1、蘭州理工大學人文學院畢業論文蘭州理工大學人文學院畢業論文 的運行并不理想，存在一定的困難和不完善之處：1民事訴訟法的規定，公示催告期間票據的轉讓行為無效，理論上有違票據的 流通原則；實踐上由于公示催告期間轉讓票據的的行為無效可能引起社會、銀行收受 票據產生票據危機，不利于票據流通和推廣；公示催告可能導致的除權判決對企業和銀行存在較大風險，尤其是善意受讓人將喪失票據權利。此做法雖然保護了失票人的權利，但卻損害了善意受讓人的利益；由于付款銀行遍及全國各地公示催告的書難以送達各個付款銀行給止付及公 示催告帶來極大的難度，有時甚至沒有實際意義；我國民事訴訟法規定的公示催告期間是60天，對于利害關系人權

2、利保護不利。法院通過公告的方式通知持票人申報權利，由于匯票到期日較長，可以長達九個月，而公示催告期間是從立案時起 60日,結果是公示催告程序往往在匯票到期日前結束， 大 多數最后持票人難以通過公告知道手中的匯票正在被公示催告，往往是在請求付款時才知道匯票被公示催告，此時票款可能已經被領走。由于公示催告的期間可能短于匯票到 期日，除權判決也完全可能在匯票到期日之前生效，因為不考慮匯票的具體到期日，規定 只要除權判決生效即可請求付款，實際上等于確認該判決可以變更票據權利的內容，這違背了除權判決的性質。2公示催告制度的完善我國民事訴訟法雖然規定了公示催告程序，但由于受當時立法客觀條件的限制， 加之我

3、國經濟生活發生了根本性的變化，公示催告程序存在嚴重缺失和漏洞，因此必須 充實和完善。公示催告期間的完善我國民事訴訟法規定，“自判決公告之日起，申請人有權向支付人請求支付，該規定看似合情合理，但是卻忽略了一個重要的問題，即“如果除權判決生效的時間早 于票據上實際記載的時間，那么票據的付款人是否可以“期限未屆滿為由主張抗辯呢？依據我國法律規定，此種情況下，票據付款人不享有抗辯權，判決生效后，付款即負有 付款義務。這就形成了一個悖論：在票據不喪失的情況下，持票人于票據到期日前請求 付款時，通常會受到付款人的抗辯；而其在票據喪失的情況下，反倒可以根據除權判決 提前實現其票據權利，這有違法律公平公正的原

4、則。因此，法律應當對票據的公示催告 期間作出下限的規定，但不對其上限作規定，即“公示催告的期限不得少于60日，同時亦不得早于票據的到期日（2）公示催告申請的擔保問題雖然公示催告涉及有公權力，但并不表示失票人可以任意實現公示催告程序。現有 公示催告程序的申請并沒有要求申請人提供相應擔保，這種無需提供擔保也無需證明申請人是最后的合法持票人的做法顯然有違公平、平等、誠信原則。首先，作為公示催告的申請人即失票人與其他現有持票人處于平等的法律地位，二 者在票據權利的形式上的差別并不能作為其正當行使票據權利的障礙。失票人申請公示催告的一個后果是導致票據的暫時被止付，若此期間票據到期，現持票人必然無法從付

5、款人或代理付款人處實現其付款請求。 此時現持票人就因為失票人的申請而使其票據權 利無法順利行使。其次，若是為保障現持票人的票據權利的順利行使而付款，則失票人 申請公示催告無實際意義。對失票人的票據權利不能保障就失去了票據喪失救濟制度的 意義。最后，若失票人惡意申請公示催告，則在其未得到除權判決的情況下獲得付款就 會損害真正持票人或其他利害關系人的利益。因此，新的公示催告制度中應當要求失票 人在申請公示催告程序時提供擔保，擔保的形式可以采用現金或其他等價物。無法提供 擔保時，借鑒臺灣地區的經驗：應當允許其將票據款項提存。如此亦可平衡兼顧各方當 事人的利益和實踐需要。條文可表述為：“票據喪失后，失

6、票人申請公示催告應當提供 相應的擔保，此擔保以足以抵銷因公示催告給其他正當權利人造成的損失為限。無法提 供擔保的，得申請將票據款項提存”。（3）取消公示催告期間轉讓票據權利行為無效的規定我國民事訴訟法第195條第2款規定：“公示催告期間，轉讓票據的行為無效”。 這條規定從保護失票人的利益考慮并不錯誤，然而，這條規定顯然沒有考慮到公示催告 期間善意取得票據的現持票人的權利，這樣規定是不妥的。在票據喪失救濟制度中，失 票人和利害關系人一般站在對立面，法律究竟要保護誰，應考慮票據的性質，考慮交易 秩序的安全和社會正義。公示催告的目的是催促與票據有利害關系的人來申報權利，至 于是否保護該利害關系人，應

7、取決于其在取得該票據時對票據喪失是否知情或者應該知 情，而不應該取決于其取得票據的時間是在公告期內還是在公告期外（除權判決前）。這種不分行為主觀善惡，絕對地將公示催告期間轉讓票據權利的行為都歸于無效的規定， 不僅違背了票據無因性和流通性這些根本屬性，而且也違背民事訴訟法平等保護雙 方當事人利益的基本原則。因此，建議取消這條規定。補充有關空白票據喪失的公示催告60由于空白票據與完全票據存在著一定的差別，所以與完全票據相比，空白票據的公 示催告程序具有一定的特殊性：第一，空白票據喪失后的公示催告主要是為了防止權利 受到侵害，而不是直接實現票據權利。第二，公示催告的申請及法院的公告中關于票據 記載內

8、容的表述往往因票據存在空白記載事項而與完全的票據公示催告的公告內容有 所不同，對此，必須寫明票據的補記授權。第三，由于空白票據中也有一部分是出票日 期或者到期日空白的票據，所以對法院公告期間的確定也不同于完全票據，在完全票據 的公示催告程序中，公告期間不得少于60日同時不得早于票據的到期日，但是在日期空 白的票據公示催告程序中，無法確定票據的到期日，所以可以確定公告期間不得少于 日即可。60確立撤銷除權判決之訴及其程序在公示催告期間屆滿后無人申報權利，或者有人申報但被駁回時，人民法院可以根 據申請人的申請，作出宣告票據無效的除權判決。這是申請人申請公示催告程序希望達 到的主要目的，因為只有人民

9、法院作出除權判決，才能使申請人所享有的票據權利與該 喪失的票據本身分離，申請人可以在不占有票據的情況下主張該票據所記載的權利。然 而，除權判決的作出，僅僅是根據公示催告申請人的申請和無人申報的事實，推定該申 請人為票據權利人的。但是，這種推定完全有可能與事實不符。因為在現實生活中，利 害關系人因正當事由的耽誤而未能在除權判決作出之前申報權利的情況是客觀存在的。 因此在這種情況下，就會產生如何恢復利害關系人的票據權利，為其提供法律救濟的問 題。對此，我國民事訴訟法第198條明確規定：禾U害關系人因正當理由不能在判決 前向法院及時申報權利的，自知道或應當知道判決公告起一年內，可以向作出判決的人 民

10、法院起訴。顯然，這里明確的是除權判決的撤銷之訴，但對哪些為撤銷除權判決的正 當理由法律沒有明確規定。由此，可以參照我國臺灣法律的規定，明確以下情況得提起 撤銷除權判決之訴：第一，法律不允許適用公示催告程序的；第二，沒有進行公示催告 公告，或者沒有按法定方式進行公告的；第三，沒有按照公示催告的公告期間進行公告 的；第四，作出除權判決的法官應當回避，沒有回避的。以上這些情形，利害關系人均 可以向人民法院提起撤銷除權判決之訴。孔博空白票據法律制度研究J.山東大學碩士學位論文,2006 : 42.季一秀票據喪失救濟制度研究J.蘇州大學學位論文,2008 : 38.訴訟補救措施的缺陷及其完善1.訴訟補救

11、措施的缺陷失票人在喪失票據后，可以直接向人民法院提起民事訴訟，要求法院判令票據債務 人向其支付票據金額。我國票據法沒有具體規定該類訴訟的訴因以及訴訟的主體資 格等問題,這一明顯缺陷，導致失票人和法院沒有法律依據可循，實際上就使訴訟這種補 救方法起不到實質作用，成為一種無法操作的程序。2訴訟補救措施的完善我國法律雖然規定了票據喪失可以通過訴訟的方式進行救濟，但對于票據喪失救濟訴訟程序卻沒有明確的規定，客觀上導致實踐中缺乏統一的操作規程，需要進行探索和 完善：訴訟主體。按照民事訴訟法的規定，在沒有確定的被告的情況下，原告是不能提起訴訟的。而 我國目前的訴訟救濟制度一大缺陷就是沒有確定明確的訴訟主體

12、。原告是失票人，這是 沒有異議的，關鍵在于確定被告。通常情況下，失票人可以票據的付款人或代理付款人 作為票據喪失付款請求權的被告。在付款人或代理付款人死亡或被宣告破產或被終止業 務活動或由于種種理由無法查找，失票人可以請求其他票據債務人作為被告。訴訟證據。依照民事訴訟法第108條的規定，起訴必須有證明原告主體適格的身份證據，即在 起訴時，原告必須承受證明其適格主體的舉證責任，而票據喪失救濟訴訟是一種特別的 訴訟，原告沒有現實的持有票據，理論上其無法證明其是適格的訴訟主體，但為避免訴 訟濫用，要求原告提起訴訟時提供適格主體身分證據是必需的，因此，失票人可應當提 供其喪失票據的書面證明。書面證明應

13、應當包括以下基本內容：(1)已喪失的票據所記載的事項和內容；(2)票據喪失的事實證明，且該證明應是證明其是最后合法持票人的 證明。若失票人因特殊情況無法提供上述證明，則應將原因以書面形式遞交給法院，法 院若在訴訟中查明失票人無法提供上述證明的原因并非正當的特殊原因，則可將其訴訟視為是惡意訴訟，駁回其訴訟。訴訟擔保。在實踐中，某些當事人為了自己的某種利益或出于某種動機，故意偽報票據喪失， 申請票據喪失救濟的現象比比皆是。因此，為了保護付款人及持票人的利益，在票據喪 失救濟制度中特別是在公示催告和普通訴訟中規定擔保制度顯得尤為重要。普通民事訴訟并不要求原告提起訴訟時必須提供擔保，只有在當事人要求訴

14、訟保全時方要求對方提 供擔保。我國票據法也沒有對喪失票據的票據權利人明確失票人提起訴訟時必須提供擔 保。但票據喪失救濟訴訟畢竟不同于普通民事訴訟，票據喪失訴訟的提起是在原告未現 實占有票據的情況下提起的在于補救失票人的票據權利的特殊訴訟，在不確定失票人為合法持票人的前提下，被告的權利有可能因為該訴訟受到損害，而其權利一旦被損害， 則原告應依法賠償其損失。因此，要求原告提供擔保是用來補償被告或票據債務人因訴 訟受到損失。對于實踐中如何進行擔保，相關法律沒有明確規定。筆者認為：一：擔保 應不限于財產擔保，也可實行人的擔保，只要出票人、承兌人或付款人等票據義務人認 可即可；二、財產擔保的具體數額不一

15、定必須與訴訟標的額等同，其標準只要票據義務 人同意即可；三、擔保時間至票據付款期限屆滿為止；四、如果失票人因為客觀原因確 實無法提供擔保，可以請求人民法院裁決將票款提存在人民法院或其他指定的機構。五、完善票據喪失救濟的配套制度（一）建立票據提存制度從受理公示催告到最終做出除權判決，至少需要兩個多月的時間，在這漫長的期間 內，付款人資信很有可能發生重大變化，尤其是支票提示付款期限屆滿后出票人賬戶是 否會一直保持足額的資金，不但涉及到出票人的意愿，還涉及到出票人的資信狀況，如 果出票人破產或涉及糾紛賬戶被凍結，即使失票人最終得到法院的除權判決，票據權利 可能還會落空。此外，現行票據法不承認附息票據

16、，票據到期后，如仍處于公示催告程 序中，則申請人不能提示付款，就會有利息損失。對此，我國應當借鑒大陸法系國家立 法的經驗，建立票據提存制度，以充分保障失票人的票據權利。筆者認為，提存票據制 度應當具備以下要件：第一、票據提存應當根據失票人的申請，人民法院一般情況下不 得依職權主動提起；第二，提存的票據應當是到期票據，未到期的票據不得提存；第三、 票款提存后，應當由人民法院或其他提存機構進行妥善保管；第四，提存的票款必須待 除權判決作出后，根據人民法院的決定交付失票人。（二）建立非票據權利人票據喪失救濟制度季一秀票據喪失救濟制度研究J.蘇州大學學位論文，2008 : 41-42.票據在不同流通環

17、節中均有喪失的可能，如出票人在出票后未交付前喪失票據，票 據背書過程中喪失票據，票據付款人喪失票據等情形。對此，票據權利人可以通過行使 民事上的賠償請求權取得賠償，一旦非票據權利人按照民法的規定對票載權利人承擔了 民事責任，法律理當對非因主觀原因喪失票據的非票據權利人給予適當的救濟，以彌補 其經濟損失。為此，應當建立非票據權利人票據喪失的救濟制度。鑒于失票救濟程序必 須由失票人即票載權利人進行啟動，為防止失票人怠于行使這種權利而給喪失票據的非 票據權利人造成損失，筆者認為應對票載權利人的行為進行規則，以實現對失票非權利 人的法律救濟。第一、非因主觀原因導致失票的，票載權利人得根據失票非權利人的

18、請 求啟動失票救濟程序；第二，票載權利人啟動失票救濟程序應在合理期間內，防止過分 遲延造成損失；第三，在非票據權利人向失票人承擔民事責任后，票載權利通過失票救 濟程序取得的利益由非票據權利人享有，產生的費用由非票據權利人承擔。第四，因票 載權利人怠于啟動失票救濟程序而引起的損失，由票載權利人承擔。失票救濟制度，是票據權利實現的保障制度，是票據法所不可缺少的重要組成部分。 盡管我國法律對票據喪失規定了掛失止付、公示催告和普通訴訟等三種救濟方式，但由 于相關救濟制度在立法上理念偏后或過于粗疏，難以有效保障喪失票據的持票人的正當 權利。因此，理當對票據喪失救濟法律制度進行完善， 以期更好地發揮票據匯

19、兌、支付、 流通、信用等經濟功能。參考文獻王春芳論票據喪失之救濟J.商場現代化雜志，2007,(2)葉永祿論票據喪失司法救濟之完善 J.新財經,2007,(3)朱青沙淺析票據喪失的訴訟救濟制度 J.法制與社會,2009,(15)柯昌輝論票據喪失后的掛失止付J.北方法學,2011,(4) 譚波我國票據喪失的救濟制度評析J.新財經,2010,(11) 沈鑫英美法系的正當持票人與我國票據法相關制度之比較研究J.知識經濟,2010,(10)周小潮偽報票據喪失問題探討J長沙鐵道學院學報，2010 ,(2)陳晴票據法案例評析J對外經濟貿易大學出版社，2010 ,(5)卞杰票據喪失的法律救濟研究D.寧波大學

20、碩士學位論文,2005孔博空白票據法律制度研究D山東大學碩士學位論文,2006季一秀票據喪失救濟制度研究D蘇州大學學位論文,2008王小能票據法教程(第二版)M.北京：北京大學出版社，2001.謝懷栻票據法概論M.北京：法律出版社.2006.胡德勝，李文良中國票據制度研究M.北京：北京大學出版社，2005.張文楚票據法導論M.武漢：華中科技大學出版社 ,2006.ReviewJamesBarr Ames . The NegotiableInstrumentsLaw . The Harvard LawReviewAssociatio n,1900,12外文文獻The Negotiable In

21、strume nts LawAuthor(s): James Barr AmesSource: Harvard Law Review, VOL 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1900), pp. 241-257Published by: The Harvard Law Review Associati onHOWEVER much lawyers may differ as to the expedie ncy of 1 1 the attempt to secure by codificati on uni formity in America n commercial law, all

22、 will agree that the commissi oners for pro-moting uniformity of legislation in the United States could not have selected a better subject for the begi nning of the experime nt tha n that of n egotiable paper. Eve n the opp onents of codification must admit that the Negotiable Instruments Law, frame

23、d and recommended by the commissi oners in 1896, and already en acted in fiftee n states,1 contains a nu mber of desirable cha nges in the law of Bills and Notes, and will, whe n gen erally adopted, settle definitively several questions which have given rise to much litiga-tion and conflict of decis

24、ions. On the other hand, the friends of codification who chanceto read the following pages may become convin ced- that there are serious defects of commissi on and omis-si on in the new code. Codification is with us a new art, and it is not surprising, although it is unfortunate, that the commission

25、-ers did not realize, as continental codifiers realize, the extreme importa nce of the widest possible publicati on of the proposed code, and the n ecessity of abundant criticism, especially of public crit-icism, from practising lawyers and judges, professors and writers, merchants and bankers. It i

26、s far from an agreeable task to offer criticisms at this late hour. Nor would the following criticisms be offered now but for the writers conviction that the Negotiable In strume nts Law ought not to be en acted by any state which has not yet acted in the matter, uni ess cha nged in importa nt respe

27、cts, and that those states in which it has been adopted should remedy its defects by supplemental legislation.2 The plan of making the law of Bills and Notes uniform throughout the United States has found favor in so many states that the en terprise ought to be car-ried through on the basis of the c

28、ommissi on ers proposed code. But in the in terest of future codificati on, as well as for the sake of the law itself, this new legislation should be in such form as to stand the fire of adverse, if also fair-min ded, critics.Before considering the defects in the new code attention should be called

29、to its merits. These are of two kin ds: first, salutary cha nges in the law; and, sec on dly, the settleme nt of con troverted questi ons.Un der the new law a n egotiable in strume nt may be made pay-able to one or more of several payees,3 or to the holder of an office for the time being.4 These pro

30、visions give effect to the tenor of the instrument and nullify certain unfortunate decisions to the contrary in which the judges failed to grasp the merca ntile con-cepti on of such in strume nts.5 Ano ther judicial error is corrected by the provision that an instrument, though indorsed in blank, ce

31、ases to be n egotiable by delivery whe never the last in dorse-me nt there on is a special in dorseme nt.6 Secti on i66 en acts that the maturity of an accepta nee for honor of a bill payable after sight shall be calculated from the date of the noting for none accepta nee, and not, as was erroneousl

32、y decided in Williams v. Germaine,7 from the date of the acceptancefor honor. Since an acceptor, by sect ion 62, en gages to pay the bill accord ing to the tenor of his accepta nee, he must pay to the innocent payee or subseque nt holder the amount called for by the bill at the time he accepted, eve

33、 n though larger tha n the origi nal amount ordered by the drawer. A bank certify ing a raised check is in the same case, since sect ion 187 assimilates a certificati on to an accepta nee. If the acceptor or certify ing bank must honor his accepta nee or certification in such a case, a fortiori a dr

34、awee who pays a raised bill or check, without acceptaneeor certification, should not re-cover the money paid from an innocent holder. These results are at varianee with numerous American decisions, but they are changes for the better, and, so far as adopted, bring the law of this country into harmon

35、y with the law of n early, if not in deed all, of the Europea n states.Other judicious cha nges for the better, but not involving the correct ion of judicial mistakes, are the following: The abolition ot days of grace; 2 the assimilation of sight and dema nd paper; 3 the provisi ons that the n egoti

36、ability of the in strume nt shall not be affected by its bearing a seal; 4 that a payor may disregard a eon-dition in an indorsement; 5 and that the holder in due course may enforce payment of an altered instrument according to its original ten or.6Especially to be comme nded are those secti ons of

37、the new code which settle, and in the right way, certa in questi ons which have bee n a prolific source of litigati on and an tag oni stic decisi ons. No-th ing but good can come from enacting that the n egotiability of an in strume nt is not destroyed by a clause provid ing for the pay-me nt of exc

38、ha nge,7 or the costs of collecti on, or an attor neys fee in case of default,8 or by a clause giving a power to eon fess judg-me nt.9The same is true of the provisi ons that ani an tecede nt debt con stitutes value; 10 that the holder in due course, although he paid less, may en force payme nt of t

39、he face value from all parties to the instrument; 11 and that a- check is not an assignment of the drawers claim upon the bank.12 The rules regulating the liability of the anomalous indorser13 are admirable, but for one slight omis-si on which may be easily remedied, as will be show n on a subse-que

40、 nt page.4 The doctrine of SECTION i6, that one who has signeda negotiable instrument complete on its face is liable there on to a holder in due course, although it was n ever delivered by him, but lost by him, or stole n from him, or eve n from some one else after his death, is somewhat startli ng

41、at first. But it should comme nd itself on reflect ion .It has bee n adopted, after much con sidera-ti on, in Germa ny.The new code, it is believed, would have gained greatly in sim-plicity, arrangement, and expression, if its framers had grasped firmly the principle that the formal right of a claim

42、ant upon a bill or note depe nds solely upon whether he is the holder by the tenor of the in strume nt, and had also give n due emphasis to the dist in c-ti on betwee n real and pers onal or equitable defences.lt is, how-ever, too late to recast the code. The critic must content himself with pointin

43、g out formal or substantial defects in particular sec-tions.If it be said that it is not worth while to make merely formal changes in sections that have been already enacted in sixteen jurisdictions, it may be answered that clearness, conciseness, and the right way of putting things are intrinsicall

44、y desirable, and that improvements of this kind do not involve any sacrifice, as to the substantive law, of the prin ciple of un iformity.It is from this point of view that the following suggestionsare made as to matters of form.SECTION 3-2 provides that an order or promise is not rendered condition

45、al by the addition of A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument. What do these words mean ? Do they cover the case of a note coupled with the words, Given as collateral security for As debt to the payee ? Such an inter-pretation, although a literal one, would be deplorable, a

46、nd would nullify several decisions.1 Mr. Crawford, the draftsman of the code, suggeststhat this sub-section applies to the case of notes containing a statement that it is given for a chattel which is to be the property of the owner of the note until the note is paid.2 Such a note is deemed negotiabl

47、e in several states,3 and justly, being in effect nothing more than a note secured by a chattel mortgage. But it is highly improbable that the courts of Massachusetts,Kansas, and Minnesota, which have taken the opposite view, will treat this sub-sect ion as cha nging the law of those states. One New

48、 York judge has already ruled that the Negotiable Instruments Law has no application to such a note.2 Many cases have decided that the statement of a consideration in a note is not notice to a transferee of its failure.3 But the doctrine of these cases, which are doubtless the only ones which this s

49、ub-section can fairly be made to cover, is a rule as to bonafides, and has nothing to do with con-ditions. The sub-sect ion in questi on should be stricke n from the act. If in terpreted literally, it is mischievous. If not take n liter-ally, it is obscure, in artistic, and useless.SECTION 36-2 and

50、3. An indorsement is restrictive which either (I) 1c onstitutes the in dorsee the age nt of the in dorser, or (2) vests the title in the in dorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person. Since the so-called agent of the indorser has, under section 37, the right to sue in his own n ame on th

51、e in strume nt, but for the ben efit of the in dorser, he is in truth a trustee, and not a mere age nt. The sub-secti ons 2 and 3 should therefore be con-solidated as follows: An indorsement is restrictive which vests the title in the indorsee in trust for the indorser or some third person. SECTION

52、137 is to the effect that a drawee who destroys a bill delivered to him for acceptance, or refuses to return it within the usual time, shall be deemed to have accepted it. A refusal to accept is an accepta nce! Such a perversi on of Ian guage would be stra nge eno ugh any where, but in a deliberatel

53、y framed code is well-nigh in explicable. As a con seque nce of this fan tastic pro-visi on the holder may bring con curre nt actions: against the drawee because of his fictitious acceptance, and against the drawer be-causeof the drawees non-acceptance.Nor is anything gained by this fiction, of whic

54、h there is no trace in the En glish act. All the dema nds of justice are met by holdi ng the misc on duct ing drawee liable for a con versi on of the bill.4 The sect ion should be can-celled as worse than useless. The following sections of the code seem to the writer to be defective, not merely in p

55、oint of form, but in substance.SECTION 9-3 declares an instrument to be payable to bearer, although it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person. Such a rule ignores the tenor of the in strume nt; inor is there any judicial precede nt or merca ntile custom in support of the no t

56、io n that a bill payable to a fictitious payee, but niot indorsed in the name of such payee, is payable to bearer. In all the reported cases, inistruments payable to a fictitious payee have been in-dorsed in the n ame of such payee before n egotiati on. By the comb ined effect of this sect ion and s

57、ect ion i6, if a note payable to a fictitious payee were stole n from the maker, and in dorsed by the thief in the name of the payee, the maker would be liable upon the note to any holder in due course. For, the note being. already payable to bearer, the forged indorsement in the payees n ame would

58、be of no legal sig nifica nee. Such a result would be a cruel injustice to the maker. The sect ion should be materially cha nged. The real an id comme ndable object of the sect ion would be atta in ed, without resort ing to a ficti on, by a provisi on as fol-lows: If a bill be draw n, or a note made

59、, payable to the order of a pers on known by the drawer or maker to be fictitious or nion-existe nt, or of a liv ing pers on not in ten ded to have any in terest in the in strume nt, and if such bill or note be in dorsed by the drawer or maker in the n ame of the nominal payee, the instru-ment will

60、have the same effect as a bill or note payable to the order of, and in dorsed by, the drawer or maker respectively.中文翻譯作者：詹姆斯巴爾艾姆斯來源：哈佛法律評論,14卷，第4期（1900年12月）,241 -257出版：哈佛法律評論協會摘要票據法律盡管許多律師關于確保安全通過統一 編纂的美國商法，有不同的企圖，所有人都會 同意委員為促進美國立法的統一，不能選擇一個更好的主題開始實驗而是可流通票據。 即使是反對編纂者也必須承認票據法律，1896通過委員制定和建議，已在15個州頒布