1、巴菲特談企業估值（1986年）范聞備注：全文摘自1986年巴菲特致股東信的附錄部分，原汁原味。為方便深刻理解巴菲特的投資理念，特采用中英文對照方式。這是巴菲特本人對企業估值的一次全面闡釋。全文如下：Appendix   附錄Purchase-Price Accounting Adjustments and the "Cash Flow" Fallacy    購買法會計調整數與現金流量的謬誤  First a short quiz: below are abbreviated 1986

2、 statements of earnings for two companies. Which business is the more valuable?首先先來個小考：以下是兩家公司的財務報表，請問哪一家比較值錢? 圖1： As you've probably guessed, Companies O and N are the same business - Scott Fetzer. In the "O" (for "old") column we have shown what the company's

3、1986 GAAP earnings would have been if we had not purchased it; in the "N" (for "new") column we have shown Scott Fetzer's GAAP earnings as actually reported by Berkshire. 大家或許都已經猜到了，公司O跟公司N指的都是同一家公司-史考特-飛茲，O公司(指舊公司)系假設它1986年沒有被Berkshire買下時依照一般公認會計原則編制的盈余報表，至于N公司(指新公司)則是指

4、1986年它被Berkshire買下后，依照一般公認會計原則在Berkshire報表上顯示的相關數字。 It should be emphasized that the two columns depict identical economics - i.e., the same sales, wages, taxes, etc. And both "companies" generate the same amount of cash for owners. Only the accounting is different.必須強調的是，這兩家公司數字所敘述的是

5、同一個經濟事實，也就是營收、薪資、稅負都相同，而兩家公司貢獻給股東的現金流入也完全相同，唯一不同的就只有適用的會計原則。 So, fellow philosophers, which column presents truth? Upon which set of numbers should managers and investors focus?所以說，各位偉大的思想家，到底哪一家呈現的才是事實? 投資人與經理人到底應該關心哪一份報表?Before we tackle those questions, let's look at what produces t

6、he disparity between O and N. We will simplify our discussion in some respects, but the simplification should not produce any inaccuracies in analysis or conclusions.在處理這些問題以前，讓我們先看看到底這兩家公司有哪一些差異之處，我們會試著將討論予以簡化，當然這不致產生錯誤的分析與結論。The contrast between O and N comes about because we paid an amount for Sc

7、ott Fetzer that was different from its stated net worth. Under GAAP, such differences - such premiums or discounts - must be accounted for by "purchase-price adjustments." In Scott Fetzer's case, we paid $315 million for net assets that were carried on its books at $172.4 million. So w

8、e paid a premium of $142.6 million.新公司(N)與舊公司(O)差異的起因源自于我們購買史考特-飛茲的價錢與其會計帳面凈值有所不同，根據一般公認會計原則，這樣的差異-不論時溢價或是折價，都必須計入購買法差異調整項下，就本例而言，我們支付了3.15億美元買下帳面價值1.724億美元的資產，中間就產生了1.426億美元的溢價。 The first step in accounting for any premium paid is to adjust the carrying value of current assets to current value

9、s. In practice, this requirement usually does not affect receivables, which are routinely carried at current value, but often affects inventories. Because of a $22.9 million LIFO reserve and other accounting intricacies, Scott Fetzer's inventory account was carried at a $37.3 million discount fr

10、om current value. So, making our first accounting move, we used $37.3 million of our $142.6 million premium to increase the carrying value of the inventory.會計原則規定處理購并溢價的第一步是將流動資產的帳列價值調整至目前的價值，實務上，通常受影響的是存貨等資產，至于具立即變現性的應收帳款則不受影響，由于史考特-飛茲的存貨計價方式采后進先出法，使得其帳列的存貨成本低于市價3,730萬美元，所以第一個動作就是將1.426億美元溢價中的3,730

11、萬美元用來調整存貨價值。 Assuming any premium is left after current assets are adjusted, the next step is to adjust fixed assets to current value. In our case, this adjustment also required a few accounting acrobatics relating to deferred taxes. Since this has been billed as a simplified discussion, I will

12、 skip the details and give you the bottom line: $68.0 million was added to fixed assets and $13.0 million was eliminated from deferred tax liabilities. After making this $81.0 million adjustment, we were left with $24.3 million of premium to allocate. 在流動資產調整完之后，第二步就是調整固定資產至現在的價值，再次地，我們必須運用一些會計

13、技巧來處理相關的遞延所得稅，由于之前我們強調是簡單的討論，所以我決定略去部份細節，直接公布結果，其中6,800萬加到固定資產，至于另外的1,300萬則從遞延所得稅負債扣除，最后剩下2,430萬美元的溢價待處理。 Had our situation called for them two steps would next have been required: the adjustment of intangible assets other than Goodwill to current fair values, and the restatement of liabilities

14、 to current fair values, a requirement that typically affects only long-term debt and unfunded n liabilities. In Scott Fetzer's case, however, neither of these steps was necessary.如果有必要，接下來還有兩個步驟要進行：一是調整無形資產(商譽除外)，一是調整負債，通常包含長期負債以及未提撥煺休金負債，然而就本例而言，這些步驟都不需要。 The final accounting adjustment w

15、e needed to make, after recording fair market values for all assets and liabilities, was the assignment of the residual premium to Goodwill (technically known as "excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired"). This residual amounted to $24.3 million. Thus, the balance sheet o

16、f Scott Fetzer immediately before the acquisition, which is summarized below in column O, was transformed by the purchase into the balance sheet shown in column N. In real terms, both balance sheets depict the same assets and liabilities - but, as you can see, certain figures differ significantly.最后

17、我們必須進行的會計動作，就是將剩余的溢價部份歸類到商譽這個科目(專業的解釋是取得成本超越資產公平價值部份)，金額為2,430萬美元，就這樣舊公司也就是史考特-飛茲在被購并的前一刻的資產負債表，被改成新公司在Berkshire帳上所列的各項數字，現實的狀況是，兩者都是用來說明同一家公司所擁有的資產與負債，但大家可以清楚地發現，兩者在某些科目卻有極大的不同。 圖2： The higher balance sheet figures shown in column N produce the lower income figures shown in column N of th

18、e earnings statement presented earlier. This is the result of the asset write-ups and of the fact that some of the written-up assets must be depreciated or amortized. The higher the asset figure, the higher the annual depreciation or amortization charge to earnings must be. The charges that flowed t

19、o the earnings statement because of the balance sheet write-ups were numbered in the statement of earnings shown earlier:新公司的盈余數字比舊公司的來得低，這是由于其資產負債表中的某些資產必須沖銷或是按期折舊攤銷所致，帳列資產金額越高，每年必須提列的折舊與攤銷也就越高，就本例而言，可能影響損益的數字包括： $4,979,000 for non-cash inventory costs resulting, primarily, from reductions tha

20、t Scott Fetzer made in its inventories during 1986; charges of this kind are apt to be small or non-existent in future years.1、以1986年史考特飛茲為主的497.9萬美元存貨跌價損失，這類的成本在往后年度金額將會慢慢變小。 $5,054,000 for extra depreciation attributable to the write-up of fixed assets; a charge approximating this amount will

21、 probably be made annually for 12 more years.2、額外的505.4萬美元固定資產折舊成本，往后12年的金額與此數目相當。 $595,000 for amortization of Goodwill; this charge will be made annually for 39 more years in a slightly larger amount because our purchase was made on January 6 and, therefore, the 1986 figure applies to only 98

22、% of the year.3、59.5萬的商譽攤銷，這筆費用還要持續39年以上，以后年度的數字會略高，因為由于購并是在1月6日發生，所以1986年只反應了98%的數字。 $998,000 for deferred-tax acrobatics that are beyond my ability to explain briefly (or perhaps even non-briefly); a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.4、99.8萬的遞延所

23、得稅攤銷，由于這部份相當復雜，所以我無法在短期間內向各位說明清楚，這筆金額還會持續12年以上。 It is important to understand that none of these newly-created accounting costs, totaling $11.6 million, are deductible for income tax purposes. The "new" Scott Fetzer pays exactly the same tax as the "old" Scott Fetzer would h

24、ave, even though the GAAP earnings of the two entities differ greatly. And, in respect to operating earnings, that would be true in the future also. However, in the unlikely event that Scott Fetzer sells one of its businesses, the tax consequences to the "old" and "new" company m

25、ight differ widely.有一點很重要，那就是這些新增的會計攤銷成本，金額約1,160萬美元是無法扣抵所得稅的，所以新公司支付的所得稅與舊公司并無二致，雖然依照一般公認會計原則所顯示的數字完全不同，而且往后年度的損益報表也有相同的情況，當然萬一史考特飛茲出售部份的事業時，兩者的稅負影響就會有所不同。 By the end of 1986 the difference between the net worth of the "old" and "new" Scott Fetzer had been reduced from $142

26、.6 million to $131.0 million by means of the extra $11.6 million that was charged to earnings of the new entity. As the years go by, similar charges to earnings will cause most of the premium to disappear, and the two balance sheets will converge. However, the higher land values and most of the high

27、er inventory values that were established on the new balance sheet will remain unless land is disposed of or inventory levels are further reduced.1986年底兩家公司凈值上的不同，在扣除1,160萬美元的已攤銷成本后，將由塬先的1.426億美元減為1.31億美元，隨著時間過去，相似的攤銷將使得彼此的差異逐漸縮小，然而土地或存貨的重估必須等到這些資產出售后才會消失。 * * *What does all this mean for owner

28、s? Did the shareholders of Berkshire buy a business that earned $40.2 million in 1986 or did they buy one earning $28.6 million? Were those $11.6 million of new charges a real economic cost to us? Should investors pay more for the stock of Company O than of Company N? And, if a business is worth som

29、e given multiple of earnings, was Scott Fetzer worth considerably more the day before we bought it than it was worth the following day? 對于股東來說，到底有何差別? Berkshire的股東們在1986年買到的，到底是一家年獲利4,020萬或是2,860萬美元的公司呢? 這筆1,160萬美元的新增成本對我們到底有沒有實質的經濟影響呢? 投資人是否應該付出更多的代價來買舊公司呢? 而又若是企業評價按本益比的角度來衡量的話，

30、史考特飛茲在被我們買下之前是否是比較值錢呢? If we think through these questions, we can gain some insights about what may be called "owner earnings." These represent (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges such as Company N's items (1) a

31、nd (4) less ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit

32、 volume, the increment also should be included in ( c) . However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change.)如果我們能夠想通這些問題，那么我們就能體會所謂的所有者的盈余，它代表(a) 帳列盈余，加計(b)折舊、攤銷與其它成本，如新公司(1)到(4)項，扣除(c)年度平均的資本支出等以維持公司長期競爭力。(如

33、果企業需要額外的營運資金來維持既有的產能與競爭力，那么這部份的增加也必須納入(c)項，然而存貨計價方式采用后進先出法的公司就比較沒有這方面的問題)。 Our owner-earnings equation does not yield the deceptively precise figures provided by GAAP, since( c) must be a guess - and one sometimes very difficult to make. Despite this problem, we consider the owner earnings figu

34、re, not the GAAP figure, to be the relevant item for valuation purposes - both for investors in buying stocks and for managers in buying entire businesses. We agree with Keynes's observation: "I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong."我們的所有者盈余公式與按照一般公認會計原則編制的數字并不會完全相同，因為(c)

35、 項本身是個估計數，且有時還很難精確的估算，基于此，我們認為所有者盈余在我們進行購并或買進公司股票，而須評估企業價值時，較有意義，我們相當同意凱因斯的看法：我寧愿大致正確也不要完全錯誤。 The approach we have outlined produces "owner earnings" for Company O and Company N that are identical, which means valuations are also identical, just as common sense would tell you sho

36、uld be the case. This result is reached because the sum of (a) and (b) is the same in both columns O and N, and because( c) is necessarily the same in both cases.用我們的方式評估新公司與舊公司所得的所有者盈余完全相同，這代表兩者的評估價值也一樣，事實上，按照一般的認知本該就如此，結果會相同是由于兩家公司(a)(b) 兩項的合計數一樣，至于(c)本來就都一樣。 And what do Charlie and I, a

37、s owners and managers, believe is the correct figure for the owner earnings of Scott Fetzer? Under current circumstances, we believe ( c) is very close to the "old" company's (b) number of $8.3 million and much below the "new" company's (b) number of $19.9 million. Theref

38、ore, we believe that owner earnings are far better depicted by the reported earnings in the O column than by those in the N column. In other words, we feel owner earnings of Scott Fetzer are considerably larger than the GAAP figures that we report.那么查理跟我身公司公司的所有人與經營者，到底哪一個數字才真正屬于史考特飛茲呢? 在目前的情況下

39、，我們認為(c)項的數字相當接近舊公司(b)830萬美元，但遠低于新公司(b)項1,990萬美元，因此我們認為舊公司財務報表上的數字比較接近所有者的盈余，換句話說，我們覺得史考特飛茲的所有者盈余遠大于一般公認會計原則編制的數字。 That is obviously a happy state of affairs. But calculations of this sort usually do not provide such pleasant news. Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend

40、 something more than (b) on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when ( c) exceeds (b) - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial. The

41、oil industry has in recent years provided a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Had most major oil companies spent only (b) each year, they would have guaranteed their shrinkage in real terms.這顯然是一個比較快樂的結果，但計算這種東西通常沒有那么讓人感到樂觀，大部分的經理人通常會認為應該花費比(b)項更多的資金以維持既有的產能與競爭力，當這種觀念存在時，也就是當(c)項遠超過(b)項時，那么也代表

42、一般公認會計原則過分高估了所有者的盈余，而且通常這個數字會非常驚人，近年來的石油產業就為這種現象提供了最明顯的例證，要是這些石油公司每年只投入(b)的資金的話，那么它們的實際的產能將大幅地縮水。 All of this points up the absurdity of the "cash flow" numbers that are often set forth in Wall Street reports. These numbers routinely include (a) plus (b) - but do not subtract ( c) . M

43、ost sales brochures of investment bankers also feature deceptive presentations of this kind. These imply that the business being offered is the commercial counterpart of the Pyramids - forever state-of-the-art, never needing to be replaced, improved or refurbished. Indeed, if all U.S. corporations w

44、ere to be offered simultaneously for sale through our leading investment bankers - and if the sales brochures describing them were to be believed - governmental projections of national plant and equipment spending would have to be slashed by 90%.以上這些論點充分解釋華爾街經營運用現金流量數字的荒謬性，這些數字通常只包含(a)加(b)但卻未扣除(c)，大

45、部分投資銀行所提供的介紹手冊也使用類似的欺騙手法，這等于是在暗示，所介紹的企業就像是商業世界里的萬年金字塔，永遠歷久彌新、不會被取代、不用維修或更新，事實上，如果全美的企業真如這些投資銀行所形容的，那么政府每年編制的全美工廠及設備采購指數將大幅下滑90%以上。 "Cash Flow", true, may serve as a shorthand of some utility in descriptions of certain real estate businesses or other enterprises that make huge initial

46、outlays and only tiny outlays thereafter. A company whose only holding is a bridge or an extremely long-lived gas field would be an example. But "cash flow" is meaningless in such businesses as manufacturing, retailing, extractive companies, and utilities because, for them, ( c) is always

47、significant. To be sure, businesses of this kind may in a given year be able to defer capital spending. But over a five- or ten-year period, they must make the investment - or the business decays.現金流量的觀念，確實可以作為某些比如說不動產或是初期需要投入大量資本支出而后僅需負擔少量維修的產業之上，具體的例子包含橋梁興建或是某些蘊藏豐富的天然氣油田等，但另一方面，現金流量卻不能適用于某些零售、制造、采

48、礦及公用事業之上，因為其必須持續投入的(c)項金額相當巨大，確實這些產業有時可以稍微忍住一兩年不做重大的投資，但就五到十年長期間來看，它們就不得不這樣做，否則企業的根基就會被侵蝕。 Why, then, are "cash flow" numbers so popular today? In answer, we confess our cynicism: we believe these numbers are frequently used by marketers of businesses and securities in attempts to jus

49、tify the unjustifiable (and thereby to sell what should be the unsalable). When (a) - that is, GAAP earnings - looks by itself inadequate to service debt of a junk bond or justify a foolish stock price, how convenient it becomes for salesmen to focus on (a) + (b). But you shouldn't add (b) witho

50、ut subtracting ( c) : though dentists correctly claim that if you ignore your teeth they'll go away, the same is not true for ( c) . The company or investor believing that the debt-servicing ability or the equity valuation of an enterprise can be measured by totaling (a) and (b) while ignoring (

51、 c) is headed for certain trouble.那么為什么現在現金流量會變得如此流行呢? 在回答前，我們必須承認我們存在某些偏見，我們認為這些數字通常都是那些專門推銷股票及公司的人，企圖要將一些爛公司粉飾包裝出售所用的手法，當(a)項也就是一般公認會計原則的盈余看起來不足以支應往后的債務所需或是過高的股票價格時，這些業務員自然就會將主意擺在(a)+(b)這個比較好看的數字上頭，但如果你硬要加上(b)的話，就必須要扣除(c)，雖然有些牙醫會告訴你，如果你能忘記牙痛的痛楚，那么它們就等于不存在，如果投資人或企業買家在考慮償債能力或股票價值，只注意(a)+(b)，卻忽略了(c)時，將來肯定會遇上大麻煩。 * * *To sum up: in the case of both Scott Fetzer and our other businesses, we feel that (b) on an historical-cost basis - i.e., with both amortization of intangibles and other purchase-price adjustments excluded - is quite close in amount to ( c) .