股市金融全球化中英文對照外文翻譯文獻股市金融全球化中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)外文:TakingStockSeriously:Equity-MarketPerformance,GovernmentPolicy,andFinancialGlobalizationMosley,LaynaSinger,DavidAndrewAreequitymarketsjustanotherfacetofglobalfinance,oraretheyuniqueintheirresponsesto—andinfluenceson—governmentpoliciesandinstitutions?Recentworkhasexploredtheimpactofpoliticalfactorsonbondmarketbehaviorandforeigndirectinvestment,butlittleattentionhasbeenpaidtostockmarkets.Onthebasisoftheparticularconcernsofequityinvestors,wehypothesizeapositiveassociationbetweenstock-marketvaluationsandlevelsofdemocracy,shareholderrights,legaltraditions,andcapital-accountliberalization,anegativeassociationwithrealinterestrates,andnoassociationwithfiscaldeficitsorsurpluses.Weassessourexpectationsbyanalyzingthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofaggregateprice-to-earningsratiosforasampleofupto37countriesfrom1985to2004,usingbothcross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectionalanalyses.Wefindsupportformost,butnotall,ofourhypotheses.Ourfindingssuggestthatwemustdisaggregatetheeffectsofdifferentassetmarketstounderstandtheimpactofeconomicglobalizationongovernmentpolicies.Howdogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsaffectequity-marketperformanceacrosscountries?Asstockmarketsgrowbroaderanddeeperinboththedevelopedanddevelopingworlds,thisquestionbecomesmorecritical.In2004,globalstock-marketcapitalizationstoodat$37.2trillion,comparedtoglobalGDPof$41.3trillion.Whilethisfigurewasslightlylessthanglobalcommercialbankassets,itmarkedlyexceededthetotalsizeofoutstandingpublicdebtsecurities,whichwere$23.1trillion.1Thebulkofglobalstock-marketcapitalizationrepresentsdeveloped-countryequitymarkets,butlessdevelopedcountrymarkets—whichaccountedfor14percentoftotalcapitalizationin2004—arequicklygainingground.Someemergingmarketcountries,suchasMalaysia,Singapore,andSouthAfrica,havetotalstock-marketcapitalizationsthatexceedtheirrespectivegrossdomesticproducts.Equitymarketsenhancecorporateefficiency,spurinnovation,andprovideavaluablesourceofcapitalforlong-termeconomicdevelopment.Theyalsoprovideausefulmechanismforgovernmentstoraisecapitalthroughthesaleofstate-ownedenterprises.Moreover,equity-marketinvestmentsconstituteanimportantelementofindividuals’assets,particularlyasgovernmentsshifttheirpensionsystemstowardtheprivatesector.Inshort,itisclearthatequitiesconstituteanincreasinglyimportantcapitalmarketintheworldeconomy.However,wecurrentlyknowverylittleabouthowgovernmentpolicychoicesandpoliticalinstitutionsinfluenceequityinvestors’decisions.Thefewextantanalysesofstockmarketsandpoliticstendtofocusononeortwodevelopedcountries,oronsectoralvariationwithinaparticularmarket,ratherthanonthedeterminantsofnational-levelmarketoutcomesinabroadercross-countrycontext.Forinstance,DavidLeblangandBumbaMukherjeeconsidertheimpactofgovernmentpartisanshipandelectionsonstockmarketoutcomesintheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.Inawiderstudy,FionaMcGillivray(2003)considerstheimpactofpartisanchangesandelectoralinstitutionsonstock-marketoutcomesinfourteenadvanceddemocracies.Heranalyses,however,focuslargelyonindustry-levelvariation,arguingthatshiftsinpoliticalconstellationschangeinvestors’expectationsregardingwhichsectorswillbenefitfrompublicpolicies.Indeed,McGillivrayisinterestedlessinequity-marketoutcomespersethaninusingsuchoutcomesasaproxymeasureoftheexpectationsofeconomicactorsregardingpoliticaldecisions.Similarly,WilliamBernhardandDavidLeblangconsidertheimpactofpoliticsandpoliticaluncertaintyondailymarketbehaviorinseveraladvanceddemocracies.Unlikemostanalyses,theirsconsidersoutcomesinmultipleassetmarkets,includingcurrencies,equities,andgovernmentbonds.BernhardandLeblang’saim,however,istoexploretheconsequencesofdiscretepoliticalevents—suchaselectionsandcabinetformations—oncapitalmarkets,ratherthantoassessthebroaderimpactofpublicpolicyandinstitutionsoncapitalmarketoutcomes.Thisarticleseekstoroundouttheliteratureonfinancialglobalizationbyexploringthelinkagesbetweenequity-marketoutcomesandnationalgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions.Itscontributionisboththeoreticalandempirical.Theoretically,weelaborateonthepoliticsofequity-marketperformance,focusinginparticularontheeffectsofgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsonstockmarketvaluations.Werelyontherelativelydevelopedliteratureonforeigndirectinvestmentandsovereignbondmarketstounderscorethedistinctivenessofequity-marketreactionstogovernmentpolicies.Empirically,weconductanovelevaluationofthecorrelatesoftotal-market,price-to-earningsratios(P?E)forasampleofupto37developedandemergingmarketcountriesduringthe1985–2004period.Cross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectional(TSCS)analysesrevealthatlevelsofdemocracy,marketliquidity,shareholderrights,andcapital-accountliberalizationarepositivelyassociatedwithequity-marketvaluations,whilerealinterestratesarenegativelyassociated.Wealsofindthatinvestorsarepositivelydisposedtowardequitymarketsinemerging-marketcountries,andnegativelydisposedtowardmarketswithhighdividendpayoutratios.Interestingly,manyofthepoliticalandeconomicfactors—includinginflation,andfiscalpolicy—deemedhighlysalienttoinvestorsinotherfinancialmarketsarenotstatisticallyassociatedwithstock-marketvaluations.Theseresultsarerobusttotheinclusionofanumberofcontrolvariables,includingcapital-assetpricingmodel(CAPM)factorsandalternativepricingmodelconsiderations.Notethattheresponsesofinvestorstopoliciesandinstitutionsalsohaveimplicationsforfuturegovernmentpolicychoices.Forinstance,ifanation’seconomyreliesmoreheavilyonFDIthanonsovereignlendingorbankfinancing,itsgovernmentmayfacefewpressurestoreducepublicspending.Ontheotherhand,ifagovernmentreliesheavilyonthebondmarkettofinanceitsexpenditures,buthasarelativelylowlevelofstock-marketcapitalization,itmayfacegreaterpressuresforfiscalandmonetarytightening.Andifacountryreliesonavariedmenuoffinancialinflows,asmostdo,assetholderswillexpressdiversepreferencesoverpublicpolicy.Untanglingthevariousfinancial-marketinfluencesongovernmentpolicymakingisclearlyalongtermresearchproject.Thisarticle,whichfocusesonthepoliticaldeterminantsofequityinvestors’behavior,complementssimilaranalysesofsovereignbondmarketsandforeigndirectinvestment.Onceweunderstandhowinvestorsineachmarketreacttogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions,wecanthenadvancetoabroaderanalysisoftheimpactoffinancialmarkets—alongwithdomesticinstitutions,interestgroups,andotherfactors—ongovernmentpolicymakingandinstitutionaldesign.Stock-marketperformanceisincreasinglyatargetofanalysisbypoliticalscientists,becauseequityinvestorsmaybehighlysensitivetotheeffectsofcertaingovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsontheirinvestments.Equityinvestmentsaregenerallyveryliquid,andthetimehorizonsofequityinvestorsareoftenrelativelyshort.Asaresult,changesingovernmentpoliciescantriggeraswiftresponsebyinvestors.Governmentpoliciesthatenhanceinvestorconfidence—eitherdirectly,byprovidingshareholderprotectionsandeaseofexit,orindirectly,byexpandingtheeconomyandimprovingcorporateearnings—willberewardedbyhigherstockpricesandmarketvaluations.Ontheotherhand,investorscanquicklywithdrawtheirfundsifgovernmentschoosemarket-unfriendlypolicies,therebygeneratingdownwardpressureonstockpricesandvaluations.Stockmarkets,inshort,areavaluableindicatoroffinancialactors’preferencesovergovernmentinstitutionsandpolicyoutcomes.Afittingalternativemeasureofperformanceistheratioofthestockpricetocompanyearnings—or,inotherwords,thepricethatequityinvestorsarewillingtopayforanexpectedstreamofprofits.Aswithstockprices,theseratiosreflectinvestors’expectationsaboutfutureearnings,buttheyalsosignalinvestors’preferencesovertime-varyinggovernmentpolicyandlargelyinvariantpoliticalinstitutions.Becauseofthelatter,cross-nationalvariationinP?Eratiospersistsevenwhennationalstockmarketsarehitsimultaneouslybyglobalpriceshocks.Theextantliteratureonthelinkagesbetweenglobalizationanddomesticpoliticshaspaidscantattentiontothediversewaysinwhichcountriesareintegratedintotheworldeconomy.Byassumingthatfinancialmarketsimposeaunifiedinfluenceongovernmentpolicies,priorstudieshaveoverlookedthestarkvariationinthepreferencesofinvestorsacrossdifferenttypesoffinancialassets.Inthisarticle,wearguethatequityinvestorsarebecominganincreasinglyinfluentialforceintheglobaleconomy,andthattheirpreferencesdivergefromthoseofotherfinancialactorsinimportantways.Toillustratethisdivergence,wepresentempiricalanalysesofthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofequitymarketperformanceacrossasampleofdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Amongthemostinterestingfindingsarethatmarketvaluationsaresignificantlyassociatedwithcapital-accountopenness,shareholderprotections,levelsofdevelopment,andalternativedomesticinvestments.Inaddition,equityinvestorsappearindifferenttowardgovernmentfiscalbalancesandthepartisanorientationsofgovernmentleaders.Giventhatcountriesareintegratedintotheglobalfinancialsystemindifferentways,thesefindingsleadtothequestionofhowgovernmentpolicymakersmightreconcilethecompetinginterestsofdifferenttypesoffinancialinvestors.譯文：股市嚴重性討論：股權市場現象，政府政策與金融全球化在政府的政策和體制影響中，股市是另一個全球金融市場，還是有其獨特的反應？最近的工作探討了政治因素對債券市場的行為和外國直接投資的影響，但很少注意到股票市場。在股票投資者特別關注問題的基礎上，我們假設股市估值與它的平均水平之間呈正相關，股東權利，傳統法律，以及資本賬戶自由化，與實際利率之間呈負相關，無財政赤字和盈余。通過我們評估的政治和體制因素的期望值分析，從1985年到2004年，以37個國家的總價格為樣本，橫軸為時間序列，縱軸為市盈率。我們發現這支持大多數人的說法，但不是所有的。我們的研究結果表明，我們必須集合不同資產市場的影響來了解經濟全球化對政府政策的影響。通過各國股票市場的政策和機制表現，它是如何影響政府的？隨著市場更廣泛的發展，股票在發達國家和發展中國家的逐漸深入，這個問題變得更加重要。2004年全球股票市值為38.4億萬美元，全球國內生產總值為41.3億萬美元。雖然這一數字略低于全球商業銀行資產，但他明顯超過了其他公共債券的總規模23.1億萬美元。全球股票市值占大部分發達國家的股票市場，但欠發達的國家市場也取得很大的進展，其中在2004年占總市值得14%。股票市場提升企業的效率，鼓勵創新，是提供資金的長期經濟發展的重要來源。他們還使各國政府通過提高國有企業銷售資金的有效機制。此外，股票市場的投資構成是個人資產的重要組成部分，特別是各國政府轉向私營部門的養老金制度。總之，很顯然的，股票構成在世界經濟中是一個日益重要的資本市場。不過，我們目前所知甚少，對于政府如何選擇政策和政治體制是由股票投資者決定的。對股市和一些現實政治的分析往往集中在一個或兩個發達國家，那是某一特定市場部門內部的變化，而不是在更廣泛的范圍內國家一級市場因素決定的結果。例如，在美國和英國DavidLeblang和BumbaMukherjee考慮到政府的黨派和選舉對股市影響的結果。在更廣泛的研究中，菲奧娜麥克基利夫雷（2003）認為，先進的民主國家選舉機構黨派變化對股市的影響。然而，她的分析在很大程度上基于行業水平的變化，她認為政治群體的變化，改變了投資者對哪些行業受益于公共政策的預期。事實上，麥克基利夫雷很感興趣，作為對決定政治經濟行為者的期望的結果沒有比股票本身的市場效果大。同樣的，在一些先進的民主國家的正常政治上，威廉和大衛考慮到政治的影響和市場的行為是不穩定的。不同于大多數分析的結果，他們認為是在多個資產市場的，包括貨幣，股票和政府債券市場。然而，Bernhard和Leblang旨在探討的是政治事件，如選舉和內閣離散的后果，，而不是更廣泛的評估資本市場公共政策和機構影響的結果。在國家政府的政策和機構中，本文旨在探討金融全球化的文獻與完善股票的市場的成果之間的聯系。它的貢獻是理論和實證兩個方面。從理論上講，我們詳細說明股票的市場對政治的表現，特別是側重于股市估值對政府政策和體制的影響。我們依靠豐富的文獻對外國直接投資和主權債券市場的比較，強調了股票的市場