企業(yè)盈利質(zhì)量分析中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)企業(yè)盈利質(zhì)量分析中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：Measuringthequalityofearnings1.IntroductionGenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP)offersomeflexibilityinpreparingthefinancialstatementsandgivethefinancialmanagerssomefreedomtoselectamongaccountingpoliciesandalternatives.Earningmanagementusestheflexibilityinfinancialreportingtoalterthefinancialresultsofthefirm(OrtegaandGrant,2003).Inotherwords,earningsmanagementismanipulatingtheearningtoachieveapredeterminedtargetsetbythemanagement.Itisapurposefulinterventionintheexternalreportingprocesswiththeintentofobtainingsomeprivategain(Schipper,1989).Levit(1998)definesearningmanagementasagrayareawheretheaccountingisbeingperverted;wheremanagersarecuttingcorners;and,whereearningsreportsreflectthedesiresofmanagementratherthantheunderlyingfinancialperformanceofthecompany.Thepopularpresslistsseveralinstancesofcompaniesengaginginearningsmanagement.SensormaticElectronics,whichstampedshippingdatesandtimesonsoldmerchandise,stoppeditsclocksonthelastdayofaquarteruntilcustomershipmentsreacheditssalesgoal.CertainbusinessunitsofCendantCorporationinflatedrevenuesnearly$500millionjustpriortoamerger;subsequently,CendantrestatedrevenuesandagreedwiththeSECtochangerevenuerecognitionpractices.AOLrestatedearningsfor$385millioninimproperlydeferredmarketingexpenses.In1994,theWallStreetJournaldetailedthemanywaysinwhichGeneralElectricsmoothedearnings,includingthecarefultimingofcapitalgainsandtheuseofrestructuringchargesandreserves,inresponsetothearticle,GeneralElectricreportedlyreceivedcallsfromothercorporationsquestioningwhysuchcommonpracticeswere“front”news.Earningmanagementoccurswhenmanagersusejudgmentinfinancialreportingandinstructuringtransactionstoalterfinancialreportstoeithermisleadsomestakeholdersabouttheunderlyingeconomicperformanceofthecompanyortoinfluencecontractualoutcomesthatdependonreportedaccountingnumbers(HealyandWhalen,1999).MagrathandWeld(2002)indicatethatabusiveearningsmanagementandfraudulentpracticesbeginsbyengaginginearningsmanagementschemesdesignedprimarilyto“smooth”earningstomeetinternallyorexternallyimposedearningsforecastsandanalysts’expectations.Evenifearningsmanagementdoesnotexplicitlyviolateaccountingrules,itisanethicallyquestionablepractice.Anorganizationthatmanagesitsearningssendsamessagetoitsemployeesthatbendingthetruthisanacceptablepractice.Executiveswhopartakeofthispracticeriskcreatinganethicalclimateinwhichotherquestionableactivitiesmayoccur.Amanagerwhoasksthesalesstafftohelpsalesonedayforfeitsthemoralauthoritytocriticizequestionablesalestacticsanotherday.Earningsmanagementcanalsobecomeaveryslipperyslope,whichrelativelyminoraccountinggimmicksbecomingmoreandmoreaggressiveuntiltheycreatematerialmisstatementsinthefinancialstatements(Clikeman,2003)TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)issuedthreestaffaccountingbulletins(SAB)toprovideguidanceonsomeaccountingissuesinordertopreventtheinappropriateearningsmanagementactivitiesbypubliccompanies:SABNo.99“Materiality”,SABNo.100“RestructuringandImpairmentCharges”andSABNo.101“RevenueRecognition”.Earningsmanagementbehaviormayaffectthequalityofaccountingearnings,whichisdefinedbySchipperandVincent(2003)astheextenttowhichthereportedearningsfaithfullyrepresentHichsianeconomicincome,whichistheamountthatcanbeconsumed(i.e.paidoutasdividends)duringaperiod,whileleavingthefirmequallywelloffatthebeginningandtheendoftheperiod.Assessmentofearningqualityrequiressometimestheseparationsofearningsintocashfromoperationandaccruals,themoretheearningsisclosedtocashfromoperation,thehigherearningsquality.AsPenman(2001)statesthatthepurposeofaccountingqualityanalysisistodistinguishbetweenthe“hard”numbersresultingfromcashflowsandthe“soft”numbersresultingfromaccrualaccounting.Thequalityofearningscanbeassessedbyfocusingontheearningpersistence;highqualityearningsaremorepersistentandusefulintheprocessofdecisionmaking.BeneishandVargus(2002)investigatewhetherinsidertradingisinformativeaboutearningsqualityusingearningpersistenceasameasureforthequalityofearnings,theyfindthatincome-increasingaccrualsaresignificantlymorepersistentforfirmswithabnormalinsiderbuyingandsignificantlylesspersistentforfirmswithabnormalinsiderselling,relativetofirmswhichthereisnoabnormalinsidertrading.Balsametal.(2003)usesthelevelofdiscretionaryaccrualsasadirectmeasureforearningquality.Thediscretionaryaccrualsmodelisbasedonaregressionrelationshipbetweenthechangeintotalaccrualsasdependentvariableandchangeinsalesandchangeinthelevelofproperty,plantandequipment,changeincashflowfromoperationsandchangeinfirmsize(totalassets)asindependentvariables.Iftheregressioncoefficientsinthismodelaresignificantthatmeansthatthereisearningmanagementinthatfirmandtheearningsqualityislow.Thisresearchpresentsanempiricalstudyonusingthreedifferentapproachesofmeasuringthequalityofearningsondifferentindustry.Thenotionis;ifthereisacompleteconsistencyamongthethreemeasures,ageneralassessmentforthequalityofearnings(highorlow)canbereachedand,ifnot,thequalityofearningsisquestionableandneedsdifferentotherapproachesformeasurementandmoreinvestigationsandanalysis.Therestofthepaperisdividedintofollowingsections:Earningsmanagementincentives,Earningsmanagementtechniques,Modeldevelopment,Sampleandstatisticalresults,andConclusion.2.Earningsmanagementincentives2.1Meetinganalysts’expectationsIngeneral,analysts’expectationsandcompanypredictionstendtoaddresstwohigh-profilecomponentsoffinancialperformance:revenueandearningsfromoperations.Thepressuretomeetrevenueexpectationsisparticularlyintenseandmaybetheprimarycatalystinleadingmanagerstoengageinearningmanagementpracticesthatresultinquestionableorfraudulentrevenuerecognitionpractices.MagrathandWeld(2002)indicatethatimproperrevenuerecognitionpracticeswerethecauseofone-thirdofallvoluntaryorforcedrestatementsofincomefiledwiththeSECfrom1977to2000.Ironically,itisoftenthecompaniesthemselvesthatcreatethispressuretomeetthemarket’searningsexpectations.Itiscommonpracticeforcompaniestoprovideearningsestimatestoanalystsandinvestors.Managementisoftenfacedwiththetaskofensuringtheirtargetedestimatesaremet.Severalcompanies,includingCoca-ColaCo.,IntelCorp.,andGilletteCo.,havetakenacontrarystanceandnolongerprovidequarterlyandannualearningsestimatestoanalysts.Indoingso,thesecompaniesclaimtheyhaveshiftedtheirfocusfrommeetingshort-termearningsestimatestoachievingtheirlong-termstrategies(MckayandBrown,2002).2.2Toavoiddebt-covenantviolationsandminimizepoliticalcostsSomefirmshavetheincentivetoavoidviolatingearnings-baseddebtcovenants.Ifviolated,thelendermaybeabletoraisetheinterestrateonthedebtordemandimmediaterepayment.Consequently,somefirmsmayuseearnings-managementtechniquestoincreaseearningstoavoidsuchcovenantviolations.Ontheotherhand,someotherfirmshavetheincentivetolowerearningsinordertominimizepoliticalcostsassociatedwithbeingseenastooprofitable.Forexample,ifgasolinepriceshavebeenincreasingsignificantlyandoilcompaniesareachievingrecordprofitlevel,thentheremaybeincentiveforthegovernmenttointerveneandenactanexcess-profittaxorattempttointroducepricecontrols.2.3Tosmoothearningstowardalong-termsustainabletrendFormanyyearsithasbeenbelievedthatafirmshouldattempttoreducethevolatilityinitsearningsstreaminordertomaximizeshareprice.Becauseahighlyviolateearningpatternindicatesrisk,thereforethestockwilllosevaluecomparedtootherswithmorestableearningspatterns.Consequently,firmshaveincentivestomanageearningstohelpachieveasmoothandgrowingearningsstream(OrtegaandGrant,2003).2.4MeetingthebonusplanrequirementsHealy(1985)providestheevidencethatearningsaremanagedinthedirectionthatisconsistentwithmaximizingexecutives’earnings-basedbonus.Whenearningswillbebelowtheminimumlevelrequiredtoearnabonus,thenearningaremanagedupwardsothattheminimumisachievedandabonusisearned.Conversely,whenearningwillbeabovethemaximumlevelatwhichnoadditionalbonusispaid,thenearningsaremanageddownward.Theextraearningsthatwillnotgenerateextrabonusthiscurrentperiodaresavedtobeusedtoearnabonusinafutureperiod.Whenearningsarebetweentheminimumandthemaximumlevels,thenearningsaremanagedupwardinordertoincreasethebonusearnedinthecurrentperiod.2.5ChangingmanagementEarningsmanagementusuallyoccursaroundthetimeofchangingmanagement,theCEOofacompanywithpoorperformanceindicatorswilltrytoincreasethereportedearningsinordertopreventorpostponebeingfired.Ontheotherhand,thenewCEOwilltryshiftpartoftheincometofutureyearsaroundthetimewhenhis/herperformancewillbeevaluatedandmeasured,andblamethelowearningatthebeginningofhiscontractontheactsofthepreviousCEO.3.EarningsmanagementtechniquesOneofthemostcommonearningsmanagementtoolsisreportingrevenuebeforethesellerhasperformedunderthetermsofasalescontract(SEC,SABNo.101,1999).AnotherareaofconcerniswhereacompanyfailstocomplywithGAAPandinappropriatelyrecordsrestructuringchargesandgeneralreservesforfuturelosses,reversingorrelievingreservesininappropriateperiods,andrecognizingornotrecognizinganassetimpairmentchargeintheappropriateperiod(SEC,SABNo.100,1999).Managerscaninfluencereportedexpensesthroughassumptionsandestimatessuchastheassumedrateofreturnonpensionplanassetandtheestimatedusefullivesoffixedassets,alsotheycaninfluencereportedearningsbycontrollingthetimingofpurchasing,deliveries,discretionaryexpenditures,andsaleofassets.3.1Bigbath“BigBath”chargesareone-timerestructuringcharge.Currentearningswillbedecreasedbyoverstatingtheseone-timecharges.Byreversingtheexcessivereserve,futureearningswillincrease.Bigbathchargesarenotalwaysrelatedtorestructuring.InApril2001,CiscoSystemsInc.announcedchargesagainstearningsofalmost$4billion.Thebulkofthecharge,$2.5billion,consistedofaninventorywritedown.Writingoffmorethanabilliondollarsfrominventorynowmeansmorethanabilliondollarsoflesscostinthefutureperiod.Thisanexampleofwhatultra-conservativeaccountinginoneperiodmakespossibleinfutureperiods.3.2AbuseofmaterialityAnotherareathatmightbeusedbyaccountantstomanipulatetheearningistheapplicationofmaterialityprincipleinpreparingthefinancialstatements,thisprincipleisverywide,flexibleandhasnospecificrangetodeterminewheretheitemismaterialornot.SECusestheinterpretationruledbythesupremecourtinidentifyingwhatismaterial;thesupremecourthasheldthatafactismaterialifthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatthefactwouldhavebeenviewedbyreasonableinvestorashavingsignificantlyalteredthe“totalmix”ofinformationmadeavailable(SEC,SABNo.99,1999).TheSEChasalsointroducedsomeconsiderationsforaquantitativelysmallmisstatementofafinancialstatementitemtobematerial:.whetherthemisstatementarisesfromanitemcapableofprecisemeasurementorwhetheritarisesfromanestimateand,ifso,thedegreeofimprecisioninherentintheestimate;.whetherthemisstatementmasksachangeinearningsorothertrends;.whetherthemisstatementhidesafailuretomeetanalysts’consensusexpectationsfortheenterprise;.whetherthemisstatementchangesalossintoincomeorviceversa;.whetherthemisstatementconcernsasegmentorotherportionoftheregistrant’sbusinessthathasbeenidentifiedasplayingasignificantroleintheregistrant’soperationsorprofitability;and.whetherthemisstatementinvolvesconcealmentofanunlawfultransaction.3.3Cookiejar“Cookiejar”reserve–sometimeslabeledrainydayreserveorcontingencyreserves,inperiodsofstrongfinancialperformance,cookiejarreserveenabletoreduceearningsbyoverstatingreserves,overstatingexpenses,andusingone-timewrite-offs.Inperiodsofweakfinancialperformance,cookiejarreservescanbeusedtoincreaseearningsbyreversingaccrualsandreservestoreducecurrentperiodexpenses(Kokoszka,2003).ThemostfamousexampleofuseofcookiejarreservesisWorldComInc.InAugust2002,aninternalreviewrevealedthatthecompanyhad$2.5billionreservesrelatedtolitigation,uncollectibleandtaxes.Thecompanyusedmostoftheminaseriesofso-calledreservereversalsinordertohavehigherearnings.Source:KhaledElMoatasemAbdelghany,2005.“Measuringthequalityofearnings”,ManagerialAuditingJournal,vol.20,no.9,pp.1001–1015.

譯文：衡量盈利質(zhì)量1、引言一般公認(rèn)會計原則（GAAP）提供準(zhǔn)備一定的靈活性的財務(wù)報表，給財務(wù)經(jīng)理一定的自由空間進(jìn)行選擇會計政策和方案。收入管理使用中的靈活性的財務(wù)報告改變公司（奧爾特加和格蘭特，2003年）的財務(wù)結(jié)果。換句話說，收入管理是操縱收益達(dá)到預(yù)定目標(biāo)的管理設(shè)置。這是有目的的干預(yù)外部報告過程并獲得一些私利的意圖（席佩爾，1989）。萊維特（1998）盈余管理的定義是一個灰色地帶，其中會計核算是不恰當(dāng)?shù)模黄渲校芾砣藛T偷工減料；并在財報反映了管理層的意愿，而不是潛在的財務(wù)業(yè)績公司。大眾媒體列出了幾個公司從事盈利實例的管理。先訊美資電子對其所售商品加蓋裝運(yùn)日期和時間，在一季度的最后一天停止了其時鐘，直到客戶出貨量達(dá)到其銷售目標(biāo)。勝騰公司的某些業(yè)務(wù)部門為了合并虛增收入近5億美元；隨后，圣達(dá)特重申和與SEC同意改變收入確認(rèn)方法。AOL重申收益為3.85億美元包括遞延不正當(dāng)?shù)臓I銷費(fèi)用。1994年，華爾街日報詳細(xì)介紹通用電氣平滑收益的許多方法，包括資本收益和使用重組費(fèi)用和儲備的時機(jī)。以回應(yīng)文章中，通用電氣據(jù)說受到其他公司的質(zhì)疑-為什么這樣約定俗成的做法會變成“頭版”的消息。收入管理發(fā)生在管理者判斷財務(wù)報告和結(jié)構(gòu)性交易時，為了改變財務(wù)報表，誤導(dǎo)有關(guān)該公司的基本經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)的一些利益相關(guān)方或影響會改變合同結(jié)果的會計數(shù)據(jù)（希利和惠倫，1999年）。馬格拉斯和威爾德（2002）指出，一開始從事設(shè)計濫用盈余管理和欺詐行為的收益管理方案主要是為了“平穩(wěn)”，以滿足內(nèi)部或外部強(qiáng)加的盈利財報預(yù)測和分析師的預(yù)期。即使盈余管理并沒有明確違反會計準(zhǔn)則，但它是一個道德上有問題的做法。其盈利的管理組織發(fā)送給它的員工的消息是彎曲的真相，但卻是一個可以接受的做法。高管這種做法創(chuàng)造一個道德氛圍，誰參加就不會出現(xiàn)在其他可能可疑的活動中。一位經(jīng)理問銷售人員，如果你以喪失1天道德來幫助加快銷售，那么另一天你就會被批評質(zhì)疑。盈余管理也處在一個十分危險的境地,而相對次要的會計花招越來越咄咄逼人,直到他們創(chuàng)建的財務(wù)報表出現(xiàn)重大錯報（克利克曼，2003年）。美國證券交易委員會（SEC）發(fā)出了三名員工的會計公報（SAB）以此來對一些會計問題提供指導(dǎo)，以防止有不恰當(dāng)?shù)挠喙芾砘顒釉谏鲜泄局谐霈F(xiàn)：SAB99號“實質(zhì)性”，SAB第100號“重組費(fèi)用和資產(chǎn)減值”和SAB第101號“收入確認(rèn)”。盈余管理行為可能會影響會計盈余質(zhì)量，該報告是由席佩爾和溫深特（2003）所作，為一定程度反映盈利忠實的代表Hichsian的經(jīng)濟(jì)收入，這是量能食用期間（即支付股息），而離開公司在開始和期間的結(jié)束同樣富裕。評估收益質(zhì)量的要求有時就會變成操作現(xiàn)金的分離和收益,收益越不對現(xiàn)金操作,收益質(zhì)量就越高。由彭曼（2001）指出，會計質(zhì)量分析的目的是區(qū)分“硬”的數(shù)字現(xiàn)金流和權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制所帶來的“軟”的數(shù)字。盈利質(zhì)量可以通過關(guān)注盈利持續(xù)性進(jìn)行評估；高品質(zhì)的市盈率可以讓企業(yè)做出更持久和更有用的決策。班尼胥和瓦古斯（2002）調(diào)查內(nèi)幕交易信息是關(guān)于是否使用收益持久性的收益質(zhì)量作為衡量收益的質(zhì)量，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對于沒有異常內(nèi)幕交易的公司，收益更持久的公司內(nèi)存在異常內(nèi)幕購買和異常內(nèi)部銷售。貝奧森（2003）使用可操縱應(yīng)計利潤水平來衡量盈利質(zhì)量。審計師變更模型是基于回歸總收益作為因變量，改變銷售和物業(yè)，廠房及設(shè)備，并且改變現(xiàn)金流運(yùn)作和公司規(guī)模(總資產(chǎn))作為獨(dú)立的變量。如果在此模型中的回歸系數(shù)是顯著的，這意味著有收入管理，表示該公司的收益質(zhì)量低下。這項研究提供了一個實證，使用三種不同的方法衡量收入在不同行業(yè)的質(zhì)量。這一概念是；如果這三項措施有一個完整的一致性，質(zhì)量評價收益（高或低）可以達(dá)到總體水平，如果沒有，表面盈利質(zhì)量有問題的，需要不同的其他方法進(jìn)行測量，調(diào)查和分析。本文的其余部分被分為以下幾個部分：盈余管理激勵，盈余管理技術(shù)，發(fā)展模式，采樣和統(tǒng)計結(jié)果，與結(jié)論。2、盈余管理的激勵2.1滿足了分析師的預(yù)期一般而言,分析師預(yù)期和公司財務(wù)業(yè)績的預(yù)測傾向于解決兩個高調(diào)的組件:營運(yùn)收入和利潤。滿足收入預(yù)期的壓力尤為激烈，管理人員從事的盈余管理行為可能是主要的催化劑，導(dǎo)致不良或欺騙性的收入確認(rèn)的做法。馬格拉斯和威爾德（2002）表明，從1977年到2000年提交給美國證券交易委員會(SEC)的收入報表中，其中收入確認(rèn)方法不恰當(dāng)?shù)模腥种欢际亲栽富虮黄鹊摹Ｓ兄S刺意味的是,這往往是企業(yè)自己創(chuàng)造這種壓力來滿足市場的盈利預(yù)期。這是公司為分析師和投資者提供收益預(yù)期的常見的做法。管理層經(jīng)常面臨的任務(wù)就是確保他們的目標(biāo)得到滿足。有幾家公司，其中包括可口可樂公司，英特爾公司和吉列公司，以相反的立場，不再提供季度和年度的盈利預(yù)測。這樣一來，這些公司聲稱他們已經(jīng)把他們的注意力從短期的盈利預(yù)測轉(zhuǎn)移了，以實現(xiàn)其長期戰(zhàn)略（曼克凱和布朗，2002）。2.2為了避