TrumpTariffs:Economicand

marketimplicationsEconomicsandMacroStrategy

DBSGroupResearch

03-04-2025

TrumpTariffs:Economicandmarketimplications

2

US

Onlyamegamarket

meltdownand

House/Senate

RepublicanrevoltcouldchangeTrump’smind

UStariffhistory

Averagerateon

Averagerateonall

dutiableimports

imports

1890s

(McKinley)

1930

50%

20%

(Hawley-

Smoot)

60%

20%

2018-19

(Trump)

10%

3%

2025

(Trump)

10-60%

20%+

Source:TaxFoundation,DBS

Trump’s“Liberation”Day

Unlikeanyotherday

10%baselinetariff.

Theseareacross-the-boardleviesonallimports,effectiveApril5.

“Discountedreciprocaltariff”ThehigherratesarefornationstheWhiteHouseconsidersbadactorsontrade.Japan:24%,EU:20%,

China:54%(34%plus20%alreadylevied)

Theaboveareinlieuoftheuniversal10%tariff,effectiveApril9

CanadaandMexicoareexcludedfromthereciprocaltariffregime.Theyarestillsubjecttoplanstoimpose25%tariffsonmostimports.

3

Autotariffswilltakeeffecttonight.25%tariffsonallforeign-madeautosasofmidnight.

Chinahasreciprocaltariffsandpasttariffs.Addsuptoover60%

Regionaldispersion

Endofre-shoring?

Tariffsandvulerabilities

ShareofexportstotheUS

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

T

aiwan

Vie

tnam

Japan

Th

ailand

SKorea

India

China

Ph

ilippines

Malay

●

Insia

●

donesia

Sing

●

apore

HKSAR

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

Reciprocalrates

4

Source:CEIC,DBS

Managingthecomingcrisis

Top-of-mindforaCFO

InvestmentPortfolioTriage.Portfolioimpact,manageliquidity,andhedgeexposureswherepossibleagainstmarketvolatility

RapidEconomicImpactAssessment

Underwriting&ExposureReview.Tradecredit,marinecargo,potentiallypoliticalrisk,D&Oforhighlyimpactedindustries

StakeholderCommunication.Board,regulators,especiallyMAS,keyclients/brokers,andinternalteams

CapitalAdequacyCheck.Re-runsolvencycalculationsbasedonimmediatemarketmovementsandpotentialfuturestressscenariosrelatedtothenewtariffs.Confirmcapitalbuffersremainsufficient.

ScenarioPlanningUpdate

5

MonitorCounterpartyRisk

US

Forcingothercountriestoappreciatetheir

currenciesorstopusingtheUSDwillopena

massivecanof

economicandfinancialworms

FourinconsistenciesofTrump’smodel

Brewingmacrorisks

Can’thavethefollowingsimultaneously:

?Immigrationtighteningandalowercostofliving

?Taxcutsandlowerfiscaldeficit

?Tariffsandcompetitiveness

6

?WeakerUSDandlowerinterestrates

Threatsfromtradewar

Autosectorvulnerabilities

US:Top10sourcesofpassengarcarimports(2024)

1

Mexico

USDbn

48.4

%share

22.7

2

Japan

39.9

18.7

3

SouthKorea

37.4

17.5

4

Canada

27.6

12.9

5

Germany

25.3

11.9

6

UK

9.7

4.5

7

Slovakia

6.3

2.9

8

Italy

3.9

1.8

9

Sweden

3.9

1.8

10

China

Worldtotal

2.6

213.6

1.2

100

7

Sources:USCensusBureau,DBS

Threatsfromtradewar

Semiconductorsectorvulnerabilities

US:Top10sourcesofsemiconductorimports(2024)

1

Malaysia

USDbn

16.2

%share

19.8

2

Taiwan

15.5

19.0

3

Vietnam

8.8

10.7

4

SouthKorea

8.5

10.4

5

Thailand

5.2

6.3

6

Israel

4.7

5.7

7

Mexico

2.8

3.4

8

China

2.6

3.2

9

Japan

2.5

3.0

10

Ireland

Worldtotal

2.2

81.9

2.6

100

8

Sources:USCensusBureau,DBS

Threatsfromtradewar

Pharmaceuticalsectorvulnerabilities

US:Top10sourcesofpharmaceuticalimports(2024)

1

Ireland

USDbn

73.4

%share

29.7

2

Switzerland

21.8

8.8

3

Singapore

19.3

7.8

4

Germany

17.3

7.0

5

India

13.1

5.3

6

Belgium

12.8

5.2

7

Italy

12.2

4.9

8

China

9.2

3.7

9

Japan

7.5

3.0

10

UK

Worldtotal

7.4

246.8

3.0

100

9

Sources:USCensusBureau,DBS

Firmlevel

impact

Profit,marketshare,solvencyChallengesgalore

Spreadcostacrossthesupplychain,allthewaytothecustomer

10

AccepthittomarginsandprofitabilitySolvencyconsiderations

Economy

levelimpact

RiskstoGDPgrowth

Retaliationscouldmakeitworse;deal-makingcouldmakeitbetter

Growth,yoy

2025

forecast

Riskto

forecast

China

5.0%

-0.5%

HongKongSAR

2.5%

-0.5%

India

6.5%

-0.4%

Indonesia

5.0%

-0.5%

Malaysia

4.8%

-1.0%

Philippines

5.8%

-0.3%

Singapore

2.8%

-0.4%

SouthKorea

1.7%

-0.7%

Taiwan

3.0%

-1.8%

Thailand

2.6%

-1.5%

Vietnam

6.8%

-2.0%

Eurozone

1.0%

-0.3%

Japan

0.9%

-0.3%

UnitedStates

2.0%

-0.5%

11

TrumpTariffs:Economicandmarketimplications

12

13

Chinaand

HongKong

Tradevis-à-vistheUS(12mmovingtotal)

(USDbn)

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

ExportsImports

Trump1.0Biden

459

Tradebalance

620

526

402

390

362

312

161

181165

0

Feb-15Feb-17Feb-19Feb-21Feb-23Feb-25Source:CEIC.DBS

Total

Exports

Imports

Tradebalance

Trump1.0

1,793(USDbn)

572(USDbn)

1,222(USDbn)

Biden

2,188(USDbn)

688(USDbn)

1,501(USDbn)

Changes

+22%

+20%

+23%

Impactassessmentoftradewar

Additionaltariff

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

54%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Averagetariff

21%

31%

41%

51%

61%

65%

71%

81%

91%

101%

111%

OriginalaverageUStariffon

Chineseexports,2024

11%

ChinaexportstotheUS,2025

3,

887(CNYb

n)

Chinatotal

exports,2025

26

,623(CNYb

n)

ShareofChinaexportstotheUS,2024

14.6%

IncrementalUStariffimpactonChinatotal

exportsvalue

-1.02%

-2.04%

-3.07%

-4.09%

-5.11%

-5.52%

-6.13%

-7.15%

-8.18%

-9.20%

-10.22%

IncrementalUStariffimpactonChinarealGDPgrowth

-0.25%

-0.46%

-0.66%

-0.86%

-1.07%

-1.15%

-1.27%

-1.47%

-1.68%

-1.88%

-2.08%

Source:DBS

14

TariffimpactonChinaindustries

Chinaand

HongKong

Electronicsandmachinerycontributeto42%oftotalexportstoUS

Averagetariffincreasesfrom13%in2023to54%aftertheadditionaltariff

ChinaexportstoUSbyproducts(%)

Electrical

Others,

26.0

Machinery

,24.0

Automotive,3.9

Nuclear

Reactors,

Boilers,

Machinery

,17.6

Textilesand

clothing,9.4

Furniture,6.0

Chemical,

3.4Plastics,Toys,5.14.5

Source:CEIC,DBS

USimportvaluefrom

USaveragetariffonChinaimports(%)Chb2)23

Afteruniversaltariffof20%and34%2024avergetariffrate

Electronics&elect.machinery MachineryMiscellaneous

ToysandsportsequipmentTextilesandclothingMetals

PlasticsandrubberChemicals

Transportationequipment

Footwear Stoneandglass Woodproducts HideandskinsPreparedfoodstuffs

63.4

65.369.1

55.5

73.872.670.6

64.3

77.9

66.9

71.8

70.2

92.7

78.271.1

68.2

57.7

73.9

119.9

81.4

39.4

31.6

26.9

22.3

20.7

20.5

16.6

13.1

6.9

6.7

3.1

2.5

2.1

1.4

0.4

0.2

VegetableAnimalMineral

Source:PIIE,DBS

products

products

productsFuel

15

ManageableimpactonHK

Chinaand

Localmanufacturedgoodsonlycontributeto1.3%ofHKtotalexportsin2024,ofwhich10.2%goestoUS.Thismeansitrepresentsonly0.13%ofHKtotal

HongKong

ShareofHongKongmanufacturedgoods

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

exports(%)

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

HKgoodstoChinaHKgoodstoUS

exports

Re-exportsviaHK

35.4

betweenChina-USdropsfrom10.6%in2014to

Locallymanufacturedgoodsexportscontributeonly1.3%oftotalexportsin2024

5.7%in2024

10.6

HK’sshareoftotaltradeoftheUSdropsfrom8.7%in2017to5.3%in2024vstoChinaaccountsfor50.9%asof2024

Feb-15Oct-16Jun-18Feb-20Oct-21Jun-23Feb-25Source:C&SD,DBS

Shareoftotaltradebydestination(%)

USAASEAN

EUMiddleEast

China(RHS)

13.9

51.0

5.2

5.2

1.9

Re-exportthroughHongKong(%)

FromUStoChina

2.4

8.2

2.3

3.0

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

55

50

45

40

35

30

FromChinatoUS

Feb-13Feb-16Feb-19Feb-22Feb-25Source:CEIC,DBS

Feb-15Feb-17Feb-19Feb-21Feb-23Feb-25Source:C&SD,CEIC,DBS

TaiwanThreatsfromreciprocaltariff

Asia:ExportstoUS/NominalGDP(2024)%

30

25.1

25

20

14.4

15

10.410.39.4

107.96.8

53.52.82.62.01.90

VNTWTHMYHKSGSKJPCNPHINIDSources:CEIC,DBS

Asia:Reciprocaltariffrates

%

01020304050

46

36

34

32

32

26

25

24

24

17

10

Sources:Reuters,DBS

VN

TH

CN

ID

TW

IN

SK

JP

MY

PH

SG

Asia:ReciprocaltariffratesandexportexposuretotheUS

Reciprocaltariff(%)

50

VN

TH

CN

40

TW

SK

JP

ID30

IN

MY

20

PH

SG

10

0

5

10

15

0

Sources:Reuters,CEIC,DBS

16

202530ExportstoUS/GDP(%,2024)

17

Taiwan

Possiblepolicyresponse

Japan

SouthKorea

Taiwan

IncreasingimportsfromUS

Increasing

manufacturing

investmentinUS

Fiscalstimulus

Monetaryeasing

India

?Indiawasmentionedasoneofthecountriesatriskin

Trump’s‘FairandReciprocalPlan’

?UStradedeficitwithIndiadoubledbetween2015and2024.USisakeytrading

partner.

?Topsectorsrangingfrom

iron&steel,pharma,

electronics,chemicalsandpreciousstonesfaceatariffgapof5%to22%(average~9%).

?Indialoweredsector-specificimporttariffsinthe

February’sbudget.

Note:Thesearenotbilateraltariffratesfromcountryaverages

18

India

~54%

?USannounced26%reciprocaltariffonIndia.Thisis2xofthetariffdifferential

?Suggestsoutsizedroleofnon-tariffbarriers

?BTAfirstphasebyfallof2025;keepsthedooropenfora

reassessment

?Exclusionofpharmaand

semiconductorsisnetpositive(fornow)

?Competitiveadvantageastariffonothersishigher

?Impactislikelytobe0.3-0.5%

19

Note:Thesearenotbilateraltariffratesfromcountryaverages

20

Inarelativelybetterposition,butexposedtoglobalslowdown

Singapore

Singaporeissettobe

KeyUSgoodsimportsfromSingaporein2024

lowestamongASEAN-6peers

ThetariffsincreaseonSingaporeispartly

mitigatedbytheUS-SingaporeFreeTradeAgreement

Singapore’sgoods

exportsexposuretotheUSissmallerthanotherASEAN-6peers,butisstillamongstitstop5

subjectedtoUSbaselinetariffrateof10%,the

Categories

%ofSingapore's

GDP

%oftotalUS

importsfrom

Singapore

Pharmaceuticalpreparations

3.5

45

U.S.goodsreturned,andreimports

0.7

9

Otherfoods

0.5

6

Medicinalequipment

0.5

6

Industrialmachines,other

0.4

6

Petroleumproducts,other

0.4

5

Semiconductors

0.3

4

Cellphonesandotherhouseholdgoods,n.e.c.

0.3

4

Electricapparatus

0.1

2

Chemicals-other,n.e.c.

0.1

1

Otherproducts

1.1

14

goodsexports

Source:UScensusbureau,CEIC,DBS

destinationin2024

Indonesia

?IndonesiawasUS’s15th

largesttradedeficitcountryin2024.

?USannounced32%reciprocaltariffonIndonesia

Directgrowthimpact(postreciprocal

tariffs)-DBSestimates

?SurprisingasIndonesiahasamorebalancedtariffstructurewiththeUS,withpositiveandnegativedifferentials.

Countries

Growthimpact

Indonesia

MalaysiaPhilippines

SingaporeThailandVietnam

?ApotentialflashpointcouldbeIndonesia'sstrong

investment/tradelinkageswithChina

?Growthimpactismore

Source:CEIC,WITS,UScensusbureau,

DBSNote:Red=Highimpact;

Green=Negligibleimpact;Yellow=Lowimpact;Orange=Mediumimpact;

notableafterhigherreciprocaltariffs

21

Assessedbasedonrelativeranking

ASEAN-6

WhileASEAN-6wasnotexplicitlymentionedintheUS’s‘‘Fairand

ReciprocalPlan’,itis

amongstthehardesthit

Vietnam,Thailand,

Malaysia,andIndonesiawereamongsttheUS’stop15tradedeficit

partnersin2024

VietnamandThailandhavethehighestgoodsexportsexposuretotheUS

Theregionwillbenegativelyhit,withgreaterimpactonVietnam,Thailand,Malaysia

TheregionishitrelativelyhardbyUStariffs

Directgrowthimpact(postreciprocaltariffs)-DBSestimates

Countries

Growthimpact

Indonesia

MalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeThailand

Vietnam

Source:CEIC,WITS,UScensusbureau,

DBSNote:Red=Highimpact;

Green=Negligibleimpact;Yellow=Lowimpact;Orange=Mediumimpact;

22

Assessedbasedonrelativeranking

23

Financialmarkets

24

Outlook

Arangeofwhichwideimplications.

USPolicyImpact-EngineeredStagflation

policiesranging

Rates

Growth

Inflation

Tariffs

TaxCuts

Itlookslikestagflation-liteforawhileastariffbites.

DOGE

Policies

Immigration

Energy

25

TariffUseCases

Takeaway

TherearemultipleusecasesfortariffsfromTrump’spointofview.

Butifrevenueisimportant,sometariffswillnotbenegotiatedaway

Tobringmanufacturingbacktothe

US

Asarevenuesource

~USD400bnintariffrevenues?

>Let’sseewhat

concessionswillbeofferedandwhowillretaliate

Asanegotiationtool

Tariffs

“TheFedwouldbeMUCHbetteroffCUTTINGRATESasU.S.Tariffsstartto

transition(ease!)theirway

intotheeconomy,”Trump

Tosafeguardkeyindustries

Engineeraslowdownsothatthe

Fedwouldcut

>3cutspricedinfortheyearasslowdownworriesgrow

Dispersedperformanceacrosstheglobe.

USexceptionalismhasfaded.

TurnaroundseeninJapan,GermanyandChina.

Tariffs

-WorriesabouthighinflationandslowergrowthintheUS.DepressedUSyields.5Y/30Ysteepening.

-Worriesaboutslowergrowth(limitedconcernsoninflation)intherestoftheworld.CurvesteepeningasAsiawillutilisemonetaryeasingandfiscalsupporttocushiontheshock.

YieldDivergence

Changein10YLCYGovernmentBondYieldsSinceStartof2025

bps

100

75

50

25

0

-25

-50

-75

-100

-125

-150

GER

JPY

CHF

SEK

NOK

GBP

NZD

AUD

CAD

USD

RUB

TRY

ZAR

COP

BRL

MXN

CNY

IDR

MYR

KRW

SGD

INR

THB

HKD

Asof3-Apr-25

G10OtherEMsAsia

*swapsusedforHKD

**5YusedforCOP

26

Source:Bloomberg,DBS

27

CGByields(%)

Medium-termflatteningvs.tacticalsteepening

Realborrowingcostsremainselevated

Loweronshoreratesonmonetaryeasing

Chinaand

HongKong

2Yand10YCGBbreachedresistanceof1.50%and1.80%levelsrespectively

(%)

2.6

2.4

2.2

2.0

1.8

1.6

1.4

1.2

1.0

2Y5Y10Y30Y

1.92

1.73

1.58

1.47

Apr-24Jul-24Oct-24Jan-25Apr-25Source:Bloomberg,DBS

Chinarealinterestrates(%)

(bps)

80

(%)

10

5

0

-5

-10

-15

CGBcurves(bps)

1YLPR-CPI1YLPR-PPI

10Y-2Y10Y-3Y

30Y-5Y30Y-10Y

5.3

3.8

70

60

50

40

33.726

18.818.4

30

20

Feb-21Feb-22Feb-23Feb-24Feb-25Source:Bloomberg,DBS

10

Apr-24Jul-24Oct-24Jan-25Apr-25Source:Bloomberg,DBS

28

Higheroffshorepremiumahead

Chinaand

Short-endCNHratesaresettoriseamidvolatileRMBexchangerates

Premiumoflong-end

HongKong

(%)

6

offshoreratescontinuetoriseamidweakRMB

5

4

3

2

1

0

CNHforwardimpliedyields(%)andUSD/CNY

USD/CNY(RHS)

6M

1M3M

CentralBankBillsissuance

7.34

7.29

7.20

2.602.60

2.00

Offshore-onshorespread

(CNHimpliedyieldsvsSHIBORs)andUSD/CNH

(bps)

USD/CNH(RHS)

1M

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

7.407.30

7.207.10

7.006.90

6.80

7.407.357.307.257.207.157.107.05

7.00

Dec-26

Apr-23Oct-23Apr-24Oct-24Apr-25Source:Bloomberg,DBS

Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26Jul-26

Source:Bloomberg,DBS

Takeaways

SequencingtheEvents

Retaliation(badforrisk)inimmediateterm.

Negotiations(potentiallygoodforrisk)nextweekaheadof9Aprildeadline.

"Justasripplesspreadoutwhenasinglepebbleisdroppedintowater,theactionsofindividualscanhavefar-reachingeffects."DalaiLama

Asiancurrenciesaremorevulnerabletohigherglobaltradetensions

Country-specificUSreciprocaltariffs

DevelopedMarketsAsiaexJapan

Switzerland31%China34%

EU20%Taiwan32%

Norway15%SouthKorea25%

UK10%Cambodia49%

Japan24%Laos48%

Australia10%Vietnam46%

NewZealand10%

BRICSnewmembers

Source:TheWhiteHouse

44%

Philippines

Singapore

India

Myanmar

Thailand

Indonesia

Malaysia

36%

32%

24%

17%

10%

26%

Performanceofcurrencies

2

%changevs.USD

1

0

-1

%changevs.USD-2

GBPCAD

Apr3vs.Mar7

EURCHFNZDJPYAUD

DevelopedMarkets

MYRVNDIDRTHB

INRPHPTWD

SGD

CNH

KRW

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

USallies

AsiaexJapan

ChinaPlusOne

Sources:DBSResearchandBloombergdata.Updated:3April2025

PBOCGovernor

PanGongsheng

assumedofficeinJuly2023

Discourage

one-way“sellCNY”bets

TightFixingRate

mostlyin7.10-7.20range

Moretolerancefor

USD/CNYtorisevs.Fixing

totheupperlimitof±2%band

ChinatomaintainstableUSD/CNYfornow

PBOChasacalibratedapproachtomaintainCNYstability

UStariffs10%20%

PBOCstartsbuying

govtbonds(CNY1trn)

7.407.307.207.107.006.906.806.70

6.60

—USD/CNY

—FixingRate

FirstFedcut(50bps)

PBOCbuys

CNY200bn

Temporary

NewPBOCGovernor

FinalFedhike

suspensionofCNYbondpurchases

ofgovtbonds

Forecasts1Q25

2Q25

3Q25

4Q25

DBSGR7.26

7.34

7.32

7.29

Consensus7.33

7.35

7.35

7.40

Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25

31

Sources:DBSResearch,Bloombergdataandconsensus.Lastupdated:3Apr2025

Sources:DBSResearchandBloombergdata.Updated:25Mar2025

Trump’stariffsaddresses“ChinaPlusOne”strategyintoSoutheastAsia

UStradedeficitwithChinaremainswide

USDbillion

Trump1.0JoeBiden

0

-100

-200

-300

-400

-500

161718192021222324

1100

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

China'stotaltradewithSEAsiaovertooktheUSandtheEU

USDbn,12Mrollingsum

EU

US

ASEAN

161718192021222324

ForeignMinister

VivianBalakrishnan

ParliamentaryaddressonthechangingworldorderonMarch3,2025

“Anewworldorderistakingshapeand

characterisedby

profoundunpredictability,instability,andvolatility.”

ANewWorldOrderistakingshape

Unipolarity

Multipolarity

Freetrade

Protectionism

Multilateralism

Unilateralism

Globalisation

Hypernationalism

Openness

Xenophobia

Optimism

Pessimism

33

34

ForeignMinister

VivianBalakrishnan

“Wemayberevertingtoatimewhentheworldis

dividedintoblocs

controlledbybigpowers.”

“Thepost-WW2rules-

basedinternationalorderthatbenefittedSingaporeisunderseriousstrain.”

Economic

fragmentation

Geostrategicupheaval

LawoftheJungle

Weakened

globalinstitutions

Retaliatorytariffs

Severelyeroded

Significantlyimpaired

leadtoglobaltradewar

?sovereignequality

theabilityto

Supplychains

?politicalindependence

?territorialintegrity

?collectivelyrespondtoglobalthreats

regionalize&bifurcate

e.g.WHO&pandemic

3leversweaponizedbyBigPowers

?tariffs

?financialsystems

?technology

Flashpoints

?NATO/Ukrainevs.Russia

?TaiwanStraits

?SouthChinaSeas

?safeguardthecommons

-WTO&freetrade

-UNResolutiononclimatechange

Scopeforcreditspreadstowidenasexuberanceistempered

IGcreditspreads:USvsEUvsAsiaex-Japan

%ann

2.001.801.601.401.201.000.800.600.400.20

0.00

AXJUSDcredit:IGUScredit:IG

EUcredit:IG

Apr

23

Jul

23

Jul

24

Oct

23

Oct

24

Jan

23

Jan

24

Jan

25

Apr

24

Source:Bloomberg,DBS

HYcreditspreads:USvsEUvsAsiaex-Japan

%ann

6.005.004.003.002.001.00

0.00

AXJUSDcredit:HYUScredit:HY

EUcredit:HY

Apr

23

Jul

23

Jul

24

Oct

23

Oct

24

Jan

23

Jan

24

Jan

25

Apr

24

Source:Bloomberg,DBS

Sources:DBSResearchandBloombergdata.Updated:25Mar2025

36

GENERALDISCLOSURE/DISCLAIMER(ForMacroeconomics,Currencies,InterestRates)

TheinformationhereinispublishedbyDBSBankLtdand/orDBSBank(HongKong)Limited(eachand/orcollectively,the“Company”).Itisbasedoninformationobtainedfromsourcesbelievedtobereliable,buttheCompanydoesnotmakeanyrepresentationorwarranty,expressorimplied,astoitsaccuracy,completeness,timelinessorcorrectnessforanyparticularpurpose.Opinionsexpressedaresubjecttochangewithoutnotice.Thisresearchispreparedforgeneralcirculation.Anyrecommendationcontainedhereindoesnothaveregardtothespecificinvestmentobjectives,financialsituationandtheparticularneedsofanyspecificaddressee.Theinformationhereinispublishedfortheinformationofaddresseesonlyandisnottobetakeninsubstitutionfortheexerciseofjudgementbyaddressees,whoshouldobtainseparatelegalorfinancialadvice.TheCompany,oranyofitsrelatedcompaniesoranyindividualsconnectedwiththegroupacceptsnoliabilityforanydirect,special,indirect,consequential,incidentaldamagesoranyotherlossordamagesofanykindarisingfromanyuseoftheinformationherein(includinganyerror,omissionormisstatementherein,negligentorotherwise)orfurthercommunicationthereof,eveniftheCompanyoranyotherpersonhasbeenadvisedofthepossibilitythereof.Theinformationhereinisnottobeconstruedasanofferorasolicitationofanoffertobuyorsellanysecurities,futures,optionsorotherfinancialinstrumentsortoprovideanyinvestmentadviceorservices.TheCompanyanditsassociates,theirdirectors,officersand/oremployeesmayhavepositionsorotherinterestsin,andmayeffecttransactionsinsecuritiesmentionedhereinandmayalsoperformorseektoperformbroking,investmentbankingandot