1、Why HAZOP?Historically, safe design of chemical plants based on:以前化工廠的安全設計工作基礎是以前化工廠的安全設計工作基礎是:Application of engineering design codes and standards 使用工程設計規范與標準。Wide experience and knowledge of professionals and experts involved in the design 依靠設計專家豐富的經驗與專業知識。Use of design tools and checklists 利用設計工

2、具和核對清單。Experience has shown that Safety in Design techniques are not enough:過去的經驗告訴我們所采用的安全設計手段還遠遠不能滿足要求：過去的經驗告訴我們所采用的安全設計手段還遠遠不能滿足要求：Evident by multiple catastrophes in the Chemical Industry 化工廠許多災難性事故很能說明問題。Increasing complexity of modern plants - highly integrated 現代化工廠變得越來越復雜 高度一體化。Traditional t

3、echniques are likely to miss design flaws 我們所采用的傳統設計手段很容易忽略設計上的缺陷。Design groups focus on individual equipment not as much emphasis on how the process functions as a whole設計人員都把注意力集中在單項設備上 - 而不是重點把握工藝的整體效能。Range of knowledge and experience of designers 設計人員的專業知識面和設計經驗問題。Flixborough, England - 1974 28

4、 died, 108 injured, losses 100M pound英國英國Flixborough- 1974年，年，28人死亡，人死亡， 108人受傷，損失一億英鎊。人受傷，損失一億英鎊。Amoco Chemical, New Castle - 1980 6 died, 20 injured, losses $40 million紐卡斯爾紐卡斯爾Amoco化工廠化工廠 - 1980年，年， 6人死亡，人死亡，20人受傷，損失人受傷，損失400萬美元。萬美元。Union Carbide, Bopal 1984 America 在印度在印度4000 died, 200,000 injure

5、dBopal的的Union Carbide廠廠 - 1984年年 4000人死亡，人死亡，20萬人受傷。萬人受傷。Marathon, Texas City - 1987HF release, 939 injured?, 3000 evacuated德克薩斯馬拉松廠德克薩斯馬拉松廠 - 1987年發生年發生HF泄露事件，泄露事件， 939人受傷，人受傷，3000人被疏散。人被疏散。Phillips Petroleum, Pasadena - 198923 died, 130 injured, losses $1.5 billionPasadena的菲力普石油化工廠的菲力普石油化工廠 - 1989

6、年年 23人死亡，人死亡，130人受傷，損失人受傷，損失15億美元。億美元。Arco, Channelview - 199017 diedChannelview的的Arco廠廠 - 1990年年 17人死亡。人死亡。Why Do Process Accidents Happen?為什么會發生工藝事件？為什么會發生工藝事件？Equipment failure設備故障。Design flaw設計缺陷。Incorrect operating conditions操作條件不正確。Unforeseen operating conditions不可預見的操作條件。Breakdown of hazard c

7、ontrols險情控制系統失靈。Human error人為因素。Events or Factors that Propagate Accidents造成事故發生的情況或者原因造成事故發生的情況或者原因Design errors (omission, commission)設計錯誤（設計漏項，試車）Incorrect diagnosis of situation對情況判斷不正確。Operating errors (omission, commission)操作錯誤（失誤，試車）。Alarm failures警報系統工作失靈。Shutdown system failures停機系統失靈。Ignit

8、ion sources點火源。Management system failures管理系統出現故障。Site-specific conditions特定的現場條件。lAlarms警報系統lSafety shutdown 安全停機系統lControl system response控制系統反饋lRelief valves/flare system泄漏閥 / 火炬系統lSecondary containment 事故預防二級外殼lFire protection systems 消防系統lOperator response 操作人員的反應lProcedures操作規程lTraining培訓lPrev

9、entive Maintenance 預防性維護保養工作lTesting檢測lInspection查驗lEmergency Response 緊急狀態反映系統lContingency planning 緊急事件處理預案How can we identify potential for an accident before it happens?我們如何才能在事故發生前查找到事故隱患？If we could identify problems, then we can prevent them!只要能查找到事故隱患，我們就能防止事故的發生！There are techniques辦法還是有.Du

10、ring the 1960s ICI developed Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies as a technique to identify problems that traditional design approaches were likely to miss.What is HAZOP?A structured/systematic examination of each part of a chemical process對化工工藝每個部分都進行有序的 / 系統化的檢驗。Using a series of “guide words”使

11、用一系列引導詞。Undertaken by an experienced multi-discipline team由經驗豐富、多種專業人員組成的小組來負責。Identify all possible deviations from design intent that can have undesirable consequences concerning safety, operability, or the environment.查找所有可能與設計目的的不符點，避免因此而在安全生產、可操作性或者環境方面帶來不良后果。HAZOPs have become more robust sinc

12、e it was developed by ICI.HAZOP方法自從由ICI研制出來后變得日益完善。HAZOPs are recognized world-wide by the Chemical Industry and Engineering and Construction Companies as a standard engineering practice to ensure integrity of the design and operation.HAZOP方法被全球范圍內的化工生產企業和設計施工公司普遍接受，被認為是能夠融合設計與生產需求的標準工程實踐措施。Numerous

13、 countries require HAZOP (process hazard analysis) for the Chemical Industry as a critical part of programs for preventing major chemical accidents.眾多國家在化工行業都需要HAZOP（工藝風險分析方法），他們運用這種方法主要是為了防止發生重大的化工企業生產事故。Benefits of HAZOP運用HAZOP分析方法所帶來的好處More complete awareness of hazards by providing a structured

14、and systematic examination of a process for hazards運用層次分明、系統化的檢驗方法來檢查工藝流程當中存在的風險事項，可以更全面地提高人們對危險的認識。Employee participation :員工的參與： - Gathers real input from team讓團隊成員真正地投入進來。 - Concerns are discussed and documented研究探討問題并作好文字記錄。 - Team is more informed on process hazards使團隊成員更清楚地了解工藝 流程中存在的危險事項。 - I

15、ncorporates multiple perspectives從多種角度來看待問題。Assists management in risk decisions:有助于管理層作出風險決策：- Can be used to develop effective strategy to reduce risks 運用這一方法有助于制定出有效的降低風險的方案。- Provides input on how to better manage risks 提供關于如何改進風險管理工作的信息。- Provides basis for determining if risks are acceptable 提

16、供決策依據，以確定風險是否屬于可接受范圍。Benefits of HAZOP Ultimate Outcomes應用HAZOP方法所能帶來的利益 - 最終結果Improved safety performance resulting in less risk to public, employees, assets, and the environment .提高安全生產水平，減少對公眾、雇員、財產以及環境造成的危害。Ensures compliance with laws and regulations確保生產行為符合法律、法規的要求。Minimizes business interrupt

17、ions最大程度地降低對經營工作造成的影響和干擾。Provides forum for identifying opportunities to improve reliability of operations, reduce upsets, and improve product quality.研究并發現機會，來提高生產操作的可靠性、減小各種負面影響、并提高產品質量。Improves relations with public and employees改善企業和公眾以及雇員之間的關系。Benefits of HAZOP For New Plants應用HAZOP方法給新建工廠帶來的好處

18、 Excellent tool for predicting hazards & incorporating prevention methods into design有利于及早預見險情并在設計階段將防范措施考慮進去。Increases the likelihood that the process will operate as intended有利于增加工藝流程按設計預期運轉的可能性。Results in smoother startup and less time required to achieve design capacity有利于平穩開工，縮短達產時間。Reduces

19、 costly late changes to design and after startup有利于節省因設計變更以及工廠開工后進行變更而造成的巨大投入。Provides sound information for development of operating procedures有利于提供編制運行規程所需的可靠資料。Provides a higher level of understanding of the process by all有利于使全體員工更好地理解工藝流程。Critical Success Factors For HAZOP成功應用HAZOP方法的關鍵因素Accurac

20、y of design drawings and other data used in the study分析過程中設計圖紙與其它數據資料的準確性。The technical skills and expertise of the team on the process工藝組工作人員的技術水平與專業知識。The ability of the team to use the approach as an aid to visualize possible deviations, causes, consequences, and relevant safeguards小組成員是否能夠很好地應用這

21、一方法，來幫助查找可能出現的任何偏差、成因、結果以及相關保障手段。The ability of a the team to maintain a sense practicality when assessing the seriousness of identified hazards and recommending corrective actions小組成員能否很好地應用這一方法，采取審慎而實際的工作態度，對查找到的危險隱患嚴重性進行評估，并提出正確的處理措施。Management commitment to the HAZOP process有利于使管理部門投入精力來研究HAZOP方

22、法。Preparation for a HAZOP應用HAZOP分析方法前的準備事項P&Ids - Focus of the HAZOP review must be accurateP&IDS - HAZOP方法的核心 - 必須準確可靠。Important information for HAZOP studies:進行HAZOP分析時應注意的重要事項：Physical and hazardous properties of chemicals, reactivity, instability, mixing hazards, MSDS, corrosive properti

23、es化學藥品、化學反應、不穩定性、混合性危險因素、MSDS、以及腐蝕性成分中的物理性能與危險特質。Process chemistry工藝過程的化學特性。Process description, material and energy balance, process limits工藝過程簡述、材料與能耗均衡情況、工藝流程的局限性。Equipment design information, materials of construction, and limits設備的設計資料、施工材料與其局限性。Plant layout or plot plans工廠平面布置或者土地使用規劃。Control

24、strategy/philosophy控制措施 / 方案。Preparation for a HAZOP應用HAZOP分析方法前的準備事項Important information for HAZOP studies:進行HAZOP分析時應注意的重要事項：Relief system design and design basis風險緩解系統設計與設計依據。Design basis and location of protective devices and safety equipment防護措施與安全設備的設計依據與布置。Ventilation system design通風系統設計。Ope

25、rating, maintenance, and safety procedures and policies操作、維修、安全生產規程與規定。Previous incident information, inspection reports, operating logs以往事故記錄資料、檢查報告以及生產日志。Team Membership for a HAZOP Study進行HAZOP分析的小組成員素質要求HAZOP Leader facilitates the review, ensures methodology is followed, helps team to stay focu

26、sed and achieve consensus. The leader must be independent of the process being reviewed.HAZOP分析小組組長 - 協調審核工作，確保分析方法得到應用，幫助小組成員集中精力、步調一致。選擇組長人選時，必須選擇與接受審核的工藝流程無關的人員。HAZOP Scribe Proficient in recording HAZOP studies and using HAZOP recording software. Aids leader in helping to bring team discussions

27、to a conclusion.HAZOP分析紀錄員 - 精通HAZOP錄入方法、與HAZOP軟件的應用知識。協助組長總結小組討論的結果。HAZOP team is a multi-discipline team representing core disciplines that support plant operationsHAZOP小組應由多種專業人員構成，他們能代表保證工廠運營所需的關鍵專業。HAZOP Team MembersHAZOP小組的成員素質要求Operations Representative Extensive hands-on experience in operat

28、ing the process being reviewed生產操作代表 - 具有在接受審核的工藝流程中豐富的一線生產經驗。Process/Chemical Engineer In depth knowledge of the process, process chemistry, and the chemical process unit operations工藝/化學工程師 - 精通有關工藝流程、工藝化學以及化工工藝裝置生產方面的知識。Design/Mechanical Engineer Extensive knowledge on the equipment physical desig

29、n and limits, materials of construction and current status of equipment設計 / 機械工程師 - 對設備物理性能設計與其局限性、施工材料和設備現狀了如指掌。Control/I&E Engineer/Technician Knowledge of control and safety systems design and control philosophies控制 / I&E工程師 / 技術員 - 了解控制與安全系統的設計與控制工作原理。HAZOP Team MembersHAZOP小組的成員素質要求Main

30、tenance Representative Extensive hands-on experience in maintaining the equipment, understanding of maintenance and mechanical integrity processes, and equipment maintenance history維修代表 - 具有豐富的設備維護一線工作經驗，了解維護與機械整體工藝知識，并了解設備的維修歷史。HSE representative (can be part-time) Sets tone for acceptable and unac

31、ceptable HSE performanceHSE代表-（可兼任）編制HSE驗收條件，決定哪些可以接受，哪些不可接受。Other Specialists Called in to answer technical questions related to equipment and their function, process chemistry, etc. Can be rotating equipment experts, electrical experts, research chemist, furnace experts, process safety expert, ven

32、dor experts for proprietary equipment其他專家 - 請來解答有關設備及其功能等方面的技術問題。可以是循環作業的設備專家、電氣專家、化學研究專家、煉爐專家、工藝安全生產專家以及專有設備供貨商派來的專家。HAZOP MechanicsHAZOP工作方法1. The P&ID to be reviewed is divided into NODES, based on design intent. 審核P&ID時應根據設計內容要求按章節進行。2. The HAZOP Team discusses the design intent of the n

33、ode, limits of process, process chemistry, and the equipment design HAZOP小組對各章節的設計內容、工藝局限性、工藝化工以及設備的設計等問題進行研究探討。3. The team takes a guide word/deviation and identifies all of the causes for the deviation. 小組按照引導詞 / 偏差，查找造成偏差的各類成因。4. The team then determines the consequences of each identified cause.

34、 If the consequence is serious, the team identifies applicable safeguards for the cause and/or consequence.小組隨后落實每個查找到的成因可能造成的結果。如果屬于嚴重結果，小組則應找出適當的安全保證措施，預防該成因及/或防止發生該結果。HAZOP Mechanics HAZOP工作方法5. If the team determines that the consequence is unacceptable and the safeguards are inadequate, then th

35、e team develops a recommendation to address the concern. Recommendations could be:如果小組認為結果不可接受，保證措施也不得力，那么，小組則應提出解決這一問題的建議方案。建議方案應包括以下內容：Modify the design修改設計。Address concern through procedures or other administrative controls通過各項規程或者行政控制手段來處理這一問題。Evaluate and determine solution for the problem分析并確定

36、解決問題的方法。6. Once the team finishes its analysis of all of the causes, it proceeds to the next guide word/deviation 小組完成了對所有成因的分析后，則繼續進行下一個引導詞 / 偏差的查找工作。HAZOP MechanicsHAZOP工作方法7. Once the team finishes examining all of the guide words, it starts reviewing the next node.小組結束對所有引導詞的檢查工作后，則應開始審核下一個章節的內容

37、。8. This process is followed until all of the process P&IDS have been reviewed 按照這一程序來完成對P&ID所有流程的審核工作。No Flow無流無流Instrumentation儀表儀表Corrosion/Erosion銹蝕銹蝕 / 腐蝕腐蝕Reverse Flow逆流逆流 Relief減壓減壓Equipment Siting設備定位設備定位More Flow流量過高流量過高Contamination污染污染Previous Incidents前次事故前次事故Less Flow流量不足流量不足Pro

38、perties of Chemicals化學成分化學成分Human Factors人為因素人為因素More Pressure壓力超量壓力超量Rupture/Leak斷裂斷裂 / 泄漏泄漏Safety安全安全Less Pressure壓力不足壓力不足Ignition點火點火Environment環境環境More Level 水位過高水位過高Service Failure服務故障服務故障Less Level水位過低水位過低Abnormal Operation非正常操作非正常操作More Temperature溫度偏高溫度偏高Sampling取樣取樣Less Temperature溫度偏低溫度偏低M

39、aintenance維護維護For each Guide Word/Deviation the team has a list of possible issues to help promote thought. Example:對每一組引導詞 / 偏差，小組都備有一份潛在問題清單，以協助工作人員發現問題。例如：More Flow流量過多流量過多Bypass valve open旁路閥開啟 - increased pumping capacity 增加泵壓能力 - operation of pumps in parallel 多臺泵同時運行 - reduced delivery head 減

40、弱揚程 - change in fluid density 改變液體濃度 - exchanger tube leaks交換管泄漏 - worn or deleted restriction orifice plates 限制孔板磨損或者被拆除 - cross connection of systems 截面連接系統 - control faults 控制缺陷 - control valve trim changed 控制閥邊沿改變 - control valve fails open 控制閥無法開啟 - burst pipe 爆裂管 - large leak 重大泄漏 - wrong valv

41、e open 閥門開啟錯誤 - fugitive emissions 揮發物排除 - slug flow廢渣流出Record Keeping記錄The study is recorded by the HAZOP scribe:分析工作由HAZOP記錄員負責記錄：Use of a software package specifically designed for efficient recording of HAZOP proceedings. This is in column format, listing causes, consequences, safeguards, and re

42、commendations運用專用軟件包，提高HAZOP過程的編入效率。該軟件以豎列格式，列有成因、結果、保證措施以及建議方案等內容。All team deliberations are recorded. 小組進行的所有談論結果都記錄在案。Each cause and significant consequence is brought to closure.每一個成因與重大結果都最終形成閉合。Team fully agrees with the documented HAZOP proceedings小組成員都認可HAZOP程序文件內容。Upon completion of a HAZOP

43、, the leader issues a HAZOP report一次HAZOP分析結束后，組長簽發一份HAZOP報告。Recommendation Resolution建議解決方案The report will contain recommendations that the management team must address and develop an action plan.報告中應提出建議方案，管理組必須審閱并據此編制出行動方案。An action plan identifies responsibility and schedule to take action on ea

44、ch recommendation and to document actions taken.每個行動方案都針對每個建議實施方案以及記錄程序明確崗位職責與工作進度。Open recommendations must be tracked to closure.沒有最終結論的建議方案必須進行跟蹤調查, 直至妥善處理完畢。Management Commitments管理層承諾1. HAZOPs are time consuming (1 P&ID/Day) Do not underestimate resource requirements for the HAZOP. 如果不了解HAZ

45、OP方法所需的資源配置，那么采用HAZOP方法則會很耗時（每天只能完成一個P&ID）。2. Make sure that you do not set conflicting priorities for HAZOP team members between the HAZOP and their existing job. Recognize the importance of HAZOP and give team members the capability to focus on the HAZOP. HAZOP小組成員在進行HAZOP分析與他們現有的工作之間，在工作次序安排上

46、，管理層應保證不出現沖突現象。應認識到HAZOP工作的重要性，讓小組成員能夠集中精力進行此項工作。3. Select the right team members for the HAZOP. The best people give the best results. The quality of the recommendations are dependent of the competency and expertise of the HAZOP team. 選擇好HAZOP小組的工作人選。人選好了就能獲得最好的工作結果。建議方案提的好與壞，就看HAZOP小組成員工作能力與專業知識如何

47、。Management Commitments管理層承諾4.Pay close attention to team burn-out. HAZOP is intense and people burn-out quickly. The efficiency and effectiveness of HAZOP teams decline rapidly after 4 hours/day of HAZOP. 應密切關注小組工作熱情的變化。HAZOP工作強度大，人們對此很容易喪失激情。每天進行HAZOP工作四個小時，會使HAZOP小組的工作效率與效果急劇下降。5.Be prepared to a

48、ddress a LOT of recommendations for improving safety, environment performance, and operability of the process. Do not underestimate resource requirements for addressing HAZOP recommendations. 時刻準備審閱一大堆旨在提高安全生產、改善環境、提高工藝工作效率的建議方案。切勿低估處理HAZOP建議方案所需的支持性資源配置。6.Be proactive and establish high priority fo

49、r completing HAZOP recommendations. Make sure there are no conflicting priorities. Reward/recognize people for their work on HAZOP items. Make sure safety recommendations on project HAZOPs are completed before startup of a project. 積極支持并高度重視完成HAZOP建議方案這項工作。保證不出現工作層次安排上的沖突。對HAZOP小組的工作應給予鼓勵 / 認可。保證在項目

50、啟動之前，通過HAZOP分析完成項目安全建議方案。Management Commitments管理層承諾Worst situations:最糟糕的情況：1. Not conducting the HAZOP because it is not a priority item ie resource demands too high - ESSO Longford Incident 2 people killed, irreputable damage to ESSO loss of asset 不進行HAZOP分析，因為這不是工作中的頭等大事 - 亦即資源配置要求太高 - ESSO Longf

51、ord事故 - 2人喪生，有損于 ESSO的聲譽 - 財產損失。2. Conducting HAZOP with an ineffective team - waste resources, and have to deal with a poor quality recommendations 進行HAZOP分析的工作小組效率低下 - 浪費資源，并且還得處理很對組織不力的建議方案。3. Conducting a HAZOP not placing priority on addressing recommendations Employees quickly see that safety

52、is not the first priority. Overall safety performance and attitude decline 進行了HAZOP分析工作 - 不重視審閱建議方案 - 員工很快發現安全問題并非頭等大事。總體安全生產水平與對安全生產的重視程度均下降。Case Study: Pasadena Plant LAO FireBP Pasadena Plant, owned and operated by Albemarle Corp. in 1992 at the time of the incident.BP在在Pasadena的工廠的工廠1992年事故發生時的場

53、年事故發生時的場景，當時該廠屬于景，當時該廠屬于Albemarle 公司并由該公司并由該公司運營。公司運營。(see notes for incident description)（詳見備注中的事故描（詳見備注中的事故描述內容）述內容）Case Study: Pasadena Plant LAO Fire個案分析： Pasadena工廠LAO車間火災 A HAZOP had not been performed on the process. 沒有對工藝流程進行過沒有對工藝流程進行過HAZOP分析。分析。 How could a HAZOP study of the process have

54、helped prevent the incident? 對工藝流程進行對工藝流程進行HAZOP分析，為何有助于預防發生該事故？分析，為何有助于預防發生該事故？1. HAZOP would have found that there was only one valve between a high pressure process and the low pressure system flush system. Misalignment or leaking valve could overpressure the low pressure flush system. 經過進行經過進行HA

55、ZOP分析，則可能會發現在高壓工藝系統與低壓系統沖洗系分析，則可能會發現在高壓工藝系統與低壓系統沖洗系統之間只有一個閘閥。閘閥安裝不當或者出現泄漏則會增加低壓沖洗系統統之間只有一個閘閥。閘閥安裝不當或者出現泄漏則會增加低壓沖洗系統的壓力。的壓力。2. HAZOP would have found that the low pressure flush system needed relief protection. 如果進行如果進行HAZOP分析，則可能會發現應在低壓沖洗系統里安裝減壓保護分析，則可能會發現應在低壓沖洗系統里安裝減壓保護裝置。裝置。Case Study: Pasadena Pl

56、ant LAO Fire個案分析： Pasadena工廠LAO車間火災 How could a HAZOP study of the process have helped prevent the incident?:對工藝流程進行對工藝流程進行HAZOP分析，為何有助于預防發生該事故？分析，為何有助于預防發生該事故？3. The high pressure ethylene feed line ran directly over the pumps containing pyrophoric chemicals. HAZOP would have identified the potential for ethylene decomposition if the line was exposed to fire. HAZOP would have identified a lack of ability to isolate the ethylene feed line 高壓乙烯進料生產線直接布置在裝有自燃化學物品的泵站上方。如果經高壓乙烯進料生產線直接布置在裝有自燃化學物品的泵站上方。如果經過過HAZOP分析，則可能會發現當該生產線與火接觸時可能會導致乙烯分析，則可能會發現當該生產線與火接