股票期權激勵外文翻譯文獻股票期權激勵外文翻譯文獻(文檔含中英文對照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：SOEExecs:GetReadyForStockIncentivesTANWEIStockoptionincentiveplanwillsoonbeavailabletostate-ownedenterpriseexecutives,butwillitleadtogreaterprosperityornewproblems?Atrailblazingnewschemetoinfusestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)withincentivestockoptionsisunderway.It’saplanthatmaybolstercompanyperformance,butit’snotwithoutrisks.OnAugust15,LiRongrong,MinisteroftheState-ownedAssetsSupervisionandAdministrationCommission(SASAC),disclosedthataftercarefulstudy,astockoptionincentivetrialplanwillbecarriedoutinthelistedSOEs.Accordingtothetrialplan,about102A-sharelistedSOEsareexpectedtobethetrialcompanies.Theshortlistofsomeofthoseexpectingtoparticipateincludes:ChinaUnicom,CiticGroup,KweichowMoutai,ChinaMerchantsBankandBeijingFinancialStreetHoldingCo.Stockoptionincentiveplanisdesignedtoenticeexecutivestoworkhardforthelong-termdevelopmentoftheircompanies.Asstocksrisebasedoncompanyperformance,theytoogainthroughthisprofitsharingarrangement.Thiskindofincentiveplanispopularinforeigncountries,especiallyintheUnitedStates,wherestockoptionscanaccountforashighas70percentofaCEO’sincome.Further,manyeconomistsbelievethestockoptionincentiveplanoptimizescorporategovernancestructure,improvemanagementefficiencyandenhancecorporatecompetitiveness.Ontheotherhand,aftertheMeasuresontheAdministrationofStockIncentivePlansofListedCompanieswasissuedearlythisyear,someofthecompaniesturnedouttohavemisusedtheincentivestockoptions.Theresultwasinsiderdealings,performancemanipulationaswellasamanipulationofthecompanystockprice.“Althoughthestockoptionincentiveschemeisafrequentlyusedtooltoencouragetopmanagement,itcouldalsobeadouble-edgedswordespeciallyinanimmaturemarketeconomy,”Lisaid.TheSASACisthereforetakingacautiousapproach,placingexplicitrequirementsoncorporategovernance,thetargetandextentoftheincentivemeasures,Liadded.Listatedthattheoverseas-listedSOEswouldbethefirstfewcompaniesthatwillimplementthemechanismbecauseoftheirsoundmanagementstructureandlaw-abidingnature.ThenthedomesticlistedSOEswillhavethechancetoembraceincentivestockoptions,whichwouldbepromotedifthetrialresultsweregood.Executiveface-liftAsformorethan900listedSOEs,thepersonnelstructureoftheboardsofdirectorswillprobablyfacesubstantialchange.That’sbecausetheplanstatesthatifthestockoptionincentivemechanismisgoingtobeimplementedinlistedSOEs,externaldirectorsshouldaccountforhalfoftheboardofdirectors.Thetrialplanintroducedtheconceptofexternaldirectorsforthefirsttime.TheexternaldirectorshouldbelegallyrecommendedbydirectorsoflistedSOEs,andshouldnotbeworkinginthelistedSOEsorinaholdingcompany,saidtheplan.However,currently,mostofboardsofdirectorsoflistedSOEsarenotincompliancewiththerequirement.Theyhavetoreadjustthestructureofboardofdirectorstofitinwiththenewmechanism.“FormostoftheSOEswhicharelistedintheA-sharemarket,theirboardsofdirectorsaremadeupofnon-externaldirectorsandindependentdirectors,whichmeansthatapartfromindependentdirectors,membersofboardofdirectorsareallworkingforthelistedcompanyorforthelargeshareholder,”saidZhuYongmin,aneconomistwiththeCentralUniversityofFinanceandEconomics.“Ifthestockoptionincentivemechanismistobecarriedoutinthosecompanies,alarge-scalerestructuringofboardofdirectorsisunavoidableandexternaldirectorsmustbeintroducedintotheboard.”ChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC)stipulatesthatanindependentdirectorisonewhodoesn’tholdanotherofficebeyondhisjobasadirector,andhasnosuchrelationswithmajorshareholderthatwouldinterferewiththeexerciseofindependentandobjectivejudgment.“Currently,theindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniescanbecategorizedasexternaldirectors,”Zhusaid.“However,thedefinitionofexternaldirectorismuchbroaderthanindependentdirector.Thosewhoworkforacompanywhichhasbusinesstieswithalistedcompany,thoughtheydonotmeettherequirementsofbeinganindependentdirector,butcanbeconsideredanexternaldirector.”Additionally,thetrialplanalsostipulatesthatthesalarycommitteeoflistedSOEsthatexercisethestockoptionincentivemechanismshouldbecomposedofexternaldirectors.However,formostofthelistedcompanies,therearestillnon-externaldirectors.Asaresult,aconsiderablenumberoflistedSOEsneedtotransformtheirsalarycommitteetofulfilltheprerequisitesofthestockoptionincentivemechanism.Avoidingover-compensationOver-compensationissomethingthatthetrialstockplanistryingtoavoidaswell.Therefore,thetrialplanstatesthatdomesticlistedSOEs’executivesshouldreceivenomorethan30percentoftheirtotalsalary(includingoptionsanddividends).Butasfortheoverseas-listedSOEs,themaximumincentiveis40percentofthetargetsalary.Thetrialplanalsofixesthevolumeofincentivestockoptions.Thetrialplanstatesthatthevolumeofincentivestockoptionsshouldbefixedinaccordancewiththescaleofthelistedcompanyandthenumberofincentiveobjectives.Thenumberofshareallocatedmaynotexceed10percentofthecompany’stotalsharecapitalandnolessthan0.1percent.Infact,BeijingReviewwasinformedbytheCSRCthatsome20listedSOEsalsobeganexploringstockoptionincentiveschemesinthefirsthalfofthisyear.ButnoneofthemreceivedapprovalfromtheCSRCbecausetheirschemesrevealedsharpcontrastwiththetrialplanintermsofthescaleofincentivestockoptionsoffered.Results-orientedUnderthetrialplan,betterperformanceisamusttoobtainstockprivileges.ThenumberofincentivestockoptionsthatseniorexecutivesinlistedSOEscangetdependsontheirannualperformance.Iftheycannotfulfillthetargetedobjectives,thelistedcompanymayhavetherighttotakebacktheincentivethestockoptionsorpurchasethembackatthepriceatwhichtheyweresoldtotheexecutives.ZhuYongminnotedthatthestockoptionincentiveplanisnotinvariable.Thedirectorsoflistedcompanies,seniorexecutives,andcoretechnologicalandmanagementpersonnelmaynotgetthetargetstockoptionsiftheyfailtoachieveasatisfactoryperformance.NofreebiesForsure,statestockswon’tbegiventoexecutivesforfree,underthetrialplan.“Thestatestockshaveprices,”Zhengsaid.“Iftheywerepaidtoseniorexecutivesforfreeinthenameofincentivestocks,itisequaltoalossofstateassets.Toelaborate,theincentivestocksshouldbetheincrementofstocksthatareearnedbytheexecutivesforlistedSOEsaftertheimplementationofthetrialplan,andshouldnotbepreviousstockinventory.Inshort,thepastispast.Onlyfuturestockincreasescanbeusedasincentivestocks.”Further,“TheincentivestocksshouldnotbepaidonlybytheSASAC,whichisthelargestshareholderofallthecentralSOEs,”saidZhengPeimin,ChairmanofShanghaiRealizeInvestmentConsultingCo.,whotookpartindraftingthetrialplan,.“Theincentiveplanshouldbeajointactionofallshareholdersofacompanyandtheyshouldshoulderthesameresponsibilityandenjoyequalbenefit.”Already,shareholderspayforsalariesofdirectors,seniorexecutivesandtechnologymanagementstaff.“Theincentivestocksshouldalsobepaidbyallshareholders.”Zhengsaid.“Forinstance,ifthegovernment,orastateownedenterprise,holds60percentofalistedSOE,theyshouldonlypay60percentoftheincentivestocksand40percentshouldbepaidbyothershareholders.”譯文：國有企業高管：準備迎接股權激勵計劃譚衛股票期權激勵計劃將很快應用于國有企業管理人員，但這會帶來更大的繁榮，還是新的問題？一個開創性的計劃正被引入——國有企業正在實施股票期權激勵計劃，它可能會增強公司業績，但它并非沒有風險。8月15日，國資委部長李蓉蓉透露，經過仔細研究，股票期權激勵計劃將要在上市國有企業試行。根據計劃，約有102家A股上市國有企業將要參與此計劃，包括：中國聯通，中信集團，貴州茅臺，中國招商銀行和北京金融街控股股份有限公司。期權激勵計劃致力于吸引企業管理人員專注于他們公司的長遠發展。由于股票價格是在公司業績提高的基礎上上升的，他們也通過此來做工作安排。這種激勵計劃在國外很受歡迎，特別是在美國，那里的股票期權可以占到首席執行官的收入的高達百分之七十之多。此外，許多經濟學家認為，股??票期權激勵計劃有助于優化公司治理結構，提高管理效率，增強公司的競爭力。另一方面，在實施上市公司股權激勵計劃管理的初期，竟然發現一些公司誤用激勵股票期權。其結果導致內幕交易，惡意操縱該公司的股票價格?！半m然股票期權激勵計劃是一個經常使用的工具，但是它亦可以被稱為一把雙刃劍，尤其是在一個不成熟的市場經濟體制之下?！崩钊厝卣f。因此，國資委采取謹慎的態度，對于實施股權激勵計劃的企業，在企業管治，目標和獎懲措施的范圍等方面提出了明確的要求，李蓉蓉補充說。李指出，因為海外上市的國有企業有可靠的管理體制和健全的法律機制，所以他們將是為數不多的幾家將實現此股權激勵機制的公司，這一現象也遵從了自然規律。其后，如果他們的試行被證明是有效地，在國內上市的國有企業將有機會實施期權激勵。整頓管理層對于上市的900多個國有企業，董事局的人員結構可能將要面臨實質的變化。這是因為該計劃規定，如果上市公司預期實施期權激勵機制，外部董事應當占上市國有企業董事會全部董事人數的一半。在該次計劃的試行中，首次引入了外部董事這一概念。該計劃規定，外部董事應當由上市國有企業的董事通過合法程序推薦，而不應在上市國有企業或控股公司工作。但是目前，大多數上市國有企業的董事會并不符合規定。他們必須重新調整董事會結構，以適應新的機制要求。“對于大多數在A股市場上市的國有企業，其董事會都是由非外部董事和獨立董事組成，這意味著，除了獨立董事，董事會成員都為上市公司工作，并且持股比例很大。”中央財經大學的經濟學家朱永敏說?！叭绻善逼跈嗉顧C制在這些公司中實施，大規模改組董事會是不可避免的，外部董事必須加入其中。”中國證券監督管理委員會（證監會）規定，獨立董事是指，不在上市公司擔任除董事外的其他職務，并與其所受聘的上市公司及其主要股東不存在可能妨礙其進行獨立客觀判斷關系的董事。“目前，上市公司的獨立董事可歸類為外部董事，”朱永敏說，“然而，外部董事的定義比獨立董事更廣泛。有些董事為某其他公司工作，而且此公司與上市公司存在業務聯系，雖然他們不符合