WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUs

abouttheEnergyTransition?

SrutakirtiMukherjeeandDanielRaimi

Report23-16

November2023

AbouttheAuthors

SrutakirtiMukherjeeisaPhDstudentintheDepartmentofEconomicsatthe

UniversityofWyoming.Herareasofinterestsarenaturalresourceandenvironmentaleconomicsandenergyeconomics.SrutakirtiholdsaBSfromUniversityofCalcuttaandaMSfromtheUniversityofWyoming.

DanielRaimiafellowatRFFandalecturerattheGeraldR.FordSchoolofPublic

PolicyattheUniversityofMichigan.Heworksonarangeofenergypolicyissueswithafocusontoolstoenableanequitableenergytransition.HehaspublishedinacademicjournalsincludingScience,ScienceAdvances,EnvironmentalScienceandTechnology,JournalofEconomicPerspectives,ReviewofEnvironmentalEconomicsandPolicy,

EnergyResearchandSocialScience,andEnergyPolicy,inpopularoutletsincluding

TheNewRepublic,Newsweek,Slate,andFortune,andquotedextensivelyinnationalmediaoutletssuchasCNN,NPR’sAllThingsConsidered,NewYorkTimes,WallStreetJournal,andmanymore.Hehaspresentedhisresearchforpolicymakers,industry,andotherstakeholdersaroundtheUnitedStatesandinternationally,includingbeforetheUSSenateBudgetCommitteeandtheEnergyandMineralResourcesSubcommitteeoftheUSHouse’sNaturalResourcesCommittee.In2017,hepublishedTheFracking

Debate(ColumbiaUniversityPress),abookthatcombinesstoriesfromhistravelstodozensofoil-andgas-producingregionswithadetailedexaminationofkeypolicyissues.

AboutRFF

ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutionin

Washington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.RFFis

committedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.

TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.

ResourcesfortheFuturei

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WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUsabouttheEnergyTransition?ii

Abstract

Place-basedpoliciesdesignedtosupportfossilfuel–dependentcommunitiesare

emergingintheUnitedStatesandabroad.However,therehasbeenlittleanalysistounderstandwhich,ifany,existingplace-basedeconomicdevelopmentpoliciescan

serveasmodelsintheenergytransition.Inthisanalysis,wereviewtheempirical

evidenceontheeffectivenessofthreemajorfederallyfundedplace-basedeconomicdevelopmentprograms,thenassesstheirrelevancetotheenergytransition.Wefindthatexistingpolicies,dependingontheirdesigndetails,canbeeffectiveindirectinginvestmentandimprovinglocaleconomicoutcomesintargetedlocations.However,theseprogramscancontributetoneighborhoodgentrification,andeconomicbenefitsmayflowprimarilytoresidentslivingoutsidethetargetedcommunity.Adaptinganyofthesepoliciestoanenergytransitioncontextwouldrequirechangesineligibility

criteria,geographictargeting,selectionmechanisms,andmore.Weofferseveral

conceptualmodelsforhowsuchpoliciescouldbestructuredbutcautionthatmuchadditionalresearchandcommunityengagementwillbeneededtodeterminewhichmixofinterventionsislikelytobemosteffectiveinensuringanequitabletransitiontowardacleanenergyfuture.

ResourcesfortheFutureiii

Contents

1.Introduction1

2.KeyFindingsfromtheLiterature3

2.1.EmpowermentZones3

2.2.NewMarketsTaxCredit4

2.3.OpportunityZones5

3.ImplicationsfortheEnergyTransition6

4.Conclusions8

5.References9

WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUsabouttheEnergyTransition?iv

1.Introduction

Thetransitionawayfrompollutingenergysourceshasseriousimplicationsforlocal

communitiesthatareheavilyreliantonfossilenergyproductionforjobs,economic

growth,andgovernmentrevenue.Oneoptiontomitigatetheeconomicdisruption

isthroughfederalprogramsthatspecificallytargetthesecommunitiestohelpthem

buildeconomicresilienceagainstanuncertainfuture.Suchplace-basedpoliciesare

notnewandhavepreviouslysoughttostimulateeconomicgrowthindisadvantaged

communitiesbyincentivizingprivateinvestments.Indeed,recentfederalpolicysuchastheInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsActandInflationReductionActincludeplace-basedenergy-relatedprovisionsthatwillcreatehubsforspecificenergytechnologiesincertainregions,incentivizeinvestmentincoalcommunities,andmore.

Inthisreport,wesummarizetheempiricalevidenceanddrawlessonsfromscholarlyarticlesthathaveexaminedtheimpactsofUSfederalplace-basedeconomic

developmentpolicies1Ourobjectiveistounderstandwhether,andtowhatextent,previouspoliciescaninformfutureplace-basedpoliciestargetingfossilenergy–dependentcommunities.

Ourreviewfocusesonthreeprograms—EmpowermentZones(EZs),Opportunity

Zones(OZs),andNewMarketsTaxCredit(NMTC)—eachofwhichseekstospur

privateinvestmentineconomicallydistressedcommunitiesusingtaxincentivesandgrants.Theseprogramsdifferacrossavarietyofdimensions,includingeligibility

criteria,selectionmechanisms,andtheavailableincentives,whichwesummarize

brieflyinTable1.Foradditionaldetailonthehistoryanduniquefeaturesofeach

program,seeMarples(2011,2022a,b).

1Notethatwedonotfocusonlocal-orstate-levelplace-basedpolicies,whichhavebeenwidelycritiquedascostlyandineffective(e.g.,Bartik2020;Decker2020).

WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUsabouttheEnergyTransition?1

2.KeyFindingsfromtheLiterature

2.1.EmpowermentZones

In1993,CongressbeganallocatingfundstosupportqualifiedEZsandtheir

counterparts,EnterpriseCommunitiesandRenewalCommunities(throughoutthis

analysis,weusetheterm“EZ”torefertoallthreetypesofcommunities),withfunds

jointlyadministeredbymultiplefederalagencies(GAO2022).Overallfundingfortheseprogramshasbeenfairlymodest,totaling$1.8billion(2011US$)from1993through

2011(Marples2011),withestimatedfuturetaxexpendituresof$1.2billionfrom2022through2026(JointCommitteeonTaxation2022).

Empiricalevidenceontheeffectivenessoftheprogramismixed,withsomestudies

findingsubstantialeconomicbenefitsbutothersreportinglittleeffect.Atthenationallevel,KrupkaandNoonan(2009)observeanincreaseinhomevaluesof25percent

ormoreasaresultoftheEZprogram(aresultthatimplieslocalgentrificationand

potentiallyregressiveeconomicoutcomes).Hametal.(2011)concludethatEZ

designationreducedlocalunemploymentratesby1.6percent,decreasedpovertyratesby6.1percent,andincreasedwagesandemployment.Usingconfidentialmicrodata,

Bussoetal.(2013)reportthat,relativetoasimilarcomparisongroup,theinitialroundoftheprogramledtoa12–31percentincreaseintractemploymentandan8-3percentincreaseinwagesfortractresidents.ReynoldsandRohlin(2015)findthatonaverageEZdesignationincreasedhouseholdincomebyroughly$2,000andhomevaluesby

$27,000comparedwithacounterfactualscenario.However,theynotethatmostof

thesebenefitsaccruedtohigher-incomehouseholdsandthatthemostdisadvantagedhouseholdsdidnotbenefitfromtheprogram.

Takingamorelocalizedview,RichandStoker(2010)identifyvariedeffectsacross

jurisdictions.Infiveofthesixmajorcitiestheyexamine,thenumberofjobsandlevelofinvestmentimprovedduetoEZdesignation.TheeffectsoftheEZprogramonothermeasures,suchasunemploymentratesandhousinginvestment,weremoremixed.

However,notallanalysesfindpositiveeffects.Forexample,OakleyandTsao(2006),whofocusondatafromfourlargeUScities,reportthatEZdesignationhadno

statisticallysignificanteffectonlocalincome,unemployment,orpovertyrateswhen

comparedwithagroupofnon-EZcensustractsthattheauthorsidentifyusing

propensityscorematching.Hanson(2009)observesthatEZdesignationslightly

increasedlocalresidents’employmentinanordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regression

approachbuthadnoeffectwhenusinganinstrumentalvariableapproachthat

accountedforendogeneityissuespresentintheOLSapproach.Additionally,NeumarkandYoung(2019)reanalyzeHametal.(2011)andarguethatendogeneityinthe

selectionofEZsrenderstheirfindingslargelymoot.TheauthorsalsocontendthatEZsingeneral,particularlywhenimplementedbystategovernments,areineffective.

WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUsabouttheEnergyTransition?3

Inanotherrelevantanalysis,HansonandRohlin(2011)focusonhowEZdesignation

mayalterthecompositionofinvestmentandemploymentinacommunity.Theauthorsfindthatretailandservicesectorestablishmentsexpandby0.16to0.30percent,

whiletransportation,finance,insurance,andrealestateindustriesdeclineby0.16to0.19percent.Theyhypothesizethatthesechangesinindustrycompositionreflectbusinesses’differentialabilitytotakeadvantageofthetaxcredits,whichprimarilyincentivizespendingonlabor(ratherthancapital).

2.2.NewMarketsTaxCredit

TheNewMarketsTaxCredit(NMTC)offersincentivesforcapitalinvestmentineligiblecommunitiesthroughCommunityDevelopmentEntities(CDEs)andcansupport

privatesectorenterprisesorcommunityfacilitiessuchasschoolsormuseums.CDEsseekinvestors,thenapplyfortaxcreditsallocatedthroughacompetitiveprocess

administeredbytheCommunityDevelopmentFinancialInstitutionsFundwithinthe

DepartmentofTreasury.IftheCDEisawardedcredits,investorsintheCDEbenefit

fromacreditvalueof5–6percentannuallyoveraseven-yearperiodbasedonthetotalamountofinvestment(Marples2022b).

TheliteratureonoutcomesoftheNMTCgenerallyreportsthattheprogramledto

additionalinvestmentandemploymentineligiblecensustracts.However,studies

alsofindevidencethatlongtimecommunityresidentsdidnotnecessarilybenefitthemost,asnewresidentsmovingintoeligibletractsandworkersfromothercommunitiesreceivedmanyofthenewjobsandwagesresultingfromNMTCinvestments.

AccordingtoGurley-Calvezetal.(2009),earlyevidencefromtheprogramshows

thattheNMTCinducedfirmstoshifttheirinvestmentsfromnonqualifiedtoqualifiedtractsbutdidnotincreasetheoveralllevelofinvestmentintheeconomy.Freedman

(2012)observesthattheprogramhadmeaningfuleffectsacrosssomemeasuresintheearly2000s,withan8percentreductioninpovertyratesanda5percentreduction

inunemploymentratesineligiblecommunities(relativetoanoneligiblecomparisongroup),alongwithsomeevidenceofgentrificationoccurringashouseholdturnoverratesincreased.Similarly,Freedman(2015)reportsthata$1millioninvestmentledto46additionaljobsintherelevanttract,butthesenewjobsoftenwenttopeoplelivingoutsidethecommunity.

Lookingatwhichsectorswereaffected,HargerandRoss(2016)identifypositive

effectsoftheNMTConexistingfirms,particularlyintheretailandmanufacturing

sectors,whichsawa10.4percentand8.8percentincreaseinemployment,respectively.However,theyalsonoteadecreaseinnewfirmsinthewholesaleandtransportation

sectors.FreedmanandKuhns(2018)focusonlocalfoodsystems,findingthatthe

programmodestlyincreasedtheentryofsupermarketsintolow-incomecommunities.

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Inthemostlong-termanalysisweidentified,Theodosetal.(2022)usedatafrom

2001to2016andreportthatprojectsintendedtoincreasefirmsresultedin18newfirmsenteringthemarket,whileprojectsintendedtocreatejobsandboostincomesgeneratedaround101additionaljobsonaverage(27ofwhichwenttocommunity

residents),reducedlocalpovertyratesby0.7percent,andslightlyboostedincomes.Likepreviouswork,thisanalysisfindsevidenceofgentrification,withNMTC

communitiesexperiencinganinfluxofcollege-educatedadults.

2.3.OpportunityZones

TheresultsfromtheliteratureontheeffectsoftheOZprogramarealsomixedbutmostlyshowlittletonoeconomicbenefitforlow-incomecommunitiesandtheir

residents.UnliketheEZandNMTCprograms,whereadministratorsmakedecisionsaboutproject-orcommunity-levelawardsbasedonadiscretionaryapplication

process,OZsareselectedbythegovernorofeachstate.Aslongasacensustractmeetscertaincriteria(seeTable1),governorscouldselectupto25percentof

theirstate’stractsasOZs.Perhapsunsurprisingly,governors’decisionsreflecteda

preferenceforthecommunitiesthatsupportedthempolitically.Specifically,governorsfavoredtractsthatwererepresentedinthestatelegislaturebyamemberoftheir

politicalpartyonaverageby7.6percentoverthosethatwerenot(Franketal.2022).

Forinvestorsandownersofeligibleproperties,theOZprogramappearstohave

createdsubstantialbenefits.Sageetal.(2023)reportthatqualifiedproperties

appreciatedby7–20percentasaresultofOZdesignation,whilevacantlandprices

rosebyupto37percentpostdesignation.WileyandNguyen(2022)notethatalthougheligibleindustrialpropertiesenjoyeda21percentpremiumfollowingdesignation,

investmentdidnotflowtothemostdistressedcommunities.Instead,therewas

evidenceofcherry-picking,withinvestmentflowingtopropertiesthathadother

physicaladvantages(e.g.,availableexcessland)orsocioeconomicstrengths(e.g.,highemploymentratesandstrongpopulationgrowth).

Forcommunitiesandtheirresidents,mostevidenceshowslittletonoeconomic

benefitfromtheOZprogram.Atkinsetal.(2021)identifynoeffectofOZdesignationonjobopeningsandasmall(1.5percent)increaseinpostedjobsalariesthatisnot

significantacrossdifferentstatisticalspecifications.SnidalandLi(2022)evaluate

dataonloanissuanceandreportthatOZdesignationdidnotincreaselocallendinginthecommercialorresidentialsector,indicatingthatthepolicydidnotstimulate

newinvestmentbycommunitymembersindesignatedtracts.Freedmanetal.(2023)userestrictedmicrodatafrom2013through2019andobservenobenefitsofOZ

designationintermsofemployment,earnings,orpovertyrates.OneexceptionisthefindingofArefevaetal.(2021)thatdesignatedcensustractsexperienced3.0–4.5

percenthigheremploymentgrowthinmetropolitanareasthansimilartractsthat

werenotdesignated.However,theyseenoeffectinnonmetropolitanareas,andmostemploymentgrowthbenefitedresidentswholivedoutsidethedesignatedtract.

WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUsabouttheEnergyTransition?5

3.ImplicationsfortheEnergyTransition

AlthoughnoneofthethreeprogramsdiscussedinSection2weredesignedtosupportthecommunitiesthatmaybenegativelyaffectedbyashiftawayfromfossilfuels,

evidenceontheireffectivenesscaninformhowsimilarpoliciesmightbedesignedtosupportfossilenergy–dependentcommunities.Inthissection,wefirstidentifykeythemesfromourliteraturereviewthatprovidesuchinformation,alongwithrelevant

Table2.ThemesfromtheLiteratureandImplicationsforFossilFuel–DependentCommunities

Theme

Implication

Program

objective

Evidenceindicatesthatsomefederal

place-basedtaxincentiveshavesteeredeconomicbenefitstotargetcommunities,eveniftheydonotincreaseinvestmentacrossthebroaderUSeconomy.

Newfederalpoliciesmaybeabletodeliver

economicbenefitsforfossilenergy–dependentcommunities.

Eligibilitycriteria

Existingprogramstargetcommunitiesbasedoncurrentmeasuresofeconomicdisadvantage.

Becausemanyfossilfuel–dependent

communitieshavestrongeconomiestodayduetothepresenceoffossilfuels,policiesshoulduseothercriteria(e.g.,economicdependenceonfossilfuelsectors)todetermineeligibility.

Selection

mechanism

Thereisatrade-offbetweensimplicityandprecision.Complexmechanismswilltendtoimprovetargetingofresourcesbutaddcostsandintroducebarrierstoentryfor

under-resourcedcommunities.

Selectionmechanismsshouldbedesignedtobalancetheneedforsimplicityandprecision.

Geographicunits

Existingprogramsusecensustractsasthegeographicunitofeligibility.

Impactsofenergysystemchangesarefelt

acrossbroadergeographies(e.g.,taxrevenueforcountiesandschooldistricts),socounty-levelunitsmaybepreferable.

Unintended

consequences

Programscanleadtogentrificationanddispersionofeconomicbenefitsbeyondtargetedregions.

Policymakersshouldconsiderthepotentialfortheseissuestoariseandseektoidentifyapproachestoaddressthem.Somepolicies(e.g.,jobtraining,socialsafetynetprograms)canspecificallytargetaffectedindividuals.

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implicationsforfuturepolicies(Table2).Wethendiscusshowcertaindesignelementsofeachprogramcouldbeadaptedtofitanenergytransitioncontext,offeringseveralconceptualmodelsforhowpoliciescouldbestructured.

AlthoughtheimplicationsdescribedinTable2donotconstituteacomprehensive

setoflessonsthatpolicymakerscanusetocraftmeasurestosupportfossilfuel–

dependentcommunitiesintheenergytransition,theyhighlightseveralcriticalpolicydesignelementsthatdeservefurtherscrutinyandofferspecificguidanceoncertaintopics,suchaseligibilitycriteriaandgeographicunits.Insomecases,elementsfromexistingplace-basedeconomicpoliciesmayserveasmodelsforfutureprograms.Forexample,onemajorfeatureoftheEZprogramisitscommunity-ledapproach,wherebylocalstakeholderscometogethertocraftavisionforfutureeconomicdevelopment

thatthefederalgovernmentcanthensupportwithfinancialandtechnicalassistance.

Thisapproachrequiresextensiveresourcesandcapacityinthecommunities

developingtheprojectproposals,however,twothingsthatmanyruralfossilfuel–

dependentcommunitieslack.

AnotheroptiontoconsideristheNMTC’suseofafederalentity,inthiscasehousedwithintheDepartmentofTreasury,tomakedecisionsabouthowtoallocatefinancialbenefits.(ThesearetaxcreditsinthecontextoftheNMTCbutcouldincludeothertypesofassistanceinanenergytransitioncontext.)Suchanentitycouldfunction

similarlytootherfederalgrantmakinginstitutions,suchastheDepartmentof

Commerce’sEconomicDevelopmentAdministrationorDepartmentofAgriculture’sRuralDevelopment,butwouldalsoneedtoavoidburdensomeadministrative

requirementsthatcanmakeitdifficultforruralenergycommunitiestoaccessfederalaid(RaimiandWhitlock2023).

PolicymakerscouldalsoconsideradaptingelementsoftheOZprogramtotargetfossilfuel–dependentcommunities.Underthismodel,newinvestmentineligiblelocations(perhapsknownas“energycounties”)couldbeincentivizedbyfederaltaxcreditsthatencouragetheprivatesectortodevelopneweconomicgrowthenginesinregionsthatarecurrentlyheavilydependentonfossilfuelproduction,refining,oruseatpower

plants.Thismodelissomewhatsimilartothe“energycommunities”provisionoftheInflationReductionActbutcouldbebroadenedtoencourageinvestmentsoutsidethecleanenergysector(RaimiandPesek2022).However,therelativeineffectivenessoftheOZprogramcautionsagainstadoptingsomeofitsdesignelements,suchasthestructureoftheprogram’staxbenefitsandthedeterminationofeligiblelocationsbystategovernors.

Tobeclear,wearenotrecommendingthatpolicymakersundertakeanyofthese

specificapproachesatthisstage.Rather,weseetheseadaptationsofexistingpoliciesaspotentialmodelstosupportequityintheenergytransition.AdditionalresearchisneededtobetterunderstandwhichmixofpolicieswillbemosteffectiveinsupportingtheregionsthathavepoweredtheUSeconomyforoveracentury.Andregardlessofwhichmodelspolicymakerschoose,significantadditionalfundingwilllikelybeneededtobuildeconomicresilienceinfossilenergy-dependentcommunities.

WhatCanFederalPlace-BasedEconomicPoliciesTeachUsabouttheEnergyTransition?7

4.Conclusions

Wehavereviewedplace-basedpoliciesdesignedtosupporteconomicallydistressedcommunitiesandfindthatsomeexistingpoliciescanbeeffectiveindirecting

investmentandimprovinglocaleconomicoutcomes.Adaptinganyofthesepoliciestoanenergytransitioncontextwouldrequirechangesineligibilitycriteria,geographictargeting,selectionmechanisms,andmore.

Weexpectthateconomicdevelopmentpolicieswillbeoneofmultiplecomponentsthatcanworktogethertobuildmorediverseandresilienteconomiesinfossilfuel–dependentregions.Additionally,differentpolicymechanismssuchasfederalblockgrants,whichstatesandlocalitiescanuseflexibly,maybemoreeffectiveatspurringlocaleconomicdevelopmentthanfederalpoliciesnarrowlyfocusedoneconomic

development(Bartik2020).

Finally,andcrucially,anyfederalinterventionshouldincludeearlyandcontinuous

engagementwithaffectedcommunities.Suchengagementisessentialtoensurethatfederalpoliciesandinvestmentsalignwithlocalprioritiesandthatlocal,state,and

federalpolicymakerscommunicateaboutwhatisworkingandwhatisnotintheyearsahead.Lookingforward,additionalresearchandcommunityengagementareneededtodeterminewhichmixofinterventionsislikelytobemosteffectiveinensuringan

equitabletransitiontowardacleanenergyfuture.

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5.References

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Atkins,RachelM.B.,PabloHernandez-Lagos,andCristianJara-Figueroa.2021.“WhatIstheImpactofOpportunityZonesonEmployment?”NYUSternSchoolofBusiness.

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Bartik,TimothyJ.2020.“UsingPlace-BasedJobsPoliciestoHelpDistressedCommunities.”JournalofEconomicPerspectives34(3):99–127.

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Busso,Matias,JesseGregory,andPatrickKline.2013.“AssessingtheIncidenceandEfficiencyofaProminentPlaceBasedPolicy.”AmericanEconomicReview103(2):897–947.

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Freedman,Matthew.2012.“TeachingNewMarketsOldTricks:TheEffectsofSubsidizedInvestmentonLow-IncomeNeighborhoods.”JournalofPublicEconomics96(11–12):1000–1014.

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———.2015.“Place-BasedProgramsandtheGeographicDispersionofEmployment.”

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Freedman,Matthew,andAnnemarieKuhns.2018.“Supply