我們四個人陸續在1955年到1957年間離開公司，目前只能夠追蹤其中三個人的投資記錄。 The first example (see Table 1*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Gra

49、ham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what "Adam Smith" - after I told him about Walter - wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):第一個案例（*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件）是華特·史洛斯。華特從來沒有念過大學，但他在紐約金融協會參加了本杰明·葛雷厄姆的夜間課程。華特在1955年離開GrehamNewman公司。以下是“亞當·

50、史密斯”在我和他談論有關華特的事跡之后在超級金錢(Supermoney，1972年) 一書中對他所做的描述： He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that's about it.他從來不運用或接觸有用的資訊。在華爾街幾

51、乎沒有人認識他，所以沒有人提供他有關投資的觀念。他只參考手冊上的數字，并要求企業寄年報給他，情況便是如此。 In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. "He never forgets that he is handling other people's money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss." He has total integrity and a realist

52、ic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real - and from this flows an attraction to the "margin of safety" principle.當華特介紹我們認識時，他曾經描述“他從來沒有忘記自己是在管理別人的資金，這進一步強化了他對于風險的厭惡?！彼懈呱械钠犯癫⒁詣諏嵉膽B度自持。對他來說金錢是真實的，股票也真實的并從此而接受了“安全邊際”的原則。 Walter has diversified enormously, owning well ov

53、er 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that's all he does. He doesn't worry about whether it it's January, he doesn't worry about whether it's Monday, he doesn't worry about whether

54、it's an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do - and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don'

55、t seem to have very much influence on Walter. That's one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.華特的投資組合極為分散，目前擁有的股票遠越過100支。他了解如何選股，將價格遠低于其價值者出售給私人投資者。這便是他所做的一切。他不擔心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不關心今年是不是大選年。他的想法非常單純，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能夠以40美分買進，我遲早會獲利。他便是如此不斷地行動：他所持有的股票種類遠比我的多而且比我更不關心企業的本質；我對華特似乎沒有

56、太大的影響力。這是他的長處之，沒有人能夠對他產生足夠的影響力。 The second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Colum

57、bia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd's course again, and took Ben Graham's course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom t

58、o ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach!第二個案例是湯姆·科納普，他曾經和我一起在GrehamNewman公司工作。湯姆于大戰之前曾在普林斯頓大學主修化學，大戰結束之后，他經常在海灘游蕩。某一天，他得知大衛·多德將在可倫比亞大學開夜間投資課程。湯姆以旁聽方式選修該課程，之后他對投資學科產生了濃厚的興趣，于是正式注冊進入哥倫比亞大學商學院，并且獲得了MBA學位

59、。35年之后，我撥 給湯姆，確定某些有關此一主題的事，我發現他仍然在海灘游蕩。惟的差別是他目前擁有一片海灘！In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide

60、 diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.在1968年，湯姆與艾德·安德生也是葛拉漢的信徒以及其他一、兩位有共同信念的人，組成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投資高度分散。他們偶爾會從事控制股權的投資，但其被動式的投資績效約略等于控權式投資的表現。 Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership