1、Carl Schmitts Two Concepts of HumanityMatthias LievensCatholic University of BrusselsVrijheidslaan 171081 BrusselsBelgiummatthias.lievenskubrussel.ac.beTel. + 32 2 412.42.76Fax. + 32 2 412.42.00Abstract: A dominant interpretation of Carl Schmitts work depicts him as a theologically inspired and anti

2、-humanist thinker. This paper argues, however, that his concept of the political, founded on a plea for relative instead of absolute enmity, takes Schmitt away from theology onto a profane level, where enemies recognize each other as human beings. Although Schmitt states that he who uses the concept

3、 of humanity wants to betray, one can trace in his work a distinction between two concepts of humanity which gives a philosophical foundation for the distinction between relative and absolute enmity, and thus, for the political. It is at the basis of a minimally normative understanding of the politi

4、cal which can be of great interest for contemporary debates on the contemporary world order. Key words: Carl Schmitt, the political, political theology, sovereignty, recognition, humanity, enmityIntroductionSchmitt is often depicted as a theologically inspired and anti-humanist thinker. A large numb

5、er of recent Schmitt readings underline the theological underpinnings of his writings. Moreover, he wrote two books titled Political Theology and is well-known as a fighting catholic.However, Schmitts philosophy is not as clear-cut as it may seem. In this article, I will argue against the dominant t

6、heological reading of Schmitt Cf. Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. The hidden dialogue(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Heinrich Meier, The lesson of Carl Schmitt. Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political Theology and Political Philosophy (Chicago an

7、d London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998); Günter Meuter, Der Katechon. Zu Carl Schmitts fundamentalistischer Kritik der Zeit (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994); Theo De Wit, De onontkoombaarheid van de politiek. De soevereine vijand in de politieke filosofie van Carl Schmitt (Ubergen

8、: Pomppers, 1992); Wolfgang Palaver. Die mythische Quellen des Politischen. Carl Schmitts Freund-Feind-Theorie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1998). to show that his concept of the political contains a profane and even humanist twist, which can also be used to deconstruct some of the more problematic parts

9、 of his work. Schmitts concept of the political entails a peculiar form of normativity and is based on a specific concept of humanity that he wants to rescue from the dominance of moral thinking in politicis in a liberal world. However odd that may seem, I will try to show that there is indeed a pol

10、itics of humanity present in Schmitts work, despite his severe criticisms of the use of the concept of humanity. The stake of elaborating upon this element in Schmitt is this. As we entered an era of global civil war, the frontiers between states no longer function as means to relativize enmity: str

11、uggle became deterritorialized. Frontiers and territoriality are becoming less and less factors that make the political possible. The search for the sources of the political and the avoidance of absolute enmity has to be oriented elsewhere. My hypothesis is that the analysis of Schmitts two concepts

12、 of humanity supplies important clues for such an endeavour. Current wars and trials in the name of humanity are rightly what Schmitt feared the most. He depicted these as the outcome of the logic of global civil war. But as I will try to show, there is an alternative way to conceive of the rescuing

13、 of the political without having to reterritorialize conflict. It is situated in the functioning of a specific concept of humanity within the symbolic order. In this sense, Schmitt does more than just unmasking the ideology of humanity, but he gives us clues for a more positive elaboration. That is

14、why thinking creatively with Schmitt can contribute to the current debate in political philosophy, to the extent that this engagement with Schmitt is, as Andreas Kalyvas states, “neither apologetic, nor dismissive, but reconstructive and selective.” Andreas Kalyvas, Whos afraid of Carl Schmitt, Phil

15、osophy and social Criticism 25, (1999): 89. The dialectic of the concept of humanitySchmitt is well-known as a critique of liberalism. Fundamentally, he claims, liberalism is internally contradictory to the extent that it lacks a necessary concept of the political (which Schmitt understands as based

16、 on the distinction between friends and enemies). Liberalism is an antipolitics, it is a theory which starts from an opposition to the state and the political, giving free space to ethics and economy instead Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.

17、70. Political struggle dissolves in liberal theory into competition on the economic terrain, and discussion on the spiritual level.In practice, however, liberals of all countries have acted politically Ibid., p. 69. They formed coalitions and waged struggles, without recognizing the importance of th

18、e political as such. One cannot install a liberal order without a precedent process of political struggles and decisions. The crux of Schmitts critique of liberalism consists in his contention that when liberalism, with its stress on the “ideological humanitarian conception of humanity” Ibid., p. 72

19、., starts to act politically, it risks to turn this very idea into its opposite. When one makes an appeal to humanity, one has to give a qualitative content to this idea, drawing a distinction between what is really human and what isnt. In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt explains how humanists and h

20、umanitarians as Francis Bacon came to very inhuman conclusions in their dealings with indigenous peoples in newly colonized territories on the other side of the Atlantic. According to Bacon, these peoples were cannibals by nature, they were outside humanity and thus could not be seen to have rights.

21、 “By no means is it paradoxical,” Schmitt says, “that non other than humanists and humanitarians put forward such inhuman arguments, because the idea of humanity is two-sided and often lends itself to a surprising dialectic.” Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus P

22、ublicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press Ltd., 2003), p. 103.A political struggle, waged in the name of humanity, tends to turn into the most intensive and extreme forms of struggle, where the enemy falls outside humanity. She is no longer recognized as a political opponent, but becomes criminalized

23、, outlawed. Liberal politics, too, slides very easily back into police actions, with its typical asymmetry between friend and enemy, as is the case in wars against terrorism and in the name of humanity, democracy or freedom, or in tribunals judging crimes against humanity. Such practices often even

24、go further than just criminalizing the enemy: in regular penal law, a criminal has certain rights of defence, while in extreme war situations, the enemy turned into a war criminal often even lacks these basic rights when he appears before exceptional courts.Drawing on these extreme situations, Schmi

25、tt tries to point to the impossibility of liberalism: it needs a politics, but doesnt or cant think it. And when it develops a politics in actual facts, this threatens to become an inhuman one. The (im)moralization of the enemy potentially leads to the most intensive forms of war which simply aims t

26、o annihilate the enemy. Liberalism is thus unable to provide a coherent theory. This doesnt mean Schmitt dismisses all its intuitions as such In some of his texts, Schmitt argues in favour of human rights, freedom of thought, the rule of law, property rights etc. (e.g. Carl Schmitt, Verfassungsrecht

27、liche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954. Materialen zu einer Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), p. 230; cf. Reinhard Merhing, Der Begriff des politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), p. 81). But its starting point is wrong. When one starts fr

28、om a moral theory of the human and its values, which claims universal validity, it becomes impossible to formulate a theory of the political. Schmitt begins the other way round: he starts with the concept of the political, in order to render it more human.Taking Schmitt away from theologyParadoxical

29、ly, the attempt to find a human form of the political seems to take Schmitt into a very profane direction. Schmitts concept of the political is based on the famous criterion of the distinction between friend and enemy. “The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a

30、union or separation, of an association or dissociation” Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 26. In fact, he locates the political on a scale of increasing intensity, ranging from a pre-political level, where the social relation is not interpreted in terms of friend/enemy oppositions, goin

31、g via an actual political level, to a hyperpolitical level where the conflict is intensified to such a degree that the enemy becomes moralised Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1991), p. 190; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 36;

32、Carl Schmitt, Theory of the partisan, in: CR: The New Centennial Review 4, 3 (2004): 67. or theologised Carl Schmitt, Ex captivitate salus. Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47 (Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2002), p. 89  Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, p. 66  Carl Schmitt, Glossarium

33、, p. 190; Jakob Taubes, En divergent accord. A propos de Carl Schmitt (Paris : Payot et Rivages, 2003), p. 25. This last situation is dangerous, according to Schmitt, because such a struggle, which tends to strip the enemy off his human character, potentially opens the door for a war of annihil

34、ation. “Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.” Carl

35、 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 36. The rigorous consequence of a confrontation with an immoral enemy is the decision to totally annihilate her. The theologisation of the enemy has a similar effect of intensifying the conflict to an inhuman degree Schmitt sees also the opposite movement:

36、a conflict which leads to the annihilation of the enemy, theologises him. “He who wants to annihilate me, is not my enemy, but my satanic prosecutor”. Carl Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 190. Schmitts theory of the political is thus aimed at finding a middle ground, recognizing the reality of political con

37、flict, and at the same time avoiding its degeneration into a war of annihilation.As said, a great part of the secondary literature on Schmitt deals with the theological or even mythical underpinnings of his writings. It was Heinrich Meier who inaugurated the theological turn in the literature on Sch

38、mitt. This could only be done by downplaying the distinction Schmitt draws between the political and what transcends the limits of the political framework, i.e. between the genuinely political enemy (the relative enemy) and the moralised or theologised, and thus absolute, enemy This essential distin

39、ction is pictured by the editors of Telos as the distinction between enemy and foe. See the special issue of Telos on Carl Schmitt, 72 (1987). Meier never speaks of relative enmity in the first place, and claims that “Schmitts later differentiation between the conventional, the real, and the absolut

40、e enemy () is not decisive for the concept of the political.” Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. The hidden dialogue(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 26. Our contention, however, is that Schmitts theory necessitates a clear delineation of the genuinely political,

41、 characterised by relative enmity and based on a specific concept of humanity, and that this concept of the political leads into a profane direction Heinrich Meier also omits two crucial features of the political in Schmitts view, notably the collective and public character of political conflicts. S

42、ee Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind. Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 204. This distinction between relative and absolute enmity is a key to make sense of Schmitts work I do not agree on this regard with Ernesto Laclau when he argues that

43、 “the distinction between real ad absolute enemy is secondary only a matter of degree” (Ernesto Laclau, On Real and Absolute Enemies, in: CR: The New Centennial Review 5, 1 (2005): 11). What defines absolute enemy is a specific, exclusive concept of humanity. The examples of real enmity that Schmitt

44、 gives, lack a foundation in such a concept. . This development onto a profane level takes place through two successive moves. Firstly, Schmitt states that all political concepts are secularised theological concepts Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 36. This doesnt make Schmitt a theolo

45、gian, however. In Political Theology, he says of political theories that they cannot be understood without understanding their historical origin in theology and their structural similarity to theological conceptions. He sees for instance an analogy between deism and the scientific way of thinking of

46、 the Enlightenment Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 48. Still, this must not be read too strictly: Schmitt would never agree with the political counterpart of theism, notably world monarchy Cf. Wolfgang Palaver, Die mythis

47、che Quellen des Politischen. Carl Schmitts Freund-Feind-Theorie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1998), p. 21. The political concepts with which Schmitt is dealing (e.g. the State and Sovereignty), thus have a certain independence vis-à-vis their theological origins. Time and again, Schmitt cites Alberi

48、cus Gentilis phrase “Silete theologi in munere alieno!” Cf. Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 70  Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 126. This must be read as also applying to Schmitt himself.What political concepts do retain from their theological origins, however, is something of t

49、heir absolute character. Indeed, in Political Romanticism, Schmitt conceives secularisation as the process through which the absolute shifts from one instance to another: for instance, from God to “mundane and worldly factors” Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 17-

50、18. In this sense, political concepts such as the State and Sovereignty are still somehow imbued with the absolute character they inherited from their theological origins. In a second move, then, Schmitt implicitly takes a step further away from the theological origins of political concepts through

51、his defence of the political as defined in terms of relative instead of absolute enmity. The absolute enemy is the one who simply has to be annihilated because he is inhuman, immoral or an obstacle for the course of History. Relative enmity presupposes a certain respect for the human and political d

52、ignity of the adversary, as I will show in the development of the concept below. What is important at this stage, is that while secularisation remained somehow within a religious frame of thought, focusing on notions of the absolute (no longer a strictly theological absolute, but the absolute of the

53、 State, Sovereignty, Morality, History or Humanity with a majuscule), Schmitts concept of the political, defined in terms of relative enmity, now leaves this frame behind in favour of a relativisation of such absolute concepts. This takes him - maybe unwittingly - to a very profane level, where the

54、political in Schmitts sense can be found: it discards all absolute truths and instances in the name of which struggles are waged, and opens a space for relativity and openness. It is this level that Schmitt wants to rescue from absolute notions that lurk behind the criminalization of the enemy in a

55、certain liberal moralism or in the Marxist tendency to see the class enemy as a relic of a society that is doomed by the course of History. Such a relativisation of enmity represents for Schmitt “a great progress from a humane point of view” Carl Schmitt, Het Begrip Politiek (Amsterdam: Boom, 2001),

56、 p. 48., as it goes against the “moral and physical annihilation of the enemy”.Although Schmitt has very often been criticized as war-prone, the acknowledgement of the proper level of the political as the terrain of relative enmity is the precondition to avoid absolute wars and regulate the conflict

57、 in the real world of politics. The paradox Schmitt underlines is that no morality can legitimise the killing of other people Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 49., while at the same time the moralisation of politics, for instance through the concept of humanity, leads very fast to the

58、conclusion that the enemy has to be annihilated and thus intensifies the conflict beyond the proper political level. Instead of being bellicose, Schmitts concept of the political has the ambition to defer the moment of taking resort to violence, and to avoid the rapid intensification of the conflict

59、 into a war of annihilation Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 35. Schmitts relativisation of enmity thus claims to lead to less violence. He underlines the way absolute ideas function ideologically to intensify the struggle and accelerate the use of violence: “As Trotsky justly reminded the democrat Kautsky, the awareness of relative truths never gives one the courage to use force and to spill blood.” Carl Schmitt, The crisis of p