英文論文2000字經濟篇一：英語論文-中國在世界經濟中的優勢與劣勢

對外經濟貿易高校遠程訓練畢業論文

(僅供同學們參考)

畢業論文/設計

題目：

學號****************姓名******

學院遠程訓練學院指導老師

專業商務英語論文成果

完成時間：*****年***月**日

中國在世界經濟中的優勢與劣勢

UniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics

GraduationThesis/Design

Title:

Department/SchoolSpecialty（chooseone）AuthorofThesis/Design

StudentIDNo.ThesisAdvisorGrade

Date

Index

Abstract……………….6

Chapter1IntroductionandOverview………………...7Chapter2China’sStrengthsintheWorldEconomy…………………8

2.1Economy-orientedPolicy……………………8

2.2HugeMarket………………...10

2.3LowCostandHighQualityofHumanResource…………...11

Chapter3China’sWeaknessesintheWorldEconomy……………13

3.1AbsenceofCreditLegalandJudicialSystem………………13

3.2InefficiencyinStateOwnedEnterprisesandFinancialSystem…………….13

3.3InadequateInfrastructure…………………...15

3.4UnemploymentandIncomeDisparity……..16

3.5Pollution……………………17Conclusion……………18

Reference……………..19

篇二：EconomicEssay經濟英文論文

TheLikonomics

--TheLikonomics--

“Likonomics”,thetermtodescribeChinesePremierLiKeqiang`seconomicpolicy.WascoinedonJune27bythreeeconomistsatBarclaysCapital.LikeThatcherism,Reaganomics,andmorerecently“Abenomics”,LikonomicshasbecomethebuzzwordtodescribetheimplicationsofChinasneweconomicprogram.Andwhatis“Likonomics”?TheBarclaysCapital`seconomistsalsogiveouraexplain,“Likonomics”wasaseriesofmeasuresadoptedbytheStateCouncil.ThemeasureswerepassedtoensurethesustainabilityofChina`seconomy.“whichcouldbesummarizedasLikonomics,consistsofthreekeypillars:nostimulus,Deleveragingandstructuralreform.ItismeantheChinaneedtofreethemarket,andstopthegovernmentcontrolthemarket.Andthisnewpoliceisalong-termobjectives,sothenextthreeyearsthegrewrateofChinesequarterofEconomicwillbereducedatleast4%.

“Sinceassumingofficeinmid-March,PremierLiKeqianghastakenadifferentpolicypath.Itskeyeconomicpolicyframework,whichcouldbesummarizedasLikonomics,consistsofthreekeypillars:nostimulus,deleveragingandstructuralreform.”(ChinaDaily07/05/2023page9byHuangYiping).Inthenews,weknowthethreesolutions,“nostimulus”,“Deleveraging”and“structuralreform”.The“stimulus”meanthegovernmentintheshorttime,

followingtheliabilitiesorexpandthemoneysupplytostimulatetheeconomy,butatthesametimetheinflationalsocoming,SothefirstwayistodecreasetheChineseinflation.Andthesecondsolutionis“Deleveraging”,thissolution`smeaningis“repay”,repaythemoneythatborrowbeforetheeconomiccrisis,atthesametimethemostassets,suchasstocks,bonds,realestatethepricesofthoseassetswillbedecrease,andthecountry`seconomyalsowillbereduced.Thelastsolutionisthe“structuralreform”,everyoneknowthegovernmenthasnoabletocontrolthemarket,becausethegovernmentcannotgetallinformationforthegovernment,butitjustisthehalfreasonforthissolution,theotherpartisthe“corruption”intheChinesegovernmentsystem,thepowerofficialhaveabletocontroltheeconomy.SothePremierLiKeqiangbuildthe“freetradezone”inShanghai,inthisareanoonecancontroltheeconomy,thatmeaneverythinghappeninthisareaareallformthemarket`sselfadjusting.

Infactthewords“nostimulus”,“Deleveraging”and“structuralreform”areprofessional,soIusemyownwordtoexplainthe“Likonomics”.Ihavefoursteps.Firststep,only“fight”theinflationanddonotcaretheChineseEconomygrowrate,rightnowinChinatheRIBORbetweenbanksisfrom2%increaseto30%,itiseffectivetostopthebanks`sventureinvestment,because

whentheRIBORincreasethebankhavetokeepthe“workingcapital”intheirownhand,theyhavenoenoughabletopaytheextremelyhighinterestrate,sothatthetotalmoneyinthemarketgoingtodecrease.ButatthesametimetheChina“TotalSocialFinancing”itreduced43%.Secondlystep,isdecreasetheTAX,assameasthepictureshowas,rightnowtheChinesetaspriceisstandonthepointA,andifthegovernmentreducedthetaxpricethetotaltaxrevenuewill

be

increase.Thirdlystep,isfreethecoal`sprice,becauseinChinathecoalisthemostimportantresource,peopleusethecoaltogenerateelectricity,warmandothers,butonthecoalhave88kindsoftax,andthegovernmentdisagreetotradethecoalwithothercountries,sothatifthegovernmentstoptocontrolthecoal`sprice,thepricewillbedecrease,thentheburdenofenterpriseswillaccordinglydrop.Fourthstep,andalsothelaststepistalkabout

thegovernmentcontrol.Weallknow,thatifthegovernmentcontrolthemarkettheefficiencyofmarketwillgoesdown,becausethegovernmentcannotgetalltheinformationinthemarket.Sothe“Freetradezone”wasborninShanghai,inthiszonethegovernmentcannotcontrol,andtheotherlargeenterprisealsocannotintervene,itisa100%freemarket.ThePremierLiisusethiswaytobreakthebureaucracyinChina.

Rightnow,theChinaisthefastestdevelopcountryintheworld,andatthesametimethestagflationalsoiscoming.SothePremierLiusetheextremelyhardcosttostoptheChineseinflationincrease.Wedon`tknowwhatwillbehappenintheaftertenyears,eventwentyyears,theChina,standonthetopofworld,everyactionofChinacanhaveabletoeffecttheinternationaleconomic.

Alltheinformationsarefromthosewebsite:

篇三：一篇經濟類英文論文(含中文翻譯)

TheProblemofSocialCost

社會成本問題

RONALDCOASE

羅納德·科斯

RonaldCoaseisProfessorEmeritusatUniversityofChicagoLawSchoolandaNobelLaureateinEconomics.ThisarticleisfromTheJournalofLawandEconomics(October1960).Severalpassagesdevotedtoextendeddiscussionsoflegaldecisions

havebeenomitted.

羅納德·科斯在芝加哥高校法學院名譽教授和諾貝爾經濟學獎得主。本文是其外法學與經濟學雜志（1960年10月）。特地的法律問題的打算的延長爭論的幾個

段落已被省略。

I.THEPROBLEMTOBEEXAMINED

Thispaperisconcernedwiththoseactionsofbusinessfirmswhichhaveharm-fuleffectsonothers.Thestandardexampleisthatofafactorythesmokefromwhichhasharmfuleffectsonthoseoccupyingneighbouringproperties.Theeconomicanalysisofsuchasituationhasusuallyproceededintermsofadivergencebetweentheprivateandsocialproductofthefactory,inwhicheconomistshavelargelyfollowedthetreatmentofPigouinTheEconomiesofWelfare.Theconclusiontowhichthiskindofanalysisseemstohaveledmosteconomistsisthatitwouldbedesirabletomaketheownerofthefactoryli-ableforthedamagecausedtothoseinjuredbythesmoke,oralternatively,toplaceataxonthefactoryownervaryingwiththeamountofsmokeproducedandequivalentinmoneytermstothedamageitwouldcause,orfinally,toexcludethefactoryfromresidentialdistricts(andpresumablyfromotherareasinwhichtheemissionofsmokewouldhaveharmfuleffectsonothers).Itismycontentionthatthesuggestedcoursesofactionareinappropriate,inthattheyleadtoresultswhicharenotnecessarily,orevenusually,desirable.

一、要檢查的問題

本文關注的是這些行動的企業有損害他人有用的影響。標準的例子是，一個工廠的煙霧從那些占據鄰近物業的有害影響。在這種狀況下的經濟分析，通常已在工廠的私人和社會產品之間的分歧方面著手，在經濟學家們基本上遵循治療庇古福利經濟。這種分析的結論，好像使大多數經濟學家是工廠里的煙霧，或者受傷的人造成的損害能夠使雇主，這將是可取的，上放置一個稅在金錢方面的損害，或最終，它會導致排解住宅區（也許是從其他地區排放的煙霧將有對他人有害影響）工廠廠主不同的金額產生的煙霧，相當于。行動的建議的課程是不合適的，由于它們導致的結果是不肯定，甚至是通常狀況下，可取的，它是我的論點。

II.THERECIPROCALNATUREOFTHEPROBLEM

Thetraditionalapproachhastendedtoobscurethenatureofthechoicethathastobe

made.ThequestioniscommonlythoughtofasoneinwhichAinflictsharmonBandwhathastobedecidedis:howshouldwerestrainA?Butthisiswrong.Wearedealingwithaproblemofareciprocalnature.Toavoidtheharmto,BwouldinflictharmonA.Therealquestionthathastobedecidedis:shouldAbeallowedtoharmBorshouldBbeallowedtoharmA?Theproblemistoavoidthemoreseriousharm.Iinstancedinmypreviousarticlethecaseofaconfectionerthenoiseandvibrationsfromwhosemachinerydisturbedadoctorinhiswork.Toavoidharmingthedoctorwouldinflictharmontheconfectioner.Theproblemposedbythiscasewasessentiallywhetheritwasworthwhile,asaresultofrestrictingthemethodsofproductionwhichcouldbeusedbytheconfectioner,tosecuremoredoctoringatthecostofareducedsupplyofconfectioneryproducts.Anotherexampleisaffordedbytheproblemofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsonneighbouringland.Ifitisinevitablethatsomecattlewillstray,allincreaseinthesupplyofmeatcanonlybeobtainedattheexpenseofadecreaseinthesupplyofcrops.Thenatureofthechoiceisclear:meatorcrops.Whatanswershouldbegivenis,ofcourse,notclearunlessweknowthevalueofwhatisobtainedaswellasthevalueofwhatissacrificedtoobtainit.Togiveanotherexample,ProfessorGeorgeJ.Stiglerinstancesthecontaminationofastream.Ifweassumethattheharmfuleffectofthepollutionisthatitkillsthefish,thequestiontobedecidedis:isthevalueofthefishlostgreaterorlessthanthevalueoftheproductwhichthecontaminationofthestreammakespossible.Itgoesalmostwithoutsayingthatthisproblemhastobelookedatintotalandatthemargin.

二、互惠性的問題

傳統的做法往往掩蓋作出的選擇，自然。這個問題通常被認為作為一個在B上一個敵人造成的損害和什么要打算的是：我們應當如何抑制一個？但這是錯誤的。我們正在處理的互惠性質的問題。為了避開損害，B將A上造成的危害，真正的問題，必需打算是：應當允許A損害B或應允許B損害嗎？問題是要避開更嚴峻的損害。我在我以前的文章中實例化一個糕點師的噪音和振動機械擔心醫生在他的工作狀況。為了避開傷及醫生會造成損害的糕點。基本上這種狀況下所造成的問題是它是否值得，作為一種限制方法可以用于糕點生產的結果，以爭取更多的糖果產品的供應削減，成本篡改。另一個例子是賜予由偏離破壞鄰近土地上的農作物的牛的問題。假如這是不行避開的，一些牛會偏離，只能獲得全部的肉類供應增加作物供應削減開支。選擇的性質是明確的：肉類或農作物。應賜予什么樣的答案是，當然，不明確的，除非我們知道得到什么價值，以及什么犧牲得到它的價值。給另一個例如，教授喬治·J.斯蒂格勒實例流的污染。假如我們假定污染的有害影響是，它殺死的魚，將要打算的問題是：是魚的價值損失大于或小于流的污染，使產品的價值。當然，幾乎沒有說，這個問題要看著總保證金。

III.THEPRICINGSYSTEMWITHLIABILITYFORDAMAGE

Iproposetostartmyanalysisbyexaminingacaseinwhichmosteconomistswouldpresumablyagreethattheproblemwouldbesolvedinacompeletelysatisfactorymanner:whenthedamagingbusinesshastopayforalldamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly(strictlythismeansthattheoperationofapricingsystemis

withoutcost).

Agoodexampleoftheproblemunderdiscussionisaffordedbythecaseofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsgrowingonneighbouringland.Letussup-posethatafarmerandcattle-raiserareoperatingonneighbouringproperties.Letusfurthersupposethat,withoutanyfencingbetweentheproperties,anincreaseinthesizeofthecattle-raiser’sherdincreasesthetotaldamagetothefarmer’scrops.Whathappenstothemarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreasesisanothermatter.Thisdependsonwhetherthecattletendtofollowoneanotherortoroamsidebyside,onwhethertheytendtobemoreorlessrestlessasthesizeoftheherdincreasesandonothersimilarfactors.Formyimmediatepurpose,itisimmaterialwhatassumptionismadeaboutmarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreases.

Giventhatthecattle-raiserisliableforthedamagecaused,theadditionalannualcostimposedonthecattle-raiserifheincreasedhisherdfrom,say,2to3steersis$3andindecidingonthesizeoftheherd,hewilltakethisintoaccountalongwithhisothercosts.Thatis,hewillnotincreasethesizeoftheherdunlessthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproduced(assumingthatthecattle-raiserslaughtersthecattle)isgreaterthantheadditionalcoststhatthiswillentail,includingthevalueoftheadditionalcropsdestroyed.Ofcourse,if,bytheemploymentofdogs,herdsmen,aeroplanes,mobileradioandothermeans,theamountofdamagecanbereduced,thesemeanswillbeadoptedwhentheircostislessthanthevalueofthecropwhichtheypreventbeinglost.Giventhattheannualcostoffencingis$9,thecattle-raiserwhowishedtohaveaherdwith4steersormorewouldpayforfencingtobeerectedandmaintained,assumingthatothermeansofattainingthesameendwouldnotdosomorecheaply.Whenthefenceiserected,themarginalcostduetotheliabilityfordamagebecomeszero,excepttotheextentthatanincreaseinthesizeoftheherdnecessitatesastrongerandthereforemoreexpensivefencebecausemoresteersareliabletoleanagainstitatthesametime.But,ofcourse,itmaybecheaperforthecattle-raisernottofenceandtopayforthedamagedcrops,asinmyarithmeticalexample,with3orfewersteers.

Itmightbethoughtthatthefactthatthecattle-raiserwouldpayforallcropsdamagedwouldleadthefarmertoincreasehisplantingifacattle-raisercametooccupytheneighbouringproperty.Butthisisnotso.Ifthecropwaspreviouslysoldinconditionsofperfectcompetition,marginalcostwasequaltopricefortheamountofplantingundertakenandanyexpansionwouldhavereducedtheprofitsofthefarmer.Inthenewsituation,theexistenceofcropdamagewouldmeanthatthefarmerwouldselllessontheopenmarketbuthisreceiptsforagivenproductionwouldremainthesame,sincethecattle-raiserwouldpaythemarketpriceforanycropdamaged.Ofcourse,ifcattle-raisingcommonlyinvolvedthedestructionofcrops,thecomingintoexistenceofacattle-raisingindustrymightraisethepriceofthecropsinvolvedandfarmerswouldthenextendtheirplanting.ButIwishtoconfinemyattentiontotheindividualfarmer.

Ihavesaidthattheoccupationofaneighbouringpropertybyacattle-raiserwouldnotcausetheamountofproduction,orperhapsmoreexactlytheamountofplanting,bythefarmertoincrease.Infact,ifthecattle-raisinghasanyeffect,itwillbetodecreasetheamountofplanting.Thereasonforthisisthat,foranygiventractofland,ifthevalueofthecropdamagedissogreatthatthereceiptsfromthesaleoftheundamagedcroparelessthanthetotalcostsofcultivatingthattractofland,itwillbeprofitableforthefarmerandthecattle-raisertomakeabargainwherebythattractoflandisleftuncultivated.Thiscanbemadeclearbymeansofanarithmeticalexample.Assumeinitiallythatthevalueofthecropobtainedfromcultivatingagiventractoflandis$12andthatthecostincurredincultivatingthistractoflandis$10,thenetgainfromcultivatingthelandbeing$2.Iassumeforpurposesofsimplicitythatthefarmerownstheland.Nowassumethatthecattle-raiserstartsoperationsontheneighbouringpropertyandthatthevalueofthecropsdamagedis$1.Inthiscase$11isobtainedbythefarmerfromsaleonthemarketand$1isobtainedfromthecattle-raiserfordamagesufferedandthenetgainremains$2.Nowsupposethatthecattle-raiserfindsitprofitabletoincreasethesizeofhisherd,eventhoughtheamountofdamagerisesto$3;whichmeansthatthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionisgreaterthantheadditionalcosts,includingtheadditional$2paymentfordamage.Butthetotalpaymentfordamageisnow$3.Thenetgaintothefarmerfromcultivatingthelandisstill$2.Thecattle-raiserwouldbebetteroffifthefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatehislandforanypaymentlessthan$3.Thefarmerwouldbeagreeabletonotcultivatingthelandforanypaymentgreaterthan$2.Thereisclearlyroomforamutuallysatisfactorybargainwhichwouldleadtotheabandonmentofcultivation.*Butthesameargumentappliesnotonlytothewholetractcultivatedbythefannerbutalsotoanysubdivisionofit.Suppose,forexample,thatthecattlehaveawell-definedroute,say,toabrookortoashadyarea.Inthesecircumstances,theamountofdamagetothecropalongtheroutemaywellbegreatandifso,itcouldbethatthefarmerandthecattle-raiserwouldfinditprofitabletomakeabargainwherebythefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatethisstripofland.

Butthisraisesafurtherpossibility.Supposethatthereissuchawellde-finedroute.Supposefurtherthatthevalueofthecropthatwouldbeobtainedbycultivatingthisstripoflandis$10butthatthecostofcultivationis$11.Intheabsenceofthecattle-raiser,thelandwouldnotbecultivated.However,giventhepresenceofthecattle-raiser,itcouldwellbethatifthestripwascultivated,thewholecropwouldbedestroyedbythecattle.Inwhichcase,thecattle-raiserwouldbeforcedtopay$10tothefarmer.Itistruethatthefarmerwouldlose$1.Butthecattle-raiserwouldlose$10.Clearlythisisasituationwhichisnotlikelytolastindefinitelysinceneitherpartywouldwantthistohappen.Theaimofthefarmerwouldbetoinducethecattle-raisertomakeapaymentinreturnforanagreementtoleavethislanduncultivated.Thefarmerwouldnotbeabletoobtainapaymentgreaterthanthecostoffencingoffthispieceoflandnorsohighastoleadthecattle-raisertoabandontheuseoftheneighbouringproperty.Whatpaymentwouldinfactbemadewoulddepend

ontheshrewdnessofthefarmerandthecattle-raiserasbargain-ers.Butasthepaymentwouldnotbesohighastocausethecattle-raisertoabandonthislocationandasitwouldnotvarywiththesizeoftheherd,suchanagreementwouldnotaffecttheallocationofresourcesbutwouldmerelyalterthedistributionofincomeandwealthasbetweenthecattle-raiserandthefarmer.

Ithinkitisclearthatifthecattle-raiserisliablefordamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly,thereductioninthevalueofproductionelsewherewillbetakenintoaccountincomputingtheadditionalcostinvolvedinincreasingthesizeoftheherd.Thiscostwillbeweighedagainstthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionand,givenperfectcompetitioninthecattleindustry,theallocationofresourcesincattle-raisingwillbeoptimal.Whatneedstobeemphasizedisthatthefallinthevalueofproductionelsewherewhichwouldbetakenintoaccountinthecostsofthecattle-raisermaywellbelessthanthedamagewhichthecattlewouldcausetothecropsintheordinarycourseofevents.Thisisbecauseitispossible,asaresultofmarkettransactions,todiscontinuecultivationoftheland.Thisisdesirableinallcasesinwhich