Companies’assessments

ofanti-corruptioncompliance

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?OECD2025.

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Foreword

Thelandscapeofanti-corruptioneffortshasshiftedinrecentyears;onceledbygovernmentsandtheirlawenforcementagencies,theprivatesectorhasbecomeanincreasinglyessentialactor.Companiesaroundtheglobehaveinvestedinthedevelopmentofanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammesandrecognisethattheseinvestmentsmust,ineffect,preventcorruption.Theimportanceofassessingcomplianceprogrammes’effectivenesshaslongbeenemphasisedbyinternationalstandards.InitsGoodPracticeGuidanceonInternalControls,Ethics,andCompliance,theOECDRecommendationforFurtherCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactionsoutlinesaroadmapforassessmentsbyguidingcompaniesonhowtoestablisheffectivemeasuresforpreventinganddetectingforeignbriberyandcorruption(OECD,2021[1]).Yetassessingtheeffectivenessofcomplianceprogrammeshasprovenchallengingandrequiresthatcompaniessetclearobjectives,measureprogressandimpact,andfosteracultureofintegrity.

Thispaperaimstosupportcompaniesintheirassessmenteffortsbytakingstockofthemethodologiesandtoolsthattheyusetoevaluateandenhancetheeffectivenessoftheiranti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammes.Itoutlinesthefactorsthatmotivatecompanies’assessmentefforts,addressestheresourcesandcapacitiesrequiredtoconductassessments,andconsidersthetoolsthatcanbeleveragedtomonitorprogressovertime.

DrawingondeskresearchanddatacollectedbytheOECDandtheBaselInstituteonGovernance,thispapercontributestopromotingstronganti-corruptionnormsandstandardswithinthepublicandprivatesectors.Itisonecomponentofatwo-partprojectdevelopedwiththesupportoftheUSStateDepartmentandwithintheframeworkoftheGalvanizingthePrivateSectorinitiative.

Theproject’ssecondcomponent,entitledGovernments’AssessmentsofCorporateAnti-CorruptionCompliance,complementsthispaperbymappingoutexistingguidancefrompublicauthoritiesonanti-corruptioncompliancecriteriaandassessmentmethodologiesandhighlightingareaswheregovernmentscanlearnfromprivatesectorpractices(OECD,2025[2]).Italsosetsoutcompanies’recommendationstogovernmentsonhowtobettercommunicatetheirexpectationsaboutcorporateanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammes,assessmentcriteria,methodologiesandtools.

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Acknowledgements

TheOECDwouldliketothankallthecompanies,businessassociations,government,civilsocietyandinternationalorganisationsthatsharedtheirinsightsforthepurposesofthisreport.SpecialthanksgotothemembersoftheAnti-CorruptionLeadershipHub,aforumofChiefComplianceOfficersorequivalentfrommajor,multinationalenterprisesconvenedbytheOECD,thecompanieswhoagreedtoparticipateintheconsultationconductedbytheBaselInstituteonGovernanceincooperationwiththeOECD,aswellasotherparticipantsintheOECDexpertmeetingonthemarginsoftheOECDGlobalAnti-CorruptionandIntegrityForuminMarch2024.ThisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupportoftheUnitedStatesgovernmentaspartoftheGPSinitiative.

ThisreportwaspreparedbyAna?sMichel,LegalAnalystintheAnti-CorruptionDivisionoftheOECDDirectorateforFinancialandEnterpriseAffairs,underthedirectionofElodieBeth,SeniorManager,Anti-corruption,GlobalRelations,intheAnti-CorruptionDivisionoftheOECDDirectorateforFinancialandEnterpriseAffairs.ThisreportbuildsonthevaluablecontributionsofProfessorVeronicaMartinez,ProfessorofLaw,DukeUniversity,andfromVanessaHans,HeadofPrivatesectorandLucieBinder,SeniorSpecialist,GovernanceandIntegrity,fromtheBaselInstituteonGovernance.

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Tableofcontents

Foreword3

Acknowledgements4

Executivesummary7

1Whyassesstheeffectivenessofanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammes?9

Avoidingormitigatingsanctionsandreputationaldamage9

Makingthebusinesscaseforcompliance11

Fosteringacultureofintegrity12

2Whatmethodologiesandcapacitiesareneededtoassesseffectiveness?15

Adoptingabehaviouralandscientificmethodology15

Leveragingrelevantcapacitiesandresources17

3Whichassessmenttoolscanbeleveragedtomonitorprogressovertime?21

Developingacombinationofactivity-andoutcome-basedindicatorsandmetrics21

Surveyingcultureandbehaviour22

Usingdataanalyticsandexploringartificialintelligence23

Leveraginginternalandexternalaudits26

Benchmarking,peerlearningandcollectiveactioninitiatives27

AnnexA.TheGoodPracticeGuidanceonInternalControls,Ethics,andCompliance31

References35

Notes38

FIGURES

Figure1.Setofindicatorstomeasuretheeffectivenessofcomplianceefforts30

TABLES

Table1.ActivitymetricsandimpactmetricsaccordingtoTransparencyInternational21

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BOXES

Box1.BRF’sexperience11

Box2.AcademicresearchprojectonassessingtheReturnonCompliance12

Box3.Academicresearchprojectonanorganisationalculturebasedonethicsandintegritytosupportanti-

corruptionefforts13

Box4.AtkinsRealis’incorporationethicalperformanceintothecalculationofexecutivebonuses18

Box5.EliLilly’scollaborationchannelsbetweentheEthicsandCompliance(E&C)teamandtheInformation

Technology(IT)team19

Box6.Novartis’culturesurveys23

Box7.ABInBev’sartificialintelligenceplatformBrewRIGHT25

Box8.Ericsson’sAllegationCaseManagementSystemandEthicsandComplianceAnalyticsApp25

Box9.UseofdataanalyticsbyOEC26

Box10.PeerlearningexperiencedbyAirbus27

Box11.TheCorporateAnti-CorruptionBenchmarkfromTransparencyInternationalUK28

Box12.BaselInstituteonGovernance:CollectiveActioninitiativeonMeasuringeffectivenessofanti-

corruptionprogrammes29

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Executivesummary

Ascompaniesmakestridesindevelopinganti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammes,theymustalsotakestepstoassesstheseprogrammestoensuretheireffectivenessinpreventingcorruption.Inpractice,companies’assessmenteffortsaredrivenbyatleastthreefactors.Chiefamongtheseisavoidingsanctionsorreputationaldamage,areactiveapproachmotivatedbyrisk-drivenconcerns.Companiesalsoundertakeassessmentstoprovideevidencethatanti-corruptionmeasurescontributetobusinesssuccess,whichsupportscompliancepersonnelinlegitimisingandsecuringcomplianceinvestments.Finally,assessmentsmaysupportadoptingaproactiveapproachtocompliancethatinvolvesholisticallyfosteringacorporatecultureofintegrity.Whilecommendable,movingawayfromarules-based,reactiveapproachrequiresthatcompaniesplacegreateremphasisonlong-termcomplianceobjectivesandcorporatevalues,andengagerelevantskillsandresources.

Assessingeffectivenessrequiresthatcompaniesfirstdefinewhatconstitutesaneffectiveanti-corruptionprogramme,thenevaluatetheprogrammebasedondesiredoutcomes.Thisimpliesthatcompliancepersonnelidentifyobjectives(e.g.,riskmitigation)andinitiativesthatcanbeundertakentoachievethem.Arisk-drivenapproachiscentraltocompanies’assessmenteffortsbutcanbecomplementedbyaproactiveapproachthatpromotesethicalcorporatebehaviour.Thisstrengthenscomplianceprogrammes’effectivenessbycultivatingasenseofownershipamongstaff.Definingandevaluatingeffectivenessalsorequiresthatcompaniescollectdatasotheycantakeappropriatestepstoimproveontheirprogrammes.Evidence-basedmeasuresthatsupportassessmentsincludeconductingrootcauseanalyses,transactionaltestingandtestingofanti-corruptiontrainingcurriculum.Leadershipengagementinpromotingandimplementinganti-corruptionstandards,frombothseniorandmiddlemanagement,iscoretotheeffectivenessofanti-corruptionprogrammesandshouldbeakeyelementinassessments.Mobilisingmultidisciplinaryteamstoensurethatcomplianceeffortsareappropriatelyembeddedacrosscorporatefunctionsalsosupportscomprehensiveassessmentsofanti-corruptionprogrammes,reflectingcompanies’recognitionthatcultivatinganethicalcorporatecultureisasharedresponsibility.

Tomonitor,measureandanalyseeffectivenessofanti-corruptionmeasures,companiesemployawiderangeofquantitativeandqualitativetools.Developingactivity-andoutcome-basedindicatorsandmetricsiskeytoascertainingwhetheracomplianceprogramme’sobjectivesarebeingmet.Surveyssupportcompanies’assessmentsoftheextenttowhichacultureofintegrityhasbeenintegratedintoanorganisation.Dataanalyticsandartificialintelligencecanhelpidentifytrendsandpatterns,includingredflagsandareasofweakness,enablingcompaniestoimproveboththeircomplianceprogrammesandassessmentmethodologies.Internalandexternalauditsprovidehelpfulinsightsoneffectiveness,particularlywhenauditsincorporatebehaviouralsciencetoevaluatewhethercomplianceprogrammesarefacilitatingculturalchange.Poolingknowledgeandco-operatingacrosscompaniesholdconsiderablepotentialforsupportingassessmentsofcomplianceeffectiveness.Peerlearningwithinindustriesthatgrapplewithsimilarchallengescanbevaluable,ascanbenchmarking,thepracticeofcomparingacompany’seffortsagainstthoseofpeerorganisationsorindustrystandards.Collectiveactioninitiatives,whichcaninvolvesectoralinitiatives,industryalliancesandanti-corruptioncoalitions,canbringtheprivatesectorandotherstakeholderstogethertotacklesharedproblemsofcorruption.Whilecompaniesarekeentoexchangeinsights,atensionpersistsbetweentheappetiteforcollectiveengagementandconfidentialityconsiderations.Toaddressthis,governmentsmayconsidertakingstepstoimprovethealignmentand

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consistencyoftheirrulesandguidanceoncorporateanti-corruptioncompliance,facilitatepublic-privatedialogueandofferincentivesfortheimplementationofeffectivecomplianceprogrammes.

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1Whyassesstheeffectivenessofanti-corruptioncompliance

programmes?

Overthelastdecadecompanieshaveinvestedsignificanteffortsindevelopinganti-corruptionprogrammes,whichhavebeenlargelydrivenbygovernmentalregulations,andareincreasinglytakingstepstoassesstheeffectivenessoftheseprogrammes.Mostoftheconsultedcompaniesassesstheiranti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammetomitigatetheriskofenforcementbyavoidingpotentialsanctionsoranticipatingthelikelihoodofanymajorreputationalincidents.Companiesalsovieweffectivenessassessmentsasessentialtojustifycomplianceinvestments.Thissectionexaminesthetwomainreasonsconsultedcompaniesassesstheiranti-corruptioncomplianceprogramme-avoidingormitigatingsanctionsandreputationaldamageandjustifyingcomplianceinvestments.Inaddition,thissectionexploreseffortsbycompanieswithadvancedprogrammestoadoptamoreproactiveapproachandassesshowvalues,attitudes,andbehaviourstranslateintoacultureofintegrity.

Avoidingormitigatingsanctionsandreputationaldamage

TheOECDreportsthatavoidingprosecutionorotherlegalactionandprotectingthecompany’sreputationarechiefmotivatingfactorsforanti-corruptioncompliance(OECD,2020[3];2022[4]).Thisobservationalsoappliestotheassessmentofcomplianceeffectiveness.

Duringtheconsultation,companiesofallsizesstatedthatcomplianceprogrammesassessmentsareprimarilydrivenbyriskavoidance.Manyviewedcompliancewithanti-corruptionlegislationasessentialtopreventingsanctionsandreputationaldamage.Severalalsolinkedtheeffectivenessofananti-corruptionprogrammetoitsabilitytomitigatetheserisks.Asonecompanyrepresentativeexplained:

“Effectivenessistheoutcomethattherearenoseriousincidentsthatwouldrequireexternaldisclosure.”

Asaresult,companiestendtocalibratetheireffortstoassesseffectivenessoftheiranti-corruptionprogrammetotheextentrequiredbyanti-corruptionlegislationsandpolicies.Notably,multiplecompaniescitedtheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice,theFrenchanti-corruptionagency(AgenceFran?aiseAnticorruption),andtheUnitedKingdomSeriousFraudOfficeasbeingespeciallyinfluentialonthedesignoftheiranti-corruptionprogrammes.AtleastonelargecompanybuiltitsprogrammearoundtheanalysisofthemostcommoncasesbroughtagainstcompaniesundertheUnitedStatesForeignCorruptPracticesAct(FCPA).

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Notonlytheriskofsanctionsbutalsoactualenforcementtriggersreactiveanti-corruptioncomplianceefforts.ThoseconsultedcompaniesthathaveexperiencedmonitorshipsundertheFCPAfoundtheprocesschallenging–andwerekeentoavoidasimilarexperienceinthefuture.Ontheotherhand,theyvaluedtheadviceprovidedandtheunavoidablepushtoassesstherobustnessoftheiranti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammeandmovetheircompaniesinamoreethicaldirection,oftenprovidingthemwithstrongleadershipsupportandadequateresources.Conversely,onecompanyrepresentativesuggestedthatsomeofthedifficultiesfacedinenforcingthecompany'santi-corruptioncomplianceprogrammeinternallymightalsostemfromthefactthatthecompanyhadnotpreviouslyencounteredanycorruptionincidents.

Interestingly,consultedcompanies,andSMEsinparticular,foundincentivesparticularlybeneficialandaneffectivewaytoleveltheplayingfieldbycreatinganadditionalbusinesscaseinfavourofcomplianceforcompanieswithlimitedresources.Asstatedbyacompanyrepresentative:

“Incentivesmotivate.Theyarecritical.Especiallyforcompaniesthathavelessmatureprogrammes.”

Companiesappreciateincentivesfortheimplementationofeffectivecomplianceprogrammes,includingmeasureslikeaccesstonon-trialresolutions,reducedpenalties,taxbreaks,preferentialinterestrates,reputationalbenefits,orpreferentialaccesstopublicprocurement.Thisobservationsuggestsarecentincreaseincompanies’awarenessofthepotentialofincentivemechanisms,whichwerepreviouslynotseenasoneofthemaindriversforcorporateanti-corruptioncompliance(OECD,2022[4]).1Companiesappearincreasinglywillingtobenefitfromincentives,andthusmoreinterestedingovernments’assessmentsofanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammesinthatcontext.Formoredetailsonthetypesofincentivesthatgovernmentsuseorcoulduseinthelawenforcementcontextorinrelationtopublicadvantages,pleaseseetheResourceGuideonStatesMeasuresforStrengtheningBusinessIntegrity(OECD/UN,2024[5]).

Whilethisrisk-averseapproachseekslegitimateprotectionagainstdamage,itmightalsohaveunintendedconsequences.Acompliancestrategythatisprimarilydrivenbytheneedtoavoidpenaltiesandreputationdamagetendstobereactiveratherthanproactive.Itfocusesassessmenteffortsonwhetherthecompanyismeetingregulatoryrequirementsintheshort-term,ratherthanonrootcauseanalysis.Adoptingsuchastrategycanfurthercreateasituationwherethereportingofissuesisseenasafailureratherthananopportunityforimprovement.Employeesmaythusfeelreluctanttoreportincidentsorflagnear-misses.Asaresult,thecompanycouldpotentiallymissopportunitiestoaddressminorissuesbeforetheyescalateandtoimplementcorrectiveactionsthatcouldpreventfutureoccurrences.

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Box1.BRF’sexperience

BRFS.A.(BRF)signedaleniencyagreementinDecember2022withtheBrazilianGeneralComptroller(CGU)andAttorneyGeneral′sOffice(AGU)inresponsetoinvestigationsintotheirprocesses.Intheframeworkofjudicialproceedings,BRFnotablyimprovedthecompany’sintegritysystem,restructuredthecompany’sgovernance,andcooperatedwiththeauthorities.

Withthesigningoftheagreement,BRFhasundertakentopaytheBrazilianauthoritiesBrazilianReal583.9millioninpenaltiesarisingfrompastconduct.Theexistenceofananti-corruptioncompliancesystemreducedthepenaltiesdefinedbyBrazilianauthoritiesandalsoassuredthecorrectremediationofallvulnerabilitieswithinthecompany.Nevertheless,theleniencyagreementalsoimposedsomeimprovements,whichsignificantlyenhancedBRF’sComplianceSystemaccordingtothecompany.Thereviewoftheriskassessmentallowedallnewmanagerstounderstandthecompany’sexposuretocorruptionrisk,withinacomplexandlongvaluechaininvolvinginteractionswithpublicauthorities.NewtrainingmaterialsandnewcommunicationsalsoincreasedemployeeawarenessoftheimportanceofBRF’sinternalcontrols.Furthermore,thecommitmenttoengageBRF’svaluechainexpandedtheactivitiesofitsComplianceTeam,embracingcriticalbusinesspartnersofBRF.

Sources:BRF;BRF(2024[6])Integratedreportfor2023;BRF(2023[7]),Integratedreportfor2022

Makingthebusinesscaseforcompliance

Existingmeasurestoassesseffectivenessofanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammesarealsodrivenbyaneedfromcompliancedepartmentstoreportbacktotheirboardonthereturnoncomplianceinvestments.Effortsinthatdirectionindicateamoveawayfromareactiveapproachfocusedonavoidingsanctionsandreputationaldamage.However,sucheffortsremainsubjecttobusinessneedsandprioritiesofthetopmanagement,whichcouldleadtoafocusonimmediaterisk-drivenconcernsratherthanaproactiveandstrategicapproachtoanti-corruption.

Assessingacompany’santi-corruptioncomplianceprogrammeenablescompliancedepartmentstosecureandrequireadditionalinvestmentstoimproveit.Obtaininggreaterinvestmentmayrequireeducatingandpersuadingmanagementthatsuchinvestmentswillbeofbenefitforthecompany.Theupshotisthattoobtaintheresourcesandcapacitytoengageinassessmentsofanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammes,managementwillneedtobelievethattheinvestmentsareinfactjustifiedbasedonanevidence-basedrationale.Ratherthanusingactivity-basedindicators,2compliancedepartmentswillneedtoshowevidenceonthereturnoncorporateinvestmentstoimplementitsanti-corruptioncomplianceprogramme.

Box2

presentsaresearchprojectaimedatdevelopingascience-basedmodelformeasuringthevaluecontributionofcomplianceinacompany,bearinginmindtheneedforcompliancedepartmentstosecurecomplianceinvestments.

Inaddition,compliancedepartmentsneedtolegitimisetheinvestmentinmeasurementtoolstoimproveassessmentmethodologies.Thedevelopmentofinnovativetools,therecruitmentofspecialisedstaffandthetestingofnewapproachestoevaluatingeffectivenesscangeneratesignificantcosts,whichcouldbeconsideredsuperfluousiftheobjectivesofthisexpenditure,andtheexpectedbenefitsforthecompany,arenotclearlyestablished,explainedto,andsupportedbymanagement.

Thisneedforlegitimisationalsoreflectsthepressuremanycompliancedepartmentsaresubjectto.Mostofconsultedcompaniesmentionedthedifficultiesthattheirdepartmentfacesinsecuringwhattheyregard

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assufficientinternalresourceallocation.Theynotablyreferredtosignificantpressurefrombothseniormanagementandgovernments“nottomakemistakes”despitelimitedresources.Accordingtosomeinterviewedcompanies,thispressureisevengreaterintimesofrapidgrowth,whenthevolumeofbusinessactivitytobemonitoredincreases,asdothepotentialcorruptionrisks.Asfurtherdetailedbelow,astrongtonefromthetop(andfromthemiddle)iskeytolegitimiseandfostereffortstoassesstheeffectivenessofanti-corruptioncomplianceprogrammes.

Box2.AcademicresearchprojectonassessingtheReturnonCompliance

Thedutytocomplywithlegalandethicalrequirementsisimperativefororganisationsandshouldnotbedrivenprimarilybyeconomicconsiderations.However,complianceofficersareoftenchallengedtoprovetheirlegitimacywithintheorganisation(Trevi?o,L.K.,denNieuwenboer,N.A.,Kreiner,G.E.,&Bishop,D.G.,2014[8]).Thisincludesdemonstratingtheeffectivenessandefficiencyofcompliancemeasuresandhowcompliancecontributestobusinesssuccess.

Toaddressthisissue,Hunzikeretal.developedascience-basedmodelformeasuringthevaluecontributionofcomplianceinthecontextofaprojectentitledReturnonCompliance(Hunziker,S.,Gruber-Durrer,M.,HauserC.,Bretti-Rainalter,J.,2025[9]).Theresearchersidentifiedelevenfactorsthatpositivelyinfluencetheeffectivenessandefficiencyofcompliance,albeittovaryingdegrees.Threefactorswerefoundtobekeytoeffectiveandefficientcompliance:compliancecompetence,decisionrelevance,andadaptability.Compliancecompetenceistheabilityofemployeestoidentify,respondto,andtakeappropriateactioninresponsetopotentialcompliancerisks.Decisionre